HISTORUM

Zen

THE ZEN OF HISTORUM

1.
Historum the quarterly journal consists of the best writing from the **Historum** web site, an English language history forum whose membership is composed of history aficionados from all corners of this event filled globe we call home.

2.
Now that this journal is a reality we leave it to Historians to look at this accident and prove that it was inevitable. [*that's an old joke*]

3.
We find agreeable these words of jurist Lewis Powell, "History balances the frustration of 'how far we have to go' with the satisfaction of 'how far we have come.' It teaches us tolerance for the human shortcomings and imperfections which are not uniquely of our generation, but of all time."

note
from the
publisher

Once again we bring you an issue jam packed with great articles. Interesting phrase that…jam packed. Why that tasty preserve should be packed with any distinction escapes me. It even makes one pause to wonder if jams travel in packs.

My dictionary gives these three definitions: *overfilled* or *compacted* or *concentrated.* On second thought the fruit product may not be related to packing at all. I remember grandma fussing about jaming one more item in a valise. *That* is the likely origin of jam packed. i.e. stuffed to the hilt. As it relates to this issue I'd like to think we have stuffed it to the hilt, everything you can't do without on your journey. Which is to say this issue is jam packed with items that are necessary baggage.
Bon Voyage.

p.s. How is your present baggage working out for you ?

Thanks
𝒫edro

Stuffed to the hilt?
Were did that come from?

With this issue
Historum the Journal of History has
filled up

1,001 *

pages

with our forums best writing.

We can truly say it is a reflection of our
members dedication
to things historical.

A tip of the hat to you all.

Thanks and keep on writing.
We look forward to a few thousand more
pages.

Keep up the good work
history buffs.

Onward to the past.

* that is two reams of paper with one sheet left over.

Writing the wrongs of history.

the wrong rites of history

WRONGING THE RIGHTS OF HISTORY

The Traditional Account

Buddhism first arose in India, based on the teachings of Siddharta Gautama (566–486 B.C.E.), the Buddha. Born as a prince, Siddharta abandoned his regal life and began a lifelong search for religious insight. After a period of intense meditation, he arrived at the core beliefs and practices of Buddhism and established a community of followers and disciples, including pre-Hindu monks and nuns, as well as laypeople. This community was responsible for propagating Siddharta's teachings after his death. In the centuries that followed, several forms of Buddhism took shape in India. The two largest of these schools of Buddhism are known today as Theravada Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism. As Buddhist missionaries traveled east, they spread the teachings throughout the rest of Asia. The style of Buddhism that became dominant in East Asia is Mahayana, and Zen is one of the many forms of Mahayana Buddhism that developed there.

According to traditional Zen accounts, the teachings of Zen are said to date back to this historical Buddha, who wordlessly transmitted them to Mahakashyapa, one of his most talented disciples. The tradition names a series of twenty-eight Indian patriarchs who passed the teachings on, beginning with the historical Buddha and Mahakashyapa and culminating with the patriarch Bodhidharma. In the fifth century, Bodhidharma traveled to China, where he took on Chinese disciples. From among these, Bodhidharma is said to have selected Hui-k'o to be his official successor. The tradition then traces its lineage through six generations of Chinese patriarchs, concluding with Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng.

After the sixth generation, the lineage of patriarchs branches into a large and ever-expanding family tree of teachers and disciples. All forms of Zen Buddhism existing today trace their origins back to the sixth patriarch, Bodhidharma, and the historical Buddha.

- by ZenBoyDodge -

How did Russian composer Dmitri SHOSTAKOVICH dissent though his music?

by John Paul

This essay examines how, in some of his music, Shostakovich dissented from Stalinist policies by setting old Jewish traditions against both classical and Soviet-reinvented musical traditions. Prominent Russian composer and arguably dissident Dmitri Shostakovich (1906-1975) is otherwise known by his musical motif "DSCH" (the notes D, E flat, C and B, represent the German spelling of "DSCH,"), witnessed the Russian Revolution and its brutality, while working under Stalin's regime. His music speaks more than he ever did during his life while labouring under State configured "Socialist realism"; "a teleological-oriented style of realistic art which has as its purpose the furtherance of the goals of socialism and communism"

(http://ietd.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstrea...hapter%202.pdf.)

Stalinists seized music for State propaganda, enforcing strict guidelines for Soviet arts and under their "socialist realism", music had to celebrate "Stalin's success and the Soviet people's happiness" in an oppressive and anti-Semitic culture (Shostakovich,1979, pp.156-8). Shostakovich's biography and Soviet politics influenced his musical production; during 1939-1945 Shostakovich experienced Nazi aggression including their assault on Jews, and the siege of Leningrad 1941-1944. The Soviets are accused of persecuting "anti-Soviet, undesirable Jewish culture", "hundreds of Jewish creative artists were persecuted and killed" (Stalin, Breaker of Nations, Conquest, R., 1993). Fear was a constant factor in Soviet life, the intensity of its effects varied from period to period and also between different segments of the populace. During the times of severely applied state terror in 1935-1939 and 1948-53, fear was generally felt across all social groupings, though with extreme intensity among the intelligentsia, particularly among certain "centres" within the intelligentsia, those in the main cities of Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev; "those old enough to have remembered significantly different conditions in earlier phases of Soviet history or pre-history (e.g., the senior generation of engineers and artistic intellectuals, and the Old Bolsheviks of Lenin's generation); those younger intelligenty in key contemporary posts in science and culture; and racial "aliens", viewed either as outsiders innately disposed to subversion or as potential scapegoats"

(http://www.siue.edu/~aho/musov/witness/wit.html).

Chamber music was Shostakovich's ideal opportunity to sympathise with Jews and subtly protest against contemporary Soviet Russia. He lamented Jewish sufferings but also said their [Jewish] music matched his own ideas of what music should be (Shostakovich, 1979, pp. 156–8). In dissent from Stalin, Shostakovich wrote a number of significant Symphonies and Chamber works including Jewish and Folk music instrumentation and beats. In essence; chamber "conversations" through music are traditionally intimate,communicative and diverse, with hidden messages for those able to spot them. Arguably, Shostakovich in his apparent dissent sometimes broke with established musical traditions, resisting contemporaneous Soviet didactics. In 1948, Shostakovich was denounced among other prominent Soviet composers for their "dissonant, atonal and decadent formalism" by Zhdanov and the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov (1896- 1948) was a Soviet politician instrumental in the cultural implementation of Soviet society in the Communist eastern bloc of Europe. Zhdanov demanded Soviet public music performances founded on foregoing traditions, but transcending them in a new epoch, free of bourgeois elements in a socialist Utopia (aka "Zhdanovism"). Artists who did not adhere to policy risked persecution and condemnation by the government. Any tensions transmitted through music were to finish with uplifting optimism, reflecting heroic Sovietism, effectively suppressing conventional "decadent" western cultural music "that had developed and thrived during the 18th and 19th centuries" when Chamber music was written for all, for string and wind instruments, sometimes combining the two, as well as music including the piano. In summary; formalistic, "decadent" traditional western music was banned under Soviet-invented traditions.

Traditional music evolves from continuous conventions, passed down through time and events, "[it is] the continuity of ideas expressed through repetition of procedures" (Krenek, 1962, p.27). Chamber music is traditionally tonal, harmonious, delineated music written for small, medium groups (ensembles) to play before small audiences in private chambers, rooms and halls. In such circumstances "a wonderful conversation between people with things to say" takes place and "many composers used chamber music to give us the truest portraits of themselves". Traditional classical chamber instruments "comprise the string quartet, the wind quintet (five wind instruments: flute, oboe, clarinet, bassoon, and French horn), the wind octet (eight wind instruments, two oboes, two clarinets, two bassoons and two French horns) and the piano trio (for piano, violin played with bow, and cello)". Shostakovich often followed these classical conventions as well as "socialist realism", but sometimes deviated from them, privately expressing non-verbal dissidence through his chamber music and biographical Quartets.

Traditionally, almost all classical instrumental music uses "sonata principle" in a key and constructed in three parts: the exposition (introduction) as two contrasting main melodies are introduced, secondly the development or ideas of the music, and finally the recapitulation as the ideas are restated. However, during String Quartet No. 2 (1944) and in apparent disorder: DSCH suggests a return to tune 1, but then presents tune 2, before ending with a daring return to tune 1. String Quartet No. 2 shows Shostakovich's maverick composition with deviations from classical structure and a harbinger for his later quartets. Judith Kuhn describes "allusions to Russian folk music. Shostakovich's Second Quartet was undoubtedly a loyal response to the 'Great Patriotic War. But what is interesting is the ethnic elements he uses for this music". Kuhn suggests Shostakovich's 'twist' on folk music was to make use of the inflections of the music of Eastern European Jewry, an ethnic group historically oppressed within Russia and Eastern Europe. 'Jewish' inflections, whether related to klezmer or to sacred sources, saturate the Second Quartet with their syncopated rhythms, 'oom-pa' accompaniments, ambivalent minor-mode dances, and 'oriental' augmented seconds" (Kuhn, J., Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.41).

Traditional classical music (Beethoven, Mozart) and popular music convention also use a time signature: four beats to the bar or measure. In Piano Trio No. 2 (1944) Shostakovich dissents with a frantic 2/2 beat and muted staccato chords picked out by all four musicians. A traditional string quartet consists of four movements, which Shostakovich sometimes observed. However, in other pieces he rejects western traditions and Stalinism in a list of Quartets: references to fright, danger, and lament seem to originate from Jewish folk music in Quartet No. 2, in A major for strings, OP. 68 (1944), his String Quartet No. 4 (1949) and especially his Quartet No. 5 (1951). He wrote one movement in Quartet No.8, and five movements (in Quartet No.3, 1946). Shostakovich accompanies his dissidence with his plaintive "DSCH" musical monogram (the notes D, E flat, C and B, represent the German spelling of "DSCH,") in his 3rd Quartet and 8th Quartet. His String Quartet No.3 can be considered a statement on the Great Patriotic War but also Shostakovich's personal and political reactions to persecution of the Jews and tragic events in Russia (Richard Taruskin, quoted in Whittall, 2003, p. 110).

Piano Trio No.2 (Shostakovich, four movements, in 2/2 time, 1944) is an elegiac (mournful) chamber work but includes a jovial Folk dance, with anguished tones and Jewish flavours (Shostakovich, Piano Trio No. 2 in e minor, Op. 67). Written in the summer of 1944 in the midst of WWII; the trio like many of Shostakovich's works reflects on the times, suggesting an elegy for the tragic victims of war in general. Shostakovich expresses tragedy following the death of his friend Sollertinsky, and the consequences of the Great Patriotic War, the Holocaust and the fate of millions of Jews came as German forces retreated in 1944. Written for violin, cello and piano, Piano Trio No. 2 has an eerie opening, followed by a frantic second scherzo movement and mournful passacaglia in the third. The fugue is tinged with melancholy. In the final, fourth movement, in dissent from the convention already discussed, the chords of the passacaglia combine with the eerie harmonics in a repeat of the opening and the work doesn't end with the uplifting finale to resolve its tensions , as demanded under socialist standards. In the finale, the trio becomes a klezmer band. Klezmer music: (klezmer music -- Encyclopedia Britannica) Piano Trio No. 2 dissents against socialist-realism through its use of Jewish Klezmer music, traditional for Jewish festivals and a genre largely eradicated by Nazis in Poland and suppressed in Russia. The piece contains frantic, inharmonious staccato and pizzicato (plucked) Jewish Klezmer music in the fourth movement, described as "nothing less than a gruesome dance of death; its quiet ending is the stillness of the mass grave" (Huth, 2005). Klezmer instruments include lead violin, clarinet or another violin, and cimbalom (a tuned percussion instrument played with hammers, not usually featured in chamber music), plus bass or cello and occasionally a flute.

Klezmer is also characterized by a "four-square" melody , traditionally played by male ensembles led by the first violinist. In Piano Trio No. 2 a lone violin indeed plays a uniquely elegiac Jewish tune, accompanied by a Germanic "umpah" style and a staccato rhythm, cocking a snook to both Germany and Stalin: "This is Klezmer, the wild music of Jewish celebration, here grotesquely metamorphosed into an image of sustained destructive power" (Philip, 2005). Let's not forget Soviet ideals that classical music had to be ethnically Russian, with classical foundations, but fit in with Soviet doctrine. Piano Trio No. 2 demonstrates that Shostakovich dissented from classical tradition and Soviet ideology with cloaked messages of resistance to those who would recognise their hidden meaning (Braun, 1985, p. 80). To summarise, Piano Trio No.2 dissents from socialist realism with its Jewish flavour and non-traditional instrumentation. In conclusion; Shostakovich reflected his life and dissent from Stalinism through non-verbal, dissident Chamber works containing mournful and political overtones. Shostakovich created a counter-tradition against socialist realism and out of his Jewish sympathies, boldly represented Jewish cultural tradition in the more private sphere of chamber music. His Piano Trio No.2 (1944) lies central to his dissidence but rests among notable, sorrowful and funereal Quartet and Symphonic works, as testimony to Shostakovich's personal and political turmoil and dissidence in Soviet Russia.

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Note: Links are not active. Cut and paste into browser.

The Appin Murder

by Chookie

The murder of Colin Ruadh Campbell of Glenure in 1752 resulted in a show trial, the judicial murder (AKA execution) of an innocent man and a very famous and well read book. That book was "Kidnapped" by R .L . Stevenson. One of the main protagonists who appeared in "Kidnapped", Alan Breck Stewart, actually existed the other,David Balfour, didn't.

In real life, Ailean Breac Stiùbhart, "Breac" meaning Speckled - due to smallpox scars was a Stewart of Appin. He was a Jacobite agent who returned to Scotland in or about 1751 for some nefarious reason (probably, given his name, to collect rents from the Clan Stewart) or so the accepted theory goes. In fact, no-one knows where he was born, nor do we know for certain when he was born - this was not an uncommon occurrence in Highland Scotland at the time. It is however known that he was a half-brother of Seamus a' Ghlinne.

Apart from his activities as a Jacobite rent collector (some of you may find this strange, but many Jacobite families paid their rents twice, once to the appointed (government sanctioned) factors (agents), and once to their original landlords – even when the originals were in exile), he didn't have all that much impact on history. His alleged implication in the murder of Colin Campbell of Glenure is the only reason that he is even a footnote in history. On the other hand, a spy doesn't really want to be well-known as that is a bit self-defeating....

In any event, he became famous due to the book "Kidnapped". The basic premise of Kidnapped, leaving aside all the nonsense about kidnaps, piracy, family double-dealing-not a new thing hereabouts (and any all mention of the family Balfour), was loyalty to a cause. The fact that that cause was or was not worthy of that loyalty is of no moment.

The murder occurred on the 14th of May, 1752 in the aftermath of the last Jacobite Rising, Campbell and four others had just crossed Loch Leven on the ferry and were passing the road at Lettermore Wood when a musket shot rang out. Campbell fell dead and the killer disappeared into the rugged countryside.

Colin Roy Campbell was ambitious yet decent. His work was distasteful but the more fair-minded regarded him as a fair man who made the best of a difficult job – indeed he was inclined to the Jacobite cause himself. At Ardsheal, James of the Glens helped him collect Stewart rents and the two men often consulted.

James Stuart of Ardsheal (Seamus a' Ghlinne or James of the Glens) was arrested for the murder of the Red Fox (Campbell of Glenure), taken to Inverarary and subjected to a show trial which was far and away more showy than anything the Soviet Union could come up with. Of the 15 jurors, 11 were Campbells, the rest were employed by Campbells and the presiding judge was the Duke of Argyll. Unsurprisingly, he was found guilty by a unanimous verdict (did I mention the word Campbell?). He was sentenced to death by hanging.

What may be surprising is that the court which found him guilty didn't even attempt to suggest that he was the actual killer. He was found guilty "in airts and pairts" (aiding and abetting /conspiracy to commit) even though there isn't sufficient evidence suggest he was in any way involved in the plot (if there was a plot in the first place), far less beyond reasonable doubt.

James was murdered on 8 November 1752 on a specially commissioned gibbet above the narrows at Ballachulish, now near the south entrance to the Ballachulish Bridge. He died protesting his innocence and recited the 35th Psalm before mounting the scaffold. In the Ballachulish area this psalm is still known (to the old farts anyway, as "Salm Seamus") It is said that on the day of the hanging, the real man who fired the shot had to be held down at a house in Ballachulish to prevent him giving himself up.

Colin Roy Campbell of Glenure had actually been very well liked, even by many veteran Jacobites. Shortly before his murder, Jacobite poet and propagandist Alasdair MacMhaighstir Alasdair poked fun at Colin's loyalties in his Anti-Hanoverian polemic An Airce.

In the poem, which begins by skewering the conventions of Aisling (Dream) poetry, the poet describes meeting the ghost of a beheaded Jacobite who prophesises that his Campbell clansmen will soon be punished for committing high treason against their lawful king by a repeat of the Ten Plagues of Egypt followed by a second Great Flood on their lands. The bard is instructed to emulate Noah by building an Ark for Campbells loyal to the Stuart cause (don't laugh, some were, in fact a good few died at Culloden...). Some, however, are first to be purged of their "treason" by receiving a good, proper soaking.

Ge toil leam Cailean Glinn Iubhair
B' fheàrr leam gu 'm b' iubhar 's nach b' fheàrna;
Bho 'n a threig e nàdur a mhuinntreach,
'S gann a dh' fhaodar cuim thoirt dà-san.

"Though Colin of Glenure I much esteem,
Would that he was not alder but true yew;
Since he forsook the allegiance of his sires,
To be reprieved is not his due.

My reading of the events is that it was a spur of the moment affair by some random teenagers out to shoot rabbits. As the trail provided no evidence that James – or anyone else – was involved in plotting the Appin Murder (yes, it's commonly referred to in this manner). As to who actually did the deed, there have been many suggestions over the years and there is an on-going legend about a "family secret" held by the chiefs of Clan Stewart of Appin, in which the family of Seamus a' Ghlinne knew who the killer was but they never said. The murder was probably carried out by Donald Stewart of Ballachulish.

According to some stories, Donald desperately wanted to turn himself in rather than allow James to hang and had to be physically held down to prevent this. Several years after James' execution, when the body was finally delivered to the Stewart Clan for burial, Donald Stewart of Ballachulish was responsible to washing the bones before the funeral.

I know I said probably, but Donald's reported behaviour would seem to indicate he had at least some involvement...

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala*

*Native dress of Guatemala
* translations by Pedro

In 1951 Carlos Mérida, Guatemala's most disguinished artist, created a limited edition of 10 color prints of the Native Clothes of Guatemala.

A thousand copies of each was printed under the supervision of Byron Zadik and Co., in Guatemala, C.A.

Each print was signed by Mérida and priced at $100 each.

In addition to the designs Mérida also contributed text.
Both text and design of five of the prints are presented on the following pages.

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala 1

The native woman wears one of the most decorative and sumptuous costumes of the high planes of Guatemala. One admires in her the fine belt of silk with which she wraps her hair, woven by hand on a small loom, with dense designs which she expresses the most delicate fantasy.

The *huipil* or blouse, constitutes the garment of the greatest sumptuousness; it is embroidered by hand, con the greatest mastery and imagination in the form of a collar, or it is in a circle around the neck; the designs utilized by her vary a lot, according to the ingeniousness of the embroiderer, but they always go around with stylized flowers or sometimes animals.

The sash holds up the *corte* or skirt, that is of the *jaspe* [tie-died] type, in green or purple, is woven by hand, with marvelously stylized drawings.

The text in spanish as originally written by Carlos Mérida: La indígena lleva uno de los más decorativos y suntuosos trajes de la alta meseta guatemalteca. Se admira en ella la fina cinta de seda con que se toca el pelo, tejida a mano, en pequeño telar, con apretados diseños, en los cuales hace acto de presencia la más delicada fantasía.

El "huipil" o camisa, constituye la prenda de mayor suntuosidad; está bordada a mano, con suma maestría e imaginación, en forma de "gola", o sea en rueda alrededor del cuello; los diseños utilizados en ella varían mucho, de acuerdo con la capacidad inventiva de la bordadora, pero siempre giran alrededor de estilizaciones florales y algunas veces, de animales. L
a "faja" para sujetar el "corte" o falda, que es de tipo "jaspe", en verde o morado, está tejida a mano, con dibujos de maravillosa estilización.

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala 2

One sees the hardy indigenous men of San Martín walking with their imposing figure throughout the region with these priestly costumes that they wear with an unequalled charming wit. The mountain serves as an appropriate frame.

The interior dress that the San Martín man wears is woven by hand: the decoration of this part of the apparel is not rich and dense except in the sleeves that are visible, the rest covered by an overcoat of heavy black wool.

Additionally, the sash at the waist, with similar designs as the sleeve, in red, green, gold and purple silk, gives the outfit a sumptuousness without equal except, perhaps, for the indigenous of Santo Tomás Chichicastenango.

The text in spanish as originally written by Carlos Mérida: Los recios indígenas de San Martín se les vé pasear su imponente figura por toda la comarca, con esos sacerdotales trajes que llevan con sin igual donosura. La montaña les sirve de marco apropiado.

El vestido interior que lleva el varón de San Martín, está tejido a mano: la decoración de esta parte de la indumentaria no se hace rica y compacta sino en la manga, que es la visible, una vez puesto el "gabán" de pesada lana negra.

Además, la faja a la cintura, con diseños semejantes al de la manga, en seda roja, verde, oro y morada, dá al conjunto una suntuosidad no igualada sino, talvez, por los indígenas de Santo Tomás Chichicastenango.

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala 3

The woman is seen with a blouse or *huipil* of corse cotton, woven by hand, embroidered with very stylized and simple designs in which alternate animals, birds, human figures and flowers. The coloration of these designs is treated within a chromatic scale that goes from magenta to orange yellow.

The skirt or *corte* is of the *jaspe* [tie-dye] type, it is woven in course cotton, generally red, with yellow stripes—gold and green. Harmony is precisely established in the coloration in relation to the blouse.

The sash to wrap the hair is multicolor, but always in harmonious relation to the rest of the costume, sometimes it is of silk, other times in simple of cotton.

The text in spanish as originally written by Carlos Mérida: La mujer viste con una camisa o "huipil" de manta, tejida a mano, bordada con diseños de tipo muy estilizado y primitivo, en los cuales alternan animales, pájaros, figuras humanas, flores. La coloración de tales diseños está tratada dentro de una escala cromática que va del magenta al amarillo naranja.

La falda o "corte" del tipo "jaspe", está tejida en grueso algodón, generalmente en rojo, con listas amarillo—oro y verde. La armonía se establece precisamente en la coloración en relación con la camisa.

La cinta para el tocado del pelo, es multicolor, pero siempre en armonía con el resto del vestuario, algunas veces de seda, otras en simple algodón.

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala 4

Here is another costume of Quiché, of a singular beauty, that of Sacapulas. Usually the woman wears a sash of bright colors in the hair, which makes a type of crown on the head. The indigenous woman of Sacapulas enjoys adorning herself with necklaces or such of the region of Nebaj, but with a different coloration. Furthermore the central part of the ornamentation is embroidered with floral themes freely broken and almost realistic. This blouse is general used loose over the skirt or *corte*.

That *corte* is of cotton, a bright red, con blue, green or yellow stripes.

The indigenous woman of Sacapulas enjoys adroning herself with necklaces or *chachales*, barrettes or other accessories of gold, silver or colored beads.

The text in spanish as originally written by Carlos Mérida: He aquí otro traje del Quiché, de belleza muy singular, el de Sacapulas. De ordinario, la mujer lleva una cinta de vivos colores en el tocado del cabello, la cual forma una especie de corona en la cabeza.

La indígena de Sacapulas gusta de alhajarse con collares o semejantes a los de la región de Nebaj, pero en diferente coloración. Además, la "gola" o parte central de la ornamentación, está bordada con temas florales de factura muy libre y casi realista. Esta camisa se usa generalmente suelta, sobre la falda o "corte".

Tal "corte" es de algodón, en rojo vivo, con estrías azules o verdes y amarillas.
La indígena de Sacapulas gusta de alhajarse con collares o "chachales", aretes y otros accesorios de oro, plata y cuentas de colores.

Trajes Indigena de Guatemala 5

The Aldermen or Municipal officials of Sololá, people of rank in the district, use a very special dress that tells the importance of the post they hold. Nevertheless, there is a common denominator between the usual dress and that of these citizens, representatives of the tribe.

They use short pants of cotton thread, finely woven and embroidered; furthermore, and over-pants of thick wool drawn up in the back. The jacket is also of wool, of a single piece, decorated with curious black designs. On top of a scarf or *tzute*, they wear hats of a waxed material and decorated with a showy flowery ribbon. The ensemble produces a descriptive apparel which is very imposing.

The text in spanish as originally written by Carlos Mérida: Los Regidores o Munícipes de Sololá, personas de categoría en la comarca, usan trajes muy especiales que los distinguen dentro de la importancia del puesto que desempeñan. Sin embargo hay un denominador común entre el traje corriente y el de estos ciudadanos, representantes de la tribu.

Usan ellos pantalones cortos de hilo de algodón finamente tejido y bordado; además, un sobrepantalón de lana gruesa recogido hacia arriba. La casaca o chaqueta, es de lana también, de una pieza, decorada con curiosos diseños en negro. Encima del tapado o "tzute", llevan sombreros de un material encerado y adornado con vistoso listón enflorado.
El conjunto que presenta la indumentaria descrita es muy imponente.

THE ZEN TEACHING OF
BODHIDHARMA

Translated by Red Pine

Zen was brought to China by Bodhidharma, a fifth-century monk. This belief is a tradition that appeared 200 years after his death, perhaps it is a correct ancestry, at least millions of Zen Buddhists today claim him as their spiritual father.

While others viewed Zen practice as a purification of the mind or a stage on the way to perfect enlightenment, Bodhidharma equated Zen with buddhahood and believed that it had a place in everyday life. Instead of telling his disciples to purify their minds, he pointed them to rock walls, to the movements of tigers and cranes, to a hollow reed floating across the Yangtze.

This bilingual edition, the only volume of the great teacher's work currently available in English, presents four teachings in their entirety. "Outline of Practice" describes the four all-inclusive habits that lead to enlightenment, the "Bloodstream Sermon" exhorts students to seek the Buddha by seeing their own nature, the "Wake-up Sermon" defends his premise that the most essential method for reaching enlightenment is beholding the mind. The original Chinese text, presented on facing pages, is taken from a Ch'ing dynasty woodblock edition.

- by ZenBoyDodge -

The Politics of a Minority or Losing Religion
by Aya Katz

Today, the worship of Jupiter is a thing of the past. It is not just a dwindling or dying religion. It pretty much doesn't exist. As such, it is also not subject to much persecution or discrimination. There are not too many laws directed at the worshipers of Jupiter, prohibiting them from taking degrees in ancient history or religion, for instance. There are no quotas, saying that only 10% of doctors should be the followers of Jupiter, or that the worshipers of Jupiter are not to marry people from another, competing religion.

From an ethical standpoint, there should not be such prohibitions against any religion, minority or sect, but today's blog is less about the ethics of the thing, but about more practical matters: such quotas and prohibitions, when they are applied to an existing spreading religion, do not actually work. It is the behavior of a minority religion to put up fences and try to keep members from leaving. But a majority group need not and should not bar others from joining.

Recently, the activities of the Emperor Julian in trying to halt the spread of Christianity have come to my attention. It seems he prohibited Christians from teaching Greek classics, thus closing off employment opportunities. If this were done today, in the United States, it would be seen as violating the establishment clause and as an instance of unfair discrimination against members of a religion. It would be especially denounced if the religion in question were one belonging to a minority.

I agree with the prohibition against establishment of religion on ethical grounds, but the point I want to make here is different: it is bad politics for a majority to treat a minority thus, for the best possible way to crush a minority is to practice openness and assimilation. It is the minorities -- as groups -- who have everything to gain from keeping their members down and separate and apart. Individual members of a minority have much to benefit from being assimilated, so much so that given the chance, they flock to become more like the majority. Therefore, fences and bars serve to create and maintain minorities, but an open policy serves the majority religion and culture best.

Take the Jews of Kaifeng. They were so busy studying Chinese language and culture in order to pass government exams so as to get good jobs that they entirely forgot how to read their own scrolls and thereby became completely assimilated.

Today, even when beleaguered minorities among the native Americans try to keep their separate identity, their minority politics actually dooms their language and culture to death.

The best policy is an open policy where individuals determine their own identity, language and religion. All attempts to fence people into a particular identity or to put bars against minorities ultimately result in loss -- loss of members for the majority and loss of opportunities for everyone.

Discrimination for or against groups creates unexpected results that ultimately profit neither the groups intended to be protected nor their members.

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
When Heroes Meet: *Sun Wukong* and *Yue Fei*
In Fiction, Martial Lore, and Holy Texts
by **Jim R. McClanahan**

Two of my favorite research topics are Sun Wukong (孙悟空), the immortal monkey demon-turned-Buddhist monk from the Chinese classic *Journey to the West* (1592, 西游记) and the historical General Yue Fei (岳飞) from the Song Dynasty (960-1279). One would think that these two have nothing in common, but you might be surprised to learn it's the opposite. The two have met in person and through other supernatural personas in Chinese fiction and martial arts legends, as well as Hindu holy texts. This informal survey will serve as a brief introduction to the subject in place of a more detailed study which I plan to do at a later date.

Sun and Yue first met in person in a brief Ming Dynasty novel entitled *A Supplement to the Journey to the West* (1641, 西游补). This work, which acts as an addendum taking place between chapters 61 and 62 of the original, has Monkey trapped in a dream world in which he travels through time and space in search of his master Xuanzang, who has given up the quest to India. After traveling to the Song dynasty, some junior devils appear and tell Sun that King Yama has recently died of an illness and that he must take his place as judge of the dead until a suitable replacement can be found. He ends up judging the fate of the recently deceased Prime Minister Qin Hui, who was instrumental in Yue's false imprisonment and death. Monkey puts Qin through a series of horrific tortures, after which a demon uses its magic breath to blow his broken body back into its proper form. He finally sends a demon to heaven to retrieve a powerful magic gourd that sucks anyone who speaks before it inside and melts them down into a bloody stew. He uses this for Qin's final punishment. Meanwhile, Monkey invites the ghost of Yue Fei to the underworld and takes him as his third master for teaching him Confucian ethics. He entertains Yue until Qin has been reduced to liquid and offers the general a cup of the Prime Minister's "blood wine." Yue, however, refuses on the grounds that drinking it would sully his soul. Monkey then does an experiment where he makes a junior devil drink of the wine.

Sometime later, the devil, apparently under the evil influence of the blood wine, murders his personal religious teacher and escapes into the "gate of ghosts," presumably being reborn into another existence. Yue Fei then takes his leave to return to his heavenly abode. Monkey sends him off with a huge display of respect by making all of the millions of denizens of the underworld kowtow before him.

I believe it's possible Yue was mentioned in the novel because the Ming dynasty, when it was written, was fighting with the Manchu, descendants of the Jurchen whom the general had historically fought.

They eventually invaded and conquered China three years later in 1644.

The Great Monkey, Sage who is Equal to Heaven, Sun Wu Kong.

It is possible Yue's mention in the novel influenced a plot device from his famous folklore biography *The Story of Yue Fei* (1684, 说岳全传). The first chapter explains that he is a reincarnation of the Buddhist bird deity Garuda. He originally sat at the top of the Buddha's throne, but was exiled from paradise for killing a celestial bat (an embodiment of the Aquarius constellation) for passing gas during the Buddha's sermon on the *Lotus Sutra*. Part of this episode was borrowed directly from *Journey to the West*, which predates Yue's novel by over 90 years. Garuda is presented as a man-eating demon as old as the universe and the Buddha's spiritual great uncle. He is so powerful that Sun Wukong has to enlist the aid of the Buddha. The Buddha tricks the demon into landing on top of his throne through the power of illusion and takes away his ability to fly.

Practitioners of a Emei Dapeng qigong (峨嵋大鵬氣功) claim that this style of breathing and stretching exercise was taught to Yue by Zhou Tong's friend, an unnamed monk, and that this was the source of his martial prowess (an obvious nod to the [*Tendon-Changing Classic*](#)). Yue's novel mentions Zhou taking him and his other students to meet a Buddhist priest on some mountain. This is who I think the practitioners have connected the "unnamed monk" with. They further borrow from both novels by saying the name of the style comes from Yue's past reincarnation as a great bird (dapeng) that was so powerful that not even Sun Wukong could defeat him. This style most likely doesn't predate the 19th-century because this is when the Eight Pieces of Brocade style of qigong was first attributed to the general.

19th-century depictions of Hanuman (top) and Garuda with Vishnu (right)

As some readers may already know, Garuda is originally a Hindu deity. One popular critic of Chinese fiction suggests that Yue and Garuda were connected based on the similarities with their names. Yue's "courtesy name" was Pengju (鵬举), while Garuda's Chinese name (appearing in various sutras) is Great Peng, the Golden-Winged Illumination King (大鵬金翅明王). Apart from this, both are portrayed as being fiercely loyal to their mothers and enemies of dragons/nagas in their respective literature. In his novel, Yue is saved (from a flood), raised, and educated by his mother. Therefore, he basically worships the ground she walks on. She is the one that gives him is famous (albeit historically dubious) tattoo "serve the country with utmost loyalty" (尽忠报国). As for dragons, his exile from heaven actually serves a dual purpose. He is sent to earth to battle an evil red dragon that has reincarnated as the leader of the Jurchen armies. The *Mahabharata* (c. 4th cent. BCE), a Hindu holy text, describes how Garuda goes on a great quest to retrieve an immortal elixir to ransom his mother, who has been enslaved by his aunt, mother of the nagas (giant serpents). Hindu lore and art often portrays him eating nagas.

Modern scholarship has shown that Sun Wukong is roughly based on the Hindu monkey deity Hanuman. He is a prominent character in the *Ramayana* (c. 4th cent. BCE), another Hindu holy text. Hanuman and Sun Wukong share similar magic powers, fighting ability, and blunt weapons. How the former influenced the latter is very complicated, just know that bits and pieces of the *Ramayana* trickled into China via Buddhist sutras from the north and Hindu converts from Southeast Asia in the south. Both Hanuman and Sun Wukong are portrayed as being fiercely loyal to their masters. Hanuman is instrumental in retrieving Sita, the wife of his master Rama, from the clutches of an evil demon named Ravana. Sun Wukong escorts and protects his master, the monk Xuanzang, from demons during their journey to India.

What's ultimately interesting about Garuda and Hanuman is that they are both loyal servants of the god Vishnu. Garuda is Vishnu's mount that he rides through the skies. As mentioned, Hanuman is the servant of Rama, who is the 7th reincarnation of Vishnu. Vishnu was later absorbed into the Buddhist Pantheon, and some lineages actually consider the Buddha to be his 9th avatar. It took a while, but both Sun/Hanuman and Yue/Garuda came around full circle to meet again under the service of the Buddha in Chinese fiction.

Yue Fei Bronze Statue

END

by Domen

Silesia is home to some of the oldest examples of literature and written culture in Polish language:

1) The Book of Henryków - written in the monastery in Henryków (established by duke Henryk Brodaty in 1227), written in years 1269 - 1310, contains the first known nowadays text written in Polish language (in jottings from 1270). This text is a statement spoke by an ethnic Czech man Bogwał to his ethnic Polish wife, daughter of a local seminary student.

2) Another important cultural center of early literature written in Polish language in Silesia was the scriptorium in Kłodzko, where the first part of Florian's Psalter (Psalms 1 - 101) was rewritten in Polish language during the last years of the 14th century.

3) First known Polish-language version of famous Marian hymn - Salve Regina (Hail Holy Queen) - was written (translated to Polish) in Silesia in the 16th century.

4) Silesian synodal resolutions from year 1257 required the knowledge of Polish language from all members of priesthood and clergy in Silesia. In other words - if a person did not speak Polish, then such person could not become a priest or a clergyman in Silesia.

5) Numerous religious and secular texts, poems, prayers, etc. were written in Polish language in Medieval Silesia, as well as Polish-language glosses to Latin manuscripts.

6) The oldest known text ever printed in Polish language comes from Silesia - it was printed in Wroclaw in year 1475 in the printery of local cathedral canon and printer Kaspar Elyan.

Day ut ia pobrusa, a ti poziwai", this is the first sentence ever written in Polish, and can now be seen via the digital library Fides. The manuscript of the "Księga henrykowska" (Book of Henryków) has been digitalized and been made available to web users.

"The Book of Henryków" was written in the second half of the 13th century (during the years 1268-1273) and documents that Silesia is Polish. The book contains the first sentence written in Polish: "day ut ia pobrusa, a ti poziwai". In a transcription this could meen: "Let me mill on the quern-stone, whilst you rest". This was a quote made by the Knight Boguchwał to his wife, whilst she was milling grain on a quern. You can find this sentence on page 24, 9th line from bottom. The full title of this medieval document is: "Liber fundationis claustri Sancte Marie Virginis in Henrichow", that is "The book of founding the monastery of the Divine Virgin Mary in Henryków". The manuscript is kept in the Archdiocese Archive in Wrocław. Now, the scanned manuscript can also be found in the "treasures of church libraries" section.

"The importance of this document is not overrated, this is why the idea to use digital technology to make it available to all parties interest in viewing it arose" – says the Liber Foundation webpage.

Fr. Prof. Józef Pater, the director of the Archdiocese Library and Chapter Library in Wrocław gave permission for the "Book of Henryków" to be published in the FIDES Federation's Virtual Library. The digitalization was done by the Ossolineum in Wrocław.

7) Jan Stanko - famous 15th century professor of the Cracow University - was born in Silesia, in the city of Wroclaw. He is an author of the first known Polish-language natural sciences dictionary, which was written in year 1472. In his dictionary, Jan Stanko included around 20,000 Latin language scientific terms, 2,000 Polish language scientific terms describing fauna and flora, as well as 800 German language scientific. Among sources used by Jan Stanko when he was compiling his dictionary, were Czech language so called rostlinarze which included many terms from sciences of medicine and herbalism.

8) Despite gradual interruption of political ties of Silesia with the rest of Poland in the 14th century, cultural ties were not interrupted and remained intact throughout the Renaissance period. Printers who were born in Silesia and later settled and worked in Kraków (capital city of Poland) - such as Jan Haller, Hieronim Wietor, Florian Ungler and M. Szarffenberger - were meritorious people when it comes to the history of development of Polish language. They improved Medieval spelling of Polish written language and reformed the principles of ortography, creating the basics of modern Polish ortography. Large part of Early Renaissance writing works in Polish language, were written and printed in Silesia.

9) Another visible sign of continually strong cultural ties between Silesia and the rest of Poland (despite the interruption of political ties) is the fact that in period 1400 - 1525 students from Silesia were around 14% of all graduates on the Cracow University (around 3500 out of 25356) and many professors of this University were from Silesia - for example already mentioned Jan Stanko from Wroclaw, author of first dictionary of natural sciences written in Polish language, which was published in 1472.

10) In the late 16th and the 17th centuries (1550 - 1700), Wrocław (Breslau) was already heavily Germanized, but ethnic Poles were still a very large percent of population of this city. Polish language literature continued to be created in Wrocław. At that time those were mostly utilitarian and popular texts, but not only them - also literature and poetry, modelled mostly on language style of authors from the Kingdom of Poland - such as for example Mikołaj Rey and Jan Kochanowski. Example of Polish language poetry in Wrocław (Breslau) is a poem "Ofiicina ferraria" written by Walenty Roździeński. Title of this poem is in Latin, but text is in Polish. This poem describes the life and work of steelmakers and miners.

An excerpt of "":

"W lichych domkach mieszkamy, bo nigdy o pyszne
Budowanie nie dbamy, ani o rozkoszne
Leganie. Mur jest a węgla – nasza pościel – suchy,
W którym leżąc nie szkodzą nam pchły ani muchy."

Translation to English:

"We live in filmsy houses, because about luxurious
constructions we don't care, neither do we
lounge about. Wall is made of carbon - our bedding - dry,
While lying in which neither fleas nor flies harm us."

11) Many of Protestants in Wroclaw (Breslau) in the 16th century, were Polish-language speakers. In a source dated 1529 there is information, that in the Church of St. Mary Magdalene - which was a Protestant church - there were Polish language sermons.

12) Also Evangelic pastors became "fencers of Polish language" in the 17th century. One of them was Adam Gdacjusz from Kluczbork (1615 - 1688), better known as "Silesian Rey" (from Mikołaj Rey - a famous Polish poet and prose writer of the Renaissance). Adam Gdacjusz was an author of Polish language postils (comments to the Holy Bible) and sermons, whose language style was modelled on language style of Polish Renaissance authors.

13) Apart from artistic texts and Protestant and Catholic religious texts in Polish language, also so called obiecadlniki, as well as dictionaries in Polish language, were being published especially in this part of Silesia, in which the Reformation put down its roots solidly (Kluczbork – Byczyna – Wołczyn – Oleśnica – Namysłów – Międzybórz – Brzeg region).

14) In cultural life of Silesia in the early 19th century (early 1800s) very important was the development of press - newspapers became common in Silesia under Prussian rules. Before times of Otto von Bismarck, Polish language in Silesia was not discriminated and also newspapers in Polish language were being regularly edited. However, at that time ethnic Polish-language speakers and were majority of the society only in Upper Silesia and in Cieszyn Silesia (Teschener Schlesien - here Czech-language speakers were nearly as numerous as Poles), while Lower Silesia was mostly German-speaking.

15) Examples of Polish-language literature in Silesia in the 2nd half of the 19th century (after 1850) were for example works of such Silesian authors like Józef Lompa, Karol Miarka (for example: "Górka Klemensowa", "Petronela, pustelnica na Górze św. Anny", "Walmani") as well as poets - such as Konstantyn Damrot ("Wianek z Górnego śląska", "Z niwy śląskiej") or priest Norbert Bończyk ("Stary kościół miechowski

Pierwsze wydanie z roku 1680 książki Adama Gdacjusza
*Przydatek do dyszkursu o pańskim i szlacheckim albo rycerskim stanie.*

Evolution in

Man of Steel

By **Jim R. McClanahan**

The new Superman film *Man of Steel* (2013) depicts Kryptonians as an ancient technologically advanced race that mastered space travel and began to colonize the stars thousands of years ago (even visiting Earth at one point). Growing children in chambers replaced live birth because population control in these far-flung outposts and on the overcrowded home world was important. These outposts were eventually forsaken when the Kryptonian council elders forbid space travel and turned inward. The council's choice to mine the planet's core for energy eventually leads to the destruction of Krypton. Fearing for the future of his race, Jor-El, the father of Kal-El (Superman) and the planet's top scientist, risks his life to retrieve an ancient primate-like skull covered in runes from an underwater chamber. This skull, known as the "Codex," is a piece of biotechnology that contains the entire Kryptonian genome. Jor-El imprints the information from the skull into the cells of his son before sending him to earth, thus ensuring the future resurrection of the Kryptonian race.

In most sci-fi films, you always see how technologically advanced an ancient alien race is, never the steps that it took to get to that point. That is why I was pleasantly surprised to see the Codex skull appear in the storyline. It implies that Kryptonians, like us, evolved from some type of primate-like creature. It seems like a natural conclusion considering their overwhelming anatomical similarities with humans. The skull only appears on the screen for a short time, but I noticed it had a small brain pan and a very prognathic face. It was very similar to that of the fossil ancestor *Australopithecus afarensis*, which lived about 4 million years ago.

I really like the concept of a fossil skull being the bases for or repurposed as biotechnology used to house the genome of an entire species. The Codex skull essentially contains the evolutionary history of the Kryptonian race. Likewise, all of the fossils that science has accumulated over the last 200 years serve to illustrate the evolutionary history of the human race.

Most of these fossils are far too old to draw any genetic material from, but the entire Neanderthal genome was extracted and mapped in 2010 thanks to the pioneering efforts of the Max Planck Institute in Germany. In addition, the chimpanzee (2005), rhesus macaque (2006), orangutan (2011), bonobo (2012), and gorilla (2012) genomes have all been successfully mapped. This compiled genetic data serves as our own "Codex" because it helps unlock the mysteries of the human genome that was mapped in 2001. If cloning technology is ever perfected in the future, this information could, in theory, be used to reestablish the human race after a great catastrophe.

I really want to know what creationists think about evolution being mentioned in the film. I've looked around, and I have yet to find anyone commenting on the skull. I have, however, found a brief article on the Discovery Institute website by David Klinghoffer entitled "In Man of Steel, Superman Is Pursued by Darwinian Bad Guys." He takes note of one scene where the main villain Generl Zod, the former protector of Krypton, asks Jor-El to help him destroy the "degenerative bloodlines that led us to this state." The "degenerative bloodlines" refer to the Kryptonian elders and "this state" refers to the imminent destruction of the planet. Jor-El retrieves the Codex in an attempt to keep Zod from deleting the genetic lineages of these elders from the skull after his planned assassination of them. Klinghoffer comments that this film has an "eerily Darwinian philosophy," so he thinks the idea of exterminating inferior people somehow meshes with Darwin's work. This shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the Theory of Natural Selection. The theory is merely an explanation for the mechanics behind the fact of evolution. It states that animals who adapt to changes in their environment will survive longer than those who are not well adapted for said changes. This is often called "survival of the fittest." Fitness in this context does not mean something that is physically larger or stronger, only that their adaptation has allowed them to survive long enough to produce more children. For example, a smaller, weaker animal with more offspring would be considered "fitter" than a larger, stronger animal with less offspring. I think Klinghoffer is confusing Zod's statement with Social Darwinism. This ideology posits that only physically strong and mentally brilliant people should survive, while mentally and physically handicapped people should

not be able to propagate. The Nazis were proponents of Social Darwinism, killing some 70,000 psychiatric patients and forcefully sterilizing hundreds of thousands more during the 1930s and 40s. Darwin has no direct connection to Social Darwinism, so equating evolution with eugenics is nothing more than a straw man.

A more obvious allusion to evolution is mentioned towards the end of the film when Superman battles Zod's female lieutenant Faora. After noticing that he is willing to put himself in harm's way to save humans, she tells him: "The fact that you possess a sense of morality, and we do not, gives us an evolutionary advantage. And if history has proven anything, it is that evolution always wins." Klinghoffer comments:The only problem with her analysis is that evolution, in the presumed Darwinian sense here, "always wins" by discarding things that don't give an "evolutionary advantage." That would seem to include the exquisitely tuned conscience with which human beings are gifted -- what advantage does that confer? -- the existence of which, as we know well, poses one of many enigmas that a Darwinian view is helpless in explaining.


Faora

I actually agree with him that removing one's conscience or sense of morality would provide no evolutionary advantage. The Kryptonian soldiers would have no allegiances and would randomly attack anyone, even members of their own unit. I, however, do not agree with the second half of his last sentence. Klinghoffer has either not read the corpus of literature on the subject, or he is purposely misrepresenting it. The evolutionary origins of morality have been explored by many scientists. In his recent book *The Bonobo and the Atheist* (2013), Primatologist Frans de Waal presents evidence that morality is not "top-down" (God-given), but "bottom-up," meaning it issues forth from the naturally arising hierarchy in primate society. Chimps, for example, have a very complex social society that is determined through competition for rank. All individuals within a community from the largest male down to the smallest child all have their place in that society. There are rules for interactions between all members—i.e. greeting, eating, mating, playing, grooming, etc. De Waal states that chimps and other primates exhibit first- and second-order fairness, the ability to recognize inequality and share resources, respectively. See this video for an example:

Capuchin monkeys reject unequal pay – Youtube this video

The monkey's ability to recognize the unfairness of the exchange is the bases for understanding the difference between right and wrong. That is why transgression of the aforementioned rules is punished by members of the community, thus enforcing conformity. Like humans, chimps have the capacity for reconciliation. Confrontations between in-group members are immediately followed by hugging, kissing, and/or grooming; and those refusing to make up are made to reconcile through a mediator, usually a female. In addition, brain anatomy and chemistry help reinforce positive group relations. For instance, research has shown that social animals like primates (including humans), cetaceans (dolphins and wales), and elephants have large areas of "spindle cells." This type of brain neuron is associated with empathy (dysfunctions in the brain can lead to lowered empathy). This, coupled with "mirror neurons," explains why these animals are able to adopt the emotions and behavior of fellow group members. This ensures cooperation and a more harmonious existence.

Those wishing to argue in favor of universal morality have to grapple with the fact that cultures all across the world have different ideas on what constitutes morality. For example, superstitious hunter-gatherer tribes of South Africa believe it a service to the community to kill twin babies because they are considered bad omens. This may be reprehensible to you and me, but we are simply judging this practice though the lens of our own culture. Any agreement between modern systems of morality—many of which are linked with different religious and judicial philosophies, I might add—stems from our common human origins. Most importantly, human morality is not static and unchanging. For instance, Deuteronomy 21:18-21 says that rebellious children must be stoned to death by the community. But when was the last time a child in the western world was executed just because they talked back to their parents? Countries around the world would certainly have far less children if this was a universal law. Thankfully it and other such laws from the bible are no longer considered acceptable. Morals evolve along with society, plain and simple.

Anyone who has seen *Man of Steel* knows that Superman is an allegory for Christ. His father was a man named *El* (God in Hebrew) who sent him to earth, he was raised by commoners, he appears at the age of 33 working miracles, and he helps save humanity through a great deal of suffering. Visuals like Kal-El standing in front of a sunlit stain glass window featuring Jesus while discussing faith and the fate of the world really drive this point home. These Judeo-Christian elements were no surprise to me since I read the comics as a child and knew Superman's creators were Jewish. However, I was surprised when I found out today (via this video) that the filmmakers specifically targeted Christian groups. This article explains:"Warner Bros., the studio, employed Grace Hill Media, a public relations firm focused on the Christian market, to arrange screenings for pastors, supply churches with free film clips and even draft sermons that draw on themes in the film that can be given a Christian interpretation."So the film was written with Christians in mind. This means the filmmaker's intentionally associated evolution, the bane of creationists, with the amoral and murderous bad guys, while highlighting Superman as the Christian hero and messianic savor of mankind. By doing this, the filmmakers are perpetuating a twisted image of evolution, one that prevents the general public from accepting it and keeps law makers questioning its scientific merit.

END

Zen

biography

One of the best known and most respected Zen masters in the world today, poet, and peace and human rights activist, Thich Nhat Hanh (called Thây by his students) has led an extraordinary life. Born in central Vietnam in 1926 he joined the monkshood at the age of sixteen. The Vietnam War confronted the monasteries with the question of whether to adhere to the contemplative life and remain meditating in the monasteries, or to help the villagers suffering under bombings and other devastation of the war. Nhat Hanh was one of those who chose to do both, helping to found the "engaged Buddhism" movement. His life has since been dedicated to the work of inner transformation for the benefit of individuals and society. In Saigon in the early 60s, Thich Nhat Hanh founded the School of Youth Social Service, a grass-roots relief organization that rebuilt bombed villages, set up schools and medical centers, resettled homeless families, and organized agricultural cooperatives. Rallying some 10,000 student volunteers, the SYSS based its work on the Buddhist principles of non-violence and compassionate action. Despite government denunciation of his activity, Nhat Hanh also founded a Buddhist University, a publishing house, and an influential peace activist magazine in Vietnam.

After visiting the U.S. and Europe in 1966 on a peace mission, he was banned from returning to Vietnam in 1966. On subsequent travels to the U.S., he made the case for peace to federal and Pentagon officials including Robert McNamara. He may have changed the course of U.S. history when he persuaded Martin Luther King, Jr. to oppose the Vietnam War publicly, and so helped to galvanize the peace movement. The following year, King nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Subsequently, Nhat Hanh led the Buddhist delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.


Thich Nhat Han

In 1982 he founded Plum Village, a Buddhist community in exile in France, where he continues his work to alleviate suffering of refugees, boat people, political prisoners, and hungry families in Vietnam and throughout the Third World. He has also received recognition for his work with Vietnam veterans, meditation retreats, and his prolific writings on meditation, mindfulness, and peace. He has published some 85 titles of accessible poems, prose, and prayers, with more than 40 in English, including the best selling *Call Me by My True Names*, *Peace Is Every Step*, *Being Peace*, *Touching Peace*, *Living Buddha Living Christ*, *Teachings on Love*, *The Path of Emancipation*, and *Anger*. In September 2001, just a few days after the suicide terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, he addressed the issues of non-violence and forgiveness in a memorable speech at Riverside Church in New York City. In September of 2003 he addressed members of the US Congress, leading them through a two-day retreat.

- by ZenBoyDodge -

Here are eleven exuberant essays on the pleasures of writing from one of the most creative, imaginative, and prolific artists of the twentieth century - an author who truly enjoys his craft and tells you why and how. Bradbury shares his wisdom and enthusiasm for writing as he examines a lifetime of creating and composing scores of stories, novels, plays, poems, films, television programs, and musicals. Refreshingly direct, each essay shares a single compelling theme: writing is a celebration, not a chore. Unlike so many books on writing, this one does not belabor the technical or become obsessed with the how-to aspects of the craft. What Bradbury does bring to every discussion of writing is the fever, the ardor, the delight that he has discovered and which can be yours.

- by ZenBoyDodge -

by Gile na Gile

A Man of Culture

Most of the non-European immigrants we get in Ireland are already "Westernised" in that vague sense that they wish to step aboard the property express and have all the goodies often denied them in their place of origin. I used to work in a refugee center and irrespective of nationality; Cameroonian, Congolese, Iranian, Egyptian, Muslim/Christian or whatever, it's the base economic determinants - the need for a job and a roof over their head which obliterate any differences that arises with respect to the cultural domain, whatever they may be.

I've often heard the attitude expressed (by people who should know better) - "oh, we can't be letting anymore in, look at us now, we've worked so hard to get where we are (pre-bust Celtic tiger) they're taking Irish jobs and blah blah blah". Well, I'm kinda happy to say that the world has shrunken somewhat and allowed us to absorb more diversity. There is a wicked closed-mindedness among all too many here which emerges from time to time - there was scarcely a black man in the entire country fifteen years ago but now we have been forced to accommodate a different viewpoint through the high influx of non-nationals and swallow at times what seemed to me from some quarters an innate racist mentality.

It's important to preserve what is distinct about our own culture and allow that to be fostered as much as we can (Gaelic games, the Irish language, a sense of "Irishness") - and this entails obviously keeping the importance of past struggles for nationhood on the public radar and not allowing ourselves to collapse into some petrified mirro-image of our nearest neighbours. But oftentimes it's hard when attempting to preserve thse atributes which we hold to be distinctly our own to mistake within ourselves another impulse which seeks to absorb from the wider world what may be termed 'a modernising impulse' or simply the collective positive trends of what is transpiring in the international sphere.

Along with a sense and even a reverence of nationality comes too an acknowledgement that for the world to work in any practical sense there must be a global collective trend towards displacing our own prejudicial love for locality and embracing all that which can bind us together and bring us forward.

There is always going to be a level of political sovereignty sacrificed within a federalised European system for instance simply because we have ceded control over so many dimensions of an economy which is now more thoroughly integrated within that system. The evidence is undeniable that this integration has helped in the past and continues to do so - we were always net beneficiaries of EU grants, aids and subsidies and up until the recent fiasco were only beginning to wean ourselves off it's enormous teat - notwithstanding the enormous and ongoing CAP subsidies to our farmers.

All of this however is a little tangential to the issue of preserving our "cultural integrity" unless you are of the viewpoint that there is something in the nature of the European project itself which denudes specifically Irish cultural traits. There are no shortage of missives from Brussels which stress the basic integrity of individual member states when it comes to matters of national "cultural" importance - the very insistence of our own MEP's in having the Irish language promoted within its chambers is in fact an instance of this. What goes on in the specifically cultural domain will always be a matter for individual members themselves to hammer out - this guarantee is in fact enshrined in EU law. Come hell or high water though, whether the EU survives in it's present form, whether further integration takes place along political or economic lines or whether it buckles under the strain of the present difficulties and collapses altogether what is specifically unique to Ireland culturally will remain largely unchanged.

What does change of course are people's attitudes and if the integrative claws maximise their grasp a little more you will see a repulsive force developing within the country - but this will emerge I'd suspect more out of a fear for ceding rights in the political or economic domains than any wish to preserve what is distinctively Irish; people look to their pockets and their autonomy before they register any threats in the national cultural domain. Though it is plausible to suggest that any further steps towards integration need to be looked at closely - the appointment of an EU Foreign minister for instance is a step laden with pitfalls for individual countries who wish to maintain an independent line on foreign policy. That to me is an area which demands the greatest scrutiny.

It's also well to reflect on what we're talking about precisely when we bring up the subject of culture and ask ourselves likewise what are the dangers really in allowing a degree of immersion to occur between peoples of differing backgrounds. If you spend any length of time in the company of people from a vastly different background to yourself the very first thing you will notice (after the initial sense of strangeness maybe) is how completely alike they are to you and your own - as most everyone, everywhere (apart from the comparative few) are engaged in the business of survival; they must work, they must rear families, they must put bread on the table, or, if they are not already doing so they will generally aspire to these ends and they will carry out all this in a usually supportive extended network of family and friends; that really is the bedrock of all cultures. And everything else which marks the distinction between cultures - the way we marry, wear our clothes or cook our meals, the language we speak, the way we practice our faith or even the way we don't have a faith, all of these things are but secondary, tributary offshoots of the one fundamental bedrock of commonality that exists among us.

I have to mention a Muslim friend of mine from Niger who this afternoon dropped in to see me on his way back to Cork having spent time back home in Africa. He came to this country several years ago as an asylum seeker, got working, but then got involved in a pretty nasty affair through no fault of his own but was taken by the public prosecutor here to be the principle guilty party - something which I knew to be entirely untrue. Anyway, I met other Muslim friends of his who are staying here and we co-ordinated a response of sorts - visiting him in the detention centre and making sure his lawyer was well briefed as to every particular. The prosecution as I saw it hadn't a leg to stand on and despite my insistence to the investigating detectives that certain other lines should be pursued as opposed to the ones they were then taking - they continued with their brief, which was essentially that of the aggrieved party (they were very serious charges) and the man (my friend) remained in detention for over four months - over the Christmas in fact - where he was roughed up, intimidated and harassed basically into "making a confession".

This scandalous state of affairs was in no way aided by the fact that he was a black Muslim and when we eventually got our day in court the judge saw quite clearly what the truth of the matter was - dropped all charges, had him immediately released and within the month he received his official papers granting him refugee status in this country - where he works to this day. He went back home to Africa two months ago where he saw his family for the first time in several years and having returned dropped in to see me - which he needn't have done as we have been out of contact for some time - told me how he has been getting on, how he has been saving up to start his own small business, showed me pictures of his new born daughter and finally presented me with a handsome native African leopard-striped leather briefcase. We chatted for twenty minutres or so and having given him directions out of the maze of an estate in which he managed to find me - he went on his way.

That, my friends, was a man of culture.

ALAN
WATTS
THIS
IS IT
and Other Essays on Zen and Spiritual Experience

The six essays in this volume all deal with the relationship of mystical experience to ordinary life. The title essay on "cosmic consciousness" includes the author's account of his own ventures into this inward realm. "Instinct, Intelligence, and Anxiety" is a study of the paradoxes of self-consciousness; "Spiritually and Sensuality," a lively discussion of the false opposition of spirit and matter; and "The New Alchemy," a balanced account of states of consciousness akin to spiritual experience induced by the aid of lysergic acid. The collection also includes the text of Watts' celebrated pamphlet, "Beat Zen, Square Zen, and Zen."

the battle of
FLODDEN
1513

by Chookie

The Battle of Flodden took place on 9th September 1513. On the face of it this was nothing more than yet another instance of Scots and English having a go at each other – just because they were Scots and English, but this isn't so, even though both sides were, on occasion, guilty of just that.

It was, in fact, part of the War of the League of Cambrai (sometimes referred to as the War of the Holy League). This war, believe it or not, was a major conflict in the Italian Wars. The principal participants of the war, which was fought from 1508 to 1516, were France, the Papal States and the Republic of Venice; they were joined, at various times, by nearly every significant power in Western Europe, including Spain (Castile and Aragon, in actuality), the Holy Roman Empire, England, Scotland, plus the Duchies of Milan, Florence, and Ferrara. Not forgetting the army of Swiss mercenaries hired by Pope Julius II.

How did Scotland get involved in this? Simply because of the Auld Alliance which was basically a mutual self-defence pact against England. How England got

involved was by Henry VIII, deciding that, as the French were busy elsewhere, he could use the occasion to expand his holdings in northern France. He concluded the Treaty of Westminster—a pledge of mutual aid against the French—with Ferdinand II of Aragon in November 1511.

That's a little background to the blood-letting – which, I feel is something often omitted in talking about battles(the background, that is) – so, getting back to the battle (which we haven't as this is only the lead-up). James IV of Scotland is asked by the current French king (Louis XII) do something to distract the English.

James IV decided this distraction would take the form of an invasion of England. He summoned an army of around 30,000, not all of whom actually turned up, but he got support from the highlands in the shape of MacLean of MacLean, with a thousand men, and 5,000 Frenchmen. So, at the beginning of the campaign he would have had approximately 27,000. He also had the one of the best equipped artillery corps in Europe – not that you'd know this from the result...

I've seen some really laughable estimations of the numbers involved, Sir Brian Tuke, Henry VIII's private secretary (who wasn't there) reckoned the Scots put 60,000 men in the field, of whom 17,000 died. Other commentators are less extravagant with numbers. The consensus seems to be an Allied force of 30,000 versus 25,000 English. For the times and equipment, that's a 50/50 chance.

Believe it or not, James informed the English four weeks before the event that he would be invading. This was according to his concept of honour (but not mine), anyway this gives the English time to collect an army of their own. Now, as Bluff King Hal was away in France doing nasty things to the locals, he wasn't available to advise the northern magnates (on the other hand, they had been fighting the Scots for years so they might just have known a bit about what they were doing...).

However, given this warning the English manage to scare up a good few thousand men of their own under the command of the Earl of Surrey (Thomas Howard), Baron Thomas Dacre and strangely, the Lord High Admiral of England (a different Thomas Howard). The Allies had around 27,000 to 30,000, making this the largest Scottish army ever to invade England, while the English reportedly had 25,000.

The English forces are outnumbered by the Scottish/French army, but not by much. On the other hand, the Allies have more and better guns, the high ground and long pointy things known as pikes. But the pike is something the Scots knew very little about. The French contingent brought 20,000 or so of what was becoming the preferred infantry weapon in Europe but it was strange to the locals. Given the preferred heavy seven or eight foot spear a Lowland Scots (there weren't all that many Highlanders or Gallowegians present) schiltrom was a match for anything except an arrowstorm - the pike however was a new thing. While it had been issued and they had practised a bit with it, they knew next to nothing about it's use in battle.

The English artillery, though inferior to the Allies, was better placed, being on lower ground and not having to muck about with powder charges was much more effective. The Allied artillery, being on higher ground have to experiment with their powder charges and are, therefore far less effective than the English. The Allied guns are shooting over and not doing much at all to the English, yet the English guns are having a field day as even if their shot falls short, it bounces and, in effect they are firing grazing shots every time a gun fires. Grazing shots are by far the preferred option against ranked infantry at this period in time because of the damage they do.

Sir Brian Tuke painted by Hans Holbein the Younger

Believe it or not, James informed the English four weeks before the event . . .

H.M. James IV - King of Scots

I've mentioned that the pike was a pretty new weapon to the Scots (who preferred a shorter, heavier spear). I didn't mention the weapon of the English infantry so I will now rectify that error. The English foot were equipped with the bill. This is a weapon which is far more useful than a pike at close quarters as it's shorter, slightly heavier and far more manoeuvrable. The pike was best employed against cavalry due to the number of sharp pointy things which horses didn't like, but the bill was more versatile as it could be used against both cavalry (with difficulty) and foot – with far more effectiveness.

There is a famous Scots song (written in the aftermath of the last Jacobite Rising, by Jean Elliot, a daughter of Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto, the Lord Justice Clerk) about the battle in which the following lines appear:-

"Dule and wae for the order
sent our lads tae the border
the English, for aince
by guile won the day"

Dule and wae (Sorrow and woe), certainly, but totally wrong. It wasn't "English guile" which won the day – it was the total and complete incompetence of the Scottish commanders, especially one named James Stewart, fourth king of that name.

For some reason unknown to me, but probably his unique view of his personal honour (it has been suggested that he ordered this move because he had been outflanked), James orders his army to advance (from the high ground, where the English foot couldn't get near them). As the English couldn't get near them, why bother advancing?

There is a sort of half-believed folk tale among historians on both sides that before leaving their positions the Scottish lords in James's division removed their footwear in order to gain better purchase on the ground they were advancing into. This is total bloody nonsense. A medieval battlefield was covered with sharp pointy things (arrows, swords, daggers, axes and other bits of metal which are not nice to bare feets). Plus, when it comes to hand-to-hand combat, bare feet are a disadvantage when the opposition are still shod...

Anyways, the Scots are the recipients of a total kicking. The king, assorted nobles, a bishop or two and some Highland chiefs are killed, as are approximately 5,000 others. The English lost something between 1,500 and 4,000 (most of whom were of the "common sort"). This discrepancy in the losses suffered by the nobility on both sides is due to the fact that although the Scots had adopted the fashionable European weapon, they retained their insistence on commanding from the front whereas the English, while using their more traditional billhook, were also using the new European command style where the commanders stood back and supervised the battle.

According to Sir Brian Tuke, whom I mentioned previously "the English halberdiers decided the whole affair, so that in the battle the bows and ordnance were of little use."

This is from "The trewe encountre or batayle lately don betwene Englande and Scotlande", printed by 'Richard Faques, dwellyng in Poulys Churche Yerde': (Who wrote it, I don't know, but unlike Tuke, (who probably plagiarised it), it displays some immediacy.

Quote:
In this battle the Scots had many great advantages that is to wit, the high hills and mountains, a great wind with them, and sodden rain, all contrary to our bows and archers. It is not to be doubted, but the Scots fought manly, and were determined either to win the field or to die, they were also as well appointed as was possible at all points with armour and harness, so that few of them were slain with arrows, how be it the bills did beat and hew them down with some pain and danger to Englishmen.

Zen and the Birds of Appetite
Thomas Merton

"Zen enriches no one,"

Thomas Merton provocatively writes in his opening statement to Zen and the Birds of Appetite-

-one of the last books to be published before his death in 1968. "There is no body to be found. The birds may come and circle for a while... but they soon go elsewhere. When they are gone, the 'nothing,' the 'no-body' that was there, suddenly appears. That is Zen. It was there all the time but the scavengers missed it, because it was not their kind of prey." This gets at the humor, paradox, and joy that one feels in Merton's discoveries of Zen during the last years of his life, a joy very much present in this collection of essays. Exploring the relationship between Christianity and Zen, especially through his dialogue with the great Zen teacher D.T. Suzuki, the book makes an excellent introduction to a comparative study of these two traditions, as well as giving the reader a strong taste of the mature Merton. Never does one feel him losing his own faith in these pages; rather one feels that faith getting deeply clarified and affirmed. Just as the body of "Zen" cannot be found by the scavengers, so too, Merton suggests, with the eternal truth of Christ.

- by ZenBoyDodge -

This is part 2 of Sparta's article on
**Life under Communism**
Part one will be found in Vol. 1 No. 3.
Download a copy from the Journal library.

Life under Communism

by Sparta

the PARTY
part 2

As I was telling in part one, the first move of Ceausescu was to reorganize the Party. First he changed the name from Romanian Workers' Party to Romanian Communist Party. This was not the original name of the inter-war period party which was titled Communist Party of Romania, and in retrospect constitutes and indication on the fact that the new Leader intended to pursue a nationalist policy.

With the change of the name came the change of the party cards. You have to realize that in a Communist country, the party card was an essential document, as important as the ID. It proved that you were a member of the "leading force of the society" and was helpful in establishing the status. If you were among the leaders you had a small number party card proving that its' holder was either a leader or an old time communist or both.

With the new change of the cards Ceausescu succeeded another coup. He offered the people who, before 1944 were members of the cover organizations of the Party the status of "party members during the illegality". This was a really privileged status that implied at least a substantial retirement and access to better health care. Until 1965 only the persons who were members of the Communist Party had these privileges. Now their numbers expanded with persons who had only vague connections with the Party and these people would be very useful allies of Ceausescu in the Party until 1989.

The second master stroke of Ceausescu was the abolition of a sacrosanct institution of the Politburo (Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party) in 1969. All the Communist Party including the Romanian one had their own Politburo. The Politburo was leading the Party and had the power to appoint or remove the Secretary General. This has never happened in Romania but in 1969 the removal of Khrushchev was a fresh memory so Ceausescu decided to act swiftly. Since 1969 the Secretary General was elected by the Congress (by the 1000 odd delegates gathered once in five years) so he could not be removed by the Central Committee (elected also by the Congress) or by the Political Executive Committee of the Party (the weaker version of the Politburo). This assured Ceausescu that he had nothing to fear from the Party's side and indeed the Party was the most subservient institution until 1989.

This is the Party that I and all the Romanians born after 1960 remember. The Party signs were everywhere; in the class rooms on the wall we had the portrait of Ceausescu and on the left the coat of arms of the Socialist Republic of Romania and on the right the coat of arms of the Party. I was a kid in the 70's so I did not bother myself too much with what the Party was. I knew that I was hearing a lot about it on Radio and TV and more and more the Party was mentioned in connection with the Secretary General. Ceausescu's personality cult was not that pervasive until 1980 so life was let's say bearable.

My parents were members of the Party. After graduating the Polytechnic University of Bucharest in 1965 they were sent somewhere to a factory and there in 1966 the leader of the Party cell told them "you are two young intellectuals and our Party needs fresh blood so do join it". Afterwards when he had a beer with my father he told him "it's better to be a Party member: you and your wife will get promoted and the Securitate (secret police) cannot bother you that much". My father answered that he had a rather bad file (my grandfather was death on the war against the URSS and my grandmother had relatives that were before 1945 members of Social Democrats or Liberals) but the Party Secretary was all smiles: "Young man, the times have changed, nobody cares about your aunties and uncles and as long as you don't do something really stupid (he was never too specific about what can be considered "really stupid") and work, you will have a good life".

As I told in the previous post, there were Party cells in every single factory, military unit, university and collective farm. The Party cell included all Party members from the workplace and had a leader ("the Party Secretary") who was, usually, an influential character, immediately after the factory director, school principal or military unit commander. The leaders of these party cells were usually people who were not paid for their activity by the Party but by their workplace. Therefore many persons who lived in those times recall at least one Party secretary who was a humane character and who really helped them (my parents will have only good words about the party secretary from their first workplace). They were also those who were trying to meddle with the running of the factory, unit, school who were hated by the people, but the Party was discouraging this.

These "basic organizations" (in accordance with the speech of the time) were subordinated to the town (or village) and County Party Organisations. These were "professional" activists, entirely dedicated to the party work and paid by the Party. I do recall some of them (those in charge with the education as I was in the high school) and most of them looked to us as grey bureaucrats who were just performing their job. I have also met a couple of them who were looking like young ambitious up climbers and they were really despicable. Unlike the old activists who may have had the excuse that they believed in Marxism, these younger communist yuppies were just quoting phrases of Ceausescu and aimed only at promotion within the Party.

The County, city and commune organizations became very important in the 70's. After Ceausescu consolidated his power, he replaced the county and city administration with the Party organizations. This meant that the counties (the most important territorial unit in Romania) and the towns were run by the Party organizations. It removed the Party from whatever connection may have had with the citizens and transformed it in a bureaucracy that was running the country but was also blamed for the failures.

At central level, the Government (Council of Ministers) could not be scrapped so it remained but it carried only the function of implementing not the laws adopted by the shadowy Parliament, but the Party decisions. Nevertheless, the Central Committee of the Party developed its own bureaucracy having structures that were supervising the Ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, Economics, Internal Affairs and so on).

Under Ceausescu the Party continued to grow in numbers; just like my parents entered the Party other intellectuals, industrial workers or peasants were joining the Party. It was a good insurance for life and did not require any belief in the Communist dogma. If the Party cell at the workplace was OK that the entry was guaranteed. In 1974 there were 2,5 million members; in 1989 just before the fall there were 4 million members. Hardly any of those members believed in Communist ideals.

The normal Party members were required to attend the Party cell meetings. Sometimes they had to write congratulatory telegrams to the General Secretary or to elect delegates for the Congresses or National Conferences. The party life had become completely meaningless and by mid 80's my father told me that the only good thing in the Party meetings was that he could go to a beer with friends afterwards. The nomenklatura had its' own life completely removed from the ordinary citizens. After 1990 I learned from the kids of nomenklatura that they had their own stores where they could buy goods inaccessible to the common mortals, special places for holidays and of course, the parents were preparing for them a bright career.
The nomenklatura was also living in fear of losing the positions either due to a change in leadership or to an action by the Securitate, the Secret Police.

My father was told that he would not have to fear the Secret Police; the guy was right, during Ceausescu's time the secret Police could not recruit Party Members as informers. However it had the right to spy on them. For ordinary people, this did not mean anything (we were anyway spied and they were not sending people in jail for cursing Ceausescu in the 80's), but for the nomenklatura a demotion meant the loss of all the privileges.

In December 1989 the regime fell without any reaction from the Party. Ceausescu's policy of subordination has killed any possibility of appearance of a reformist wing. While the communists in Bulgaria and Hungary succeeded to survive (as reformed socialist parties), the Romanian Communist party has merely vanished away. The country was led until 1996 by a former Communist, Iliescu, but even he could not save the beloved Party, while he tried a bit in January 1990. The people were fed-up with it and did not want anything like that. Today the most important legacy of the Communist Party and its avatars remain the archives, still not completely opened nor recovered.

I have met real Communists in the 90's. One of them told me a lot about the time when Ceausescu acceded to power and the early 70's. Afterwards he fell from grace and was sent to work in the textile industry. He survived and even managed to reinvent himself as capitalist in 90's. In 1998 after a beer he summed up his feelings: "I believed in Party until the end and in Ceausescu for a long while. Today they are both gone and I understand why's that. However sonny what I hate most is that these people from the Secret Police made it so good during the transition".

Indeed, the Securitate people made it very good both in Communism and the troubled transition that followed. About Securitate in another post, probably in August.

I was contacted earlier this year by a Princeton graduate concerning my past research on the Kaifeng Jews. I'm always on the lookout for new material, so I welcomed the news that he had located a reference to Jews in Xinjiang province, China that had been overlooked by researchers like Donald Leslie and Chen Yuan. This new information was located in a report on the 1900-1901 exploration of Xinjiang (then known as Eastern Turkestan) by the famous archaeologist Aurel Stein (1862-1943). [1] It describes a 12th-century Jew named Turk Terkhān, the ruler of the desert town of Kenhān. This entry presents my opinion on the historical validity of the material in relation to the Jews of China.


A Jewish Ruler in Xinjiang
by **Jim R. McClanahan**

In mid-march of 1901, Stein set out to locate a town named in various historical travel logs as *Hanmo* (捍麼) (Song Yun, 6th. c.), *Pimo* (媲摩) (Xuanzang, 7th c.), and *Pein* (Marco Polo, 13th c.). [2] After crossing an expanse of desert and swamp by camel and horse, he came across two ancient deserted towns, Uzun-Tati ("the distant tati [dwelling]") and Ulūgh-Ziārat ("ancient shrine"), which he believed to be contenders for the target of his search. Positioned about 3 miles apart, these two towns were located in the exact direction and number of miles from Yotkan, the capital of the ancient Khotan empire, as given in the travel account of the monk Xuanzang (玄奘, 602-664). [3] Stein cites evidence that both locations were occupied as late as the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127). [4] For example, the Tadhkira (biography) of Maḥmūd Karam Kābulī, a work containing information about the 12th-century, mentions Ulūgh-Ziārat by name. It is this work that references the Jewish ruler. Stein writes:

"This text…describes in some detail the conquest by the Muhammadan champions of the territory of 'Kenhān', situated between the Keriya river and Khotan. Its ruler, the infidel 'Turk Terkhān', is spoken of as a Jew and as a dependent of the Nūdūn Khān, the 'Tersa' or Christian, who held Khotan with his Kirghiz Kalmak or Kara-Khitai. [5] After defeating Turk Terkhān the Muhammadan host is said to have taken and pillaged the rich town of *Ulūgh-Ziārat*, which was close to his capital *Kenhān*. The latter itself vanished through magic, while the Muslim host next occupied Chīra, and victoriously advanced upon Khotan. Whatever interpretation we may care to put upon any historical reminiscences that may possibly have mingled with this legend, it is quite clear on topographical grounds that by 'the province of Kenhān' must be meant the oases stretching from Kerya to Chīra, and by 'the town of Ulūgh-Ziārat' the site of Ulūgh-Ziārat. The 'town of Kenhān', Turk Terkhān's capital, which is said to have vanished, may, at the time not exactly known to us when the legend took the shape recorded in the Tadhkira, have been looked for among the sands of Uzun-Tati." [6]

Despite Ulūgh-Ziārat being a historical city, I am not inclined to accept the account provided by the Ta<u>dh</u>kira. I have not been able to track down any more information on Turk Terkhān or Nūdūn Khān. I find it hard to believe that a Jew and a Christian ruled over land (Terkhān and Khān are both ranks) in a predominantly Muslim area neighboring the eastern caliphate. [7] In fact, there are elements of the story that make me think it was a legend created to glorify Islam. For starters, both men are referred to by derogatory terms. The Terkhān is called an "infidel" and the Khān is called a "tersa." The Persian word *tersa* was a universal term applied to "conquered idolaters" (any non-Muslim living under their rule).[8] Second, the Muslim forces are portrayed as sweeping through and easily conquering both men and their nomad armies. [9]. Thus, the Jew and Christian are painted as weak infidels, while the Muslims are painted as conquering victors.

A map of the Silk Road routes leading into China. Khotan, a major oasis city not far from Ulūgh-Ziārat, is indicated by a yellow star.

A good parallel is the legend told to the Jesuit Matteo Ricci by the Chinese Jew Ai Tian (艾田) in 1605. Ricci recorded in his journal that the Jew told him "they [the community] had preserved the tradition that many Moors, Christians and Jews had come with the King Tamerlane, when he conquered Persia and also China 800 years ago." [10] Eight hundred years prior would have put Tamerlane's (1336-1405) arrival during the middle of the Tang Dynasty (618-907). The only problem is that he lived during the early Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and died just 200 years prior to Ai and Ricci's meeting. Additionally, he never conquered China at all. Tamerlane originally became upset when Ming Emperor Hongwu (洪武, 1328-1398) sent him a letter describing him as a vassal in 1397. He didn't start amassing forces for an offensive against China until 1404, during the rule of the Yongle Emperor (永樂], 1360-1424). Fortunately, Tamerlane died of an illness in 1405 in the Central Asian town of Otrar before ever reaching China. [11] He originally intended on converting all of China to Islam, [12] so the legend of him conquering the land may have been spawned by wishful thinking Muslims living in the Middle Kingdom.

In conclusion, the story regarding Turk Terkhān cannot be accepted as a historical account of a Jew living in Xinjiang. No source outside of the Tadhkira mentions the events, which makes it difficult to verify. It's very possible that Turk Terkhān is a fictional straw man—or at the very least the shadow of a demonized historical ruler—created to glorify Islam. He and the Christian Nūdūn Khān are painted as weak infidels, while the Muslims are painted as conquering victors. Such stories may have been common because the 17th-century Jew Ai Tian shared a legend about the Muslim ruler Tamerlane conquering China. This is obviously wrong considering that Tamerlane died before his armies reached China. It was most likely the product of wishful thinking Muslims, like those who created the story featured in the Tadhkira.

I do not doubt, however, that Jews have lived and passed through Xinjiang for centuries. They are known to have been active in the area by at least the 8th-century. For example, during the same expedition, Stein uncovered a Judeo-Persian business letter in Dandān-Uiliq near Khotan.[13] The letter was written during the Tang dynasty by a Jew upset with a business partner in Persia because he was stuck with selling an inferior flock of sheep. [14] It is important to note that it was written on paper, which was only available in China at this time. [15] The Kaifeng Jews are thought to have settled in China during 12th-century. The fact that they were Persian merchants probably means they had to have traveled through Xinjiang in order to get to the imperial capital of Kaifeng. Also, Jews may have been among the "people with colored eyes" (色目人) imported to China by the Mongols during the proceeding Yuan dynasty. [16] Those living in the north no doubt had to travel through Xinjiang.

Notes

[1] Aurel Stein, *Ancient Khotan, Detailed Report of Archaeological Explorations in Chinese Turkestan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907). The entire 700 + page report can be downloaded for free from Google Books.
[2] Ibid, 452 and 455-457. The Chinese characters for Song Yun and Xuanzang are 宋雲 and 玄奘, respectively. Both monks traveled to India with the expressed purpose of retrieving Buddhist sutras.
[3] Ibid, 462.
[4] Ibid, 461 and 463.
[5] The Kirghiz Kalmak or Kara-Khitai are nomadic tribes from Central Asia and Mongolia known for their fighting ability.
[6] Ibid, 463.
[7] These ranks were common among Mongolian and Turkish people (Henry H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols, From the 9th to the 19h Century* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1966), 31). Terkhān was once a rank in the Persianate, but eventually became a name by the time of Baber (1483-1530) (Robert Marriott Caldecott, *The Life of Baber, Emperor of Hindostan* (London: J. Darling; [etc.], 1844), 17).
[8] Palmira Johnson Brummett, *The 'book' of Travels: Genre, Ethnology, and Pilgrimage, 1250-1700* (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 42.
[9] See note #5.
[10] Donald Leslie, *The Survival of the Chinese Jews: The Jewish Community of Kaifeng* (T'oung pao, 10. Leiden: Brill, 1972), 9 and 32. The bracketed words are mine.
[11] Denis Crispin Twitchett, John K. Fairbank, and Frederick W. Mote, *The Cambridge History of China. Vol.7, The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 259.
[12] Ibid.
[13] David S. Margoliouth, "An Early Judaeo-Persian Document from Khotan in the Stein Collection, with other early Persian Documents," in *Studies of the Chinese Jews: Selections from Journals East and West*, ed. Hyman Kublin (New YorK: Paragon Book Reprint Corp, 1971), 25.
[14] A full translation of the letter can be found in Bo Utas, "The Jewish-Persian fragment from Dandan-Uiliq," *Orientalia Suecana*, 17 (1968): 123-136.
[15] Xu Xin, *The Jews of Kaifeng, China: History, Culture, and Religion* (Jersey City, NJ: KTAV Pub. House, 2003), 153.
[16] Zhu Jiang, "Jewish Traces in Yangzhou," in *Jews in Old China: Studies by Chinese Scholars*, ed. Sidney Shapiro (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1988), 146.

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
This book was an experience.

Cangaço
- highwaymen -

by Tairusiano

Between the 19th and the mid-20th century (in Brazil), a specific type of banditry was developed in the northeastern hinterland: the cangaço.

The Cangaço was a phenomenon in northeastern Brazil formed by nomads who used violence to commit crimes in the region.

The very term "cangaceiro" in its origins, makes reference to the term "canga"(yoke) piece of wood usually placed on mules and transport animals.

Thus, the word cangaceiro originally alludes to utensils that these outlaws carried on their body.

These groups appeared in function primarily of the poor social conditions of northeastern region. The landlordism, which concentrated land and income in the hands of farmers, leaving the majority of the population in the margins of society.

Understanding the cangaço

Therefore, we can understand the cangaço as a social phenomenon, characterized by violent actions on the part of cangaceiros. These, who went in armed groups, spreading fear through the northeastern hinterland. Ransacked the farms, attacking convoys and kidnapped landowners to obtain ransoms. Raping and killing for nothing.

Through criminal practices, these groups constituted a social group outside the structures of power and social relations prevailing during the time of the oligarchies. According to their interests, cangaceiros established alliances with those who offered economic advantages or protection to its activities.

The cangaceiros generally lived committing crimes, running and hiding. But there were three groups in Cangaço. One of them rendered service to the landowners themselves, so they were not as so fugitives. There was a second group that represented still more the powers of local farmers, who were known as "political". These, therefore, enjoyed certain protection. Only a third group that was independent and practiced a thug life on their own. All of them, however, knew well the nature of the Brazilian caatinga (desert land) and thus had a large advantage in time to escape the authorities. It was also the nature that drew all the resources to face adversity.

The Cangaceiros had some level of support from the poorest population: the bandits sustained some beneficial behaviors such as acts of charity, buying of goods for higher

The cangaceiros had very specific notions of how to behave and dress. First of all, most of them knew how to sew quite well. Living in the desert lands of the northeast of Brazil, they had to survive amidst spiky dry bushes. Despite the heat during the day, the cangaceiros preferred to wear leather clothing, embellished with all kinds of coloured ribbons and metal pieces.

They also used leather gloves with coins and other pieces of metal sewn onto them, almost like armour.
The cangaceiros were very equiped by the time armed with shotguns, Mauser rifles and carbine, pistols the favorite being the german lugger and even submachine guns like the Berggman MP18.

The cangaceiros were very equiped by the time armed with shotguns, Mauser rifles and carbine, pistols the favorite being the german lugger and even submachine guns like the Berggman MP18.

They also made famous a thin, long, and very sharp knife called a "peixeira", a fish-cleaning knife, used mostly to torture or cut the throats of their victims.

(peixeira)

The most vamous Cangaceiro was "Lampião" Oil Lamp", according to his fellows, he could shoot so quickly that he could illuminate the place (his name was Virgulino Ferreira da Silva)

He began when he was just a boy, amongst vendetta plots of the Pereira and Nogueira-Carvalho families. When his parents were killed because of these disputes, some of his brothers ran away, but Antônio, Livino, and Ezequiel followed Virgulino into the cangaço.

Seen as a mixture of hero and bandit, Lampião became one of the most representative icons of Brazil.

Wandering around Santa Brígida, in the state of Bahia, he met Maria Alia da Silva (a.k.a. Maria de Déia), wife of shoemaker Zé de Nenê. Later she would be better known as Mrs. Lampião, Maria Bonita (literally "Pretty Maria").

Lampião was killed by the police in 1938, in a region between the state limits of Bahia and Alagoas, when an informer, Pedro de Cândida gave away their location to the police. A massive offensive led to bloodshed, and the eleven of the band was killed: Lampião, Maria Bonita, Luís Pedro, Mergulhão, Enedina, Elétrico, Quinta-Feira, Moeda, Alecrim, Colchete and Macela.

His head and the heads of his band were cut (an old and nasty brazilian tradition) and paraded by the whole Brazil to show that the famous bandit was dead.

"Lampião" Oil Lamp"

The Volantes

The aggravation of the problem of cangaço led state police to create special forces to combat it called "Volante"(volant or flying), led by career officers , but formed by temporary "soldiers" and whose methods of operation - particularly in relation to poor population was not much different from those of the cangaceiros themselves.

The volantes were small and special band of troops – around 20 to 60 with the mission of hunt and destroy the cangaceiros.

The end of cangaço.

After the end of the band of Lampião, the other groups of cangaceiros, already weakened, were disarticulated and defeated in the late 1930s.

Lampião Lieutenant, the cangaceiro Corisco vowed revenge and continued to fight until May 1940, when he also was killed in a police siege. In the 40s, Brazil was undergoing major economic and social transformations, promoted by industrialization.

The evolution of transport and communication gradually integrated the hinterland to the rest of the country. Moreover, the need for labor in the factories of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo started to attract the population of semi-arid. Thus, the various circumstances that led to the cangaço disappeared along with it.

sources
Cangaço a guerra no sertão da República
Autor: Bráz, Júlio Emílio

História do Cangaço
Autor: Queiroz, Maria Isaura Pereira de

END

The Norman Conquest and Scotland

by John Paul

The Norman Conquest after 1066 changed Scotland's position, even Anglicizing Scotland to some extent. Just as the Roman and the Saxon conquests had driven the Brythons/Celtic speaking Britons up north, so the dispossessed Saxons or even Anglo-Danish fled to Scotland from William after the Conquest. The result considerably changed Scotland's ecclesiastics and its civilisation and the proportion of Anglo-*Danish* to the races known as Celts must also have been increased, but not overwhelmingly so.

The catalyst for the Harrying was arguably the Anglo Saxon teenage Prince Edgar the Aetheling (Harold's heir) ([Edgar The Aetheling (Anglo-Saxon prince) -- Encyclopedia Britannica](#)) and Malcolm III of Scotland leading the Northern revolt. Because the Conquest didn't include Northern counties of England, the border with Scotland was unclear, Northumbria was easy prey to the Scottish king Malcolm (1058 to 1093), he was the bloke that killed MacBeth in 1057 to avenge his father and became king. Malcolm had also spent some time in English exile and after 1066 sheltered Edgar the Aetheling (Harold's heir) for four years, and his sisters. One; Margaret, or St. Margaret ([Saint Margaret of Scotland (queen of Scotland) -- Encyclopedia Britannica](#)) became his second wife and became the mother of three kings. We're getting English in to Scotland here already and later, we see a struggle between the North and William for control.

Queen Margaret is reported as influencing Scotland from her Court, promoting the English refugees, and introducing changes against the established Scottish Church, which we could say brought the Pope in to Scotland's affairs decades later. *Saint* Margaret was canonized , it's generally said, around 1250/1251.

The marriage gave Malcolm an excuse to interfere in England, carrying out a long series of raids over the border. During 1069-70, Malcolm (who also even in the Confessor's time was hostile in Northumberland) invaded for his brother-in-law Edgar, hoping to join up with the Danes. But Malcolm was too late; the Danes had gone home, bribed by William. William had in any case already harried the North which made Malcolm look a bit daft really but Malcolm did provoke William's counter-attack, restarting the battle for supremacy. In 1070, William had made peace with *Swein* of Denmark which put him out of the game (http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthe...conqueror.aspx). Edgar and Malcolm were on their own.

Malcom III

William went into Scotland during 1071-1072 with a naval force and a land force, crossing the Forth (the first English king to do so since the Egfrith fell at Nectansmere in 685). Florence of Worcester says that William got as far as Abernethy; where Malcolm met him, and surrendered to him. The Anglian Chronicle records that the King of Scots became the "man" of the English king (The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle - Annals from A.D. 1071 to A.D. 1080). No further invasion took place till 1079, when Malcolm took advantage of William's Norman difficulties to make another harrying expedition, he didn't get very far (Annales of Scotland: From the accession of Malcolm III. surnamed Canmore, to ... - Sir David Dalrymple - Google Books). Around 1080, *Newcastle upon Tyne* was established. History shows how the North-East, particularly Gatehead, was laid waste and also suffered under the battles and William's destruction.

Quote:
When Robert Curthose, the Conqueror's eldest son, returned in 1080 from an unsuccessful enterprize against Malcom king of Scotland, he erected a fortress, which was called The New Castle upon Tyne. The old castle is supposed to have been the Roman fortress, Pons Ælii, whose venerable walls had braved the assaults and storms of eight hundred years. From this New Castle the adjoining town derived the appellation which it still retains.

(Historical events - To 1584 | Historical Account of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (pp. 1-22))
The Norman Conquest
http://www.royal.gov.uk/historyofthe...conqueror.aspx
History of the Kingdom of Northumbria

Many of the following questions raised are of both a philosophical and practical nature and are of the highest import for millions around the world today who have been given, or will be given, a "diagnosis" of an extreme mental illness ("psychosis") such as is found in "bipolar disorder", "schizophrenia" or "schizo-effective disorder".

History of
MADNESS
part one by Gile na Gile

The psychiatric "medical model" comprises the response by today's society in dealing with unusual modes of subjectivity; the hearing of so-called 'voices', the experiencing of so-called visual 'hallucinations' and other unusual perceptive phenomena. These modes of alterior subjectivity can manifest as both bizarre and bewildering to the experient and as frightening and confusing to those around them.

To avoid the danger of a possible violent conflagration it is thought best to segregate the experient from the rest of society via the mental institute or asylum - until such time as the individual has "recovered" their senses. It is the consultant psychiatrist who determines when a person is "fit" to rejoin the wider world; and thus, a psychiatric sojourn, once began, can, in theory, and often does, last indefinitely. The preferred mode of treatment has a deceptively simple goal; to bludgeon the sensory apparatus of the experient. Many different drugs are used of course but they all have this ultimate end in common - despite what they say on the wrapper.

Now, the closest I have come to murdering someone with my bare hands was when, as a 'man interrupted' in my second visit to a psychiatric ward I was told to don a pair of pyjamas, take 'my medicine' and prepare for a ten o' clock nightcap. I thought of immediately crushing the nurse's head against the wall and stamping the life out of him. The impulse to do so was so strong I didn't think any force could prevent me from doing otherwise.

As luck would have it; I managed to restrain the "demon" within, and that man is alive today, and I, for my part, was in a position to carefully bring about the conditions of my release - some two months later. Some might be appalled and think if I were capable of doing such a thing then 'they' were right and there was every reason for me to be 'locked up'. But I will tell you this; you do not or can not then know, what the meaning of *frustration* in it's essence is - of being *unable* to communicate your mind and thus have yourself known and understood by those around you. Worse still, is having to deal with this wall of ignorant nonsense known as psychiatry.

Now, on "release", it was evident that inheriting the rubric of 'mental illness', to be placed in the position of having to use such a phrase to describe your past and present status seriously curtails your future prospects in almost every sphere of life. In reality, the concept of 'mental illness' is a misnomer, it has no real meaning and deserves no usage for it quite unnaturally, demarcates and effectively banishes to the nether regions a significant, yet predominantly voiceless and thus powerless proportion of our society.

You can attempt to dismiss it, as I have done for years, as an impossibly crude, hopelessly absurd and overly-simplistic 'explanation' for a particular period in your life, yet, despite my awareness of this fact, would-be employers still turn up their noses as though you had spent years marinating in some foul and rancid sauce. They will have the presence of mind, of course, to nod sympathetically as they are aware they should in such cases, but ultimately, your unlikely to get the call, nor indeed, should you expect to, for once you have accepted the term 'mental illness' as being in any way a satisfactory designation for who you are, what you were, or, what 'Please God', you hope never to be again, if you accept all of that, then you have what I would call a real problem; you have embraced the mythology of the psycho-pharmaceutical complex - yet another virulent offshoot of untrammelled *late* capitalism.

However, there is no shame in this as you have been deceived by powerful forces. What makes this particular myth so powerful, and it is a characteristic shared with all virulent falsehoods that cloud human reason, is that (a) its chief proponents, the psychiatric profession, believe substantively in the letter of its creed - I know, having spent several years in and out 'their care', I can say they never 'blink' - and (b) 'Big Pharma', the drugs companies who sponsor the research and clinical trials, provide the billions in advertising, and who incessantly lobby our politicians, are happy to continually embellish the myth; indeed the myth couldn't be sustained without their largesse. These latter group, however, cannot be said to actually believe in anything, least of all a myth of their own making.

And yet, despite this, we still have knowledgeable scholars, whom we call 'neurologists' who seek to interpret the 'holy writ', holy and sanctified because what transpires there, oddly enough, tells them just about everything they need to know about ourselves and our 'sins'. Under the old regimes - both animist and monotheistic - we were possessed by all manner of demons whose names were, in one famous instance at least, legion; well plus ca change, Roger Blashfield writing in the Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease in 1996 and tracing the staggering expansion of afflictions documented in the pages of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual predicted it's fifth edition would have '256 pages, will contain 1800 diagnostic criteria, eleven appendices and would generate $80 million in revenue for the American Psychiatric Association'.

He was of course lampooning the whole tragi-farcical evolution of syndromes, disorders and diseases each multiplying exponentially as a consequence of our 'vastly improved technologies' - MRI and PET- and each coming with a tailor-made and competitively priced solution; why three Hail Mary's and an Our Father when we now have Zyprexa and Olanzapine, or a decade of the rosary - when your nasty demons can be pacified by Syrenase or Chlorpromazine and so it goes, and so it never stops in fact, for we are now lifetime subscribers, a shareholders fantasy, a captive market (did we mention your condition was deteriorative?), battery humans in the factories of Pfizer and Novartis --- in the wards we are made to pad limply as limbic disembodied ghosts grateful for our daily benediction - a sad, appalling, grotesque charade, there is a genuine affliction here alright - its called Stockholm's Syndrome.

Now we see immediately that we are in trouble because in order to talk about a thing it is natural in trying to bring order to chaos by attempting to place it under some sort of classificatory heading. Then we may say of a thing that it is like this or that or that it belongs to this range of phenomena and so on. But how can you begin to talk about 'psychosis' if you start off by contending that it is not even a mental illness for all at once you have removed it from the spotlight under which it seems, it has always languished.

Let me illustrate what I mean by retelling an old Sufi teaching story;

"It is late at night. The legendary wise fool, Mullah Nasruddin, is crawling on his hands and knees under a corner street lamp. A close friend discovers him and, thinking that Mullah may be a little drunk, tries to help:'Mullah, let me help you up! Do you need help to find your way home?'

'No, no, my friend …. I've lost the key to my house. Here, get down on your hands and knees and help me look.' Groaning, Mullah's friend gets down onto the hard pavement and begins to crawl around. He makes a thorough search, peering into all the crevices in the cobblestones, gradually and laboriously widening his search. After what seems like hours his knees are aching. No luck.'Mullah, I've looked everywhere within thirty feet. Are you sure you've lost your keys here?'

'No .. actually, I think I lost them about a block away, over there.'

'Mullah, Mullah - you idiot! Why are we wasting our time here then?'

'Well, the light was better here …..'"

And so we ask ourselves who is sponsoring the wattage of this spotlight that is shining erroneously on the terrain of the brain. The question becomes central because if we cannot become aware of how a handful of institutions has so adroitly managed society's response towards an ancient set of behaviours then we are indeed in a collective mire.

William James in his study *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) set himself the task of approaching the matter of religion not from the point of view of its external forms; its dogmas and institutions, but from those "unique" mental states that gave rise to it in the first place;

Essential reading for the educated mind.

"There can be no doubt that as a matter of fact a religious life, exclusively pursued, does tend to make the person exceptional and eccentric. I speak not now of your ordinary religious believer, who follows the conventional observances of his country, whether it be Buddhist, Christian or Mohammedan. His religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit. It would profit us little to study this second-hand religious life. We must make search rather for those original experiences which were the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct. These experiences we can only find in individuals for whom religion exists not as a dull habit, but as an acute fever rather. Invariably they have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner life, and had melancholy during a part of their career. They have known no measure, been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and frequently have fallen into trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily classed as pathological. Often, moreover, these pathological features in their career have helped to give them their religious authority and influence."

So, before we can even begin looking at the modern era we may well ask who in earlier times bore the characteristics of today's "mentally ill"? It is a sobering thought after all to think that there are millions across the world today who have undoubtedly had original experiences comparable to the founders of the great religions and who are yet subjected to that invidious form of social ostracism known as a psychiatric diagnosis. Viewed in this light there doesn't appear to be any genuine empathy or real understanding of the lives led by these founders (with whom the vast majority of us claim to identify), for if there was, surely there would be a greater attempt to understand the emotional turmoil undergone by so many found in today's psychiatric wards. James, it may be noted, shared Carl Jung's incredulity at what was been called the biological reductionist approach, further reflecting;

"Medical materialism seems indeed a good appellation for the too simple minded system of thought which we are considering. Medical materialism finishes up St. Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out St. Teresa as an hysteric, St. Francis of Assisi as an hereditary degenerate. George Fox's discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom of a disordered colon."

For the evolutionary psychologists Price and Stevens the original impulse to posit the existence of a God or gods or to improve on pre-existing notions of the aforesaid usually emerge from characters who, they are careful to mention, share much of the symptomatology of today's mental patients and 'neurotics'. In their study *Prophets, Cults and Madness* the "schizotypal" personality trait, a DSM classification which broadly coincides with what Freud defined as the paraphrenias, is implicated as the primary motor force in the splitting of primitive groups and the consequent development of new societies with a fresh ideological superstructure.

The schizotypal personality trait is moreover highly suited to this task because of their supposed "pathogenic" propensity to obsessively dream of new and improved systems of social organization. In the modern world the same sets of behaviours are now treated as a threat to the social order because the base from which the "experients" would have received support - the network of close affiliations and alliances characteristic of an integrated village and community life - have, in modern times, been largely eroded.

What the "madmen" (seers, prophets, shamans) of earlier times seemed to have had as an advantage, prior to the Enlightenment, and the near universal acceptance of empirical modes of enquiry to establish "the truth", was the communal acceptance of the presence of a spiritual realm; a realm which allowed for the existence of the gods, witchcraft, the supernatural and, if you like, pillars of tortoises.

In other words, some, like the shamans, had a privileged position with regard to the generation of meaning and it seems in fact that there has been a remarkable reversal of fortunes for the bearers of the condition. The body of the experient has necessarily remained the same, yet the process of signifying inscription has over the millenia conspired to invert their relative value to society. This transition or fall from grace invites all manner of interesting questions not least from the point of view of what we may call social evolutionary dynamics.

Can a genotype that was not only accepted but thrived from the earliest stirrings of human consciousness be so summarily dispensed with? To what extent has the phenotype expression of the psychotic/experient genotype altered from hunter-gatherer times to the present and what is the exact nature of the adjustments which the phenotype has felt incumbent to make? How has the genotype compensated for the radical shift in signifying inscription? This altered interface between the body of the experient and the wider social whole may be dramatised as follows;

Ancient World
Your voices tell us the thoughts of our ancestors, you shall tell us the meaning of our dreams, perform our rituals, draft our laws, and speak on our behalf to the gods. Your gifts are vital to the spiritual life of the tribe.

Modern World
Your voices tell us that you have a diseased brain. There is no cure, but this illness can be combated through the use of neuroleptics. If you had the money you could avail of a psychotherapist who can interpret your dreams and perform a ritual of cathartic cleansing. If you disagree with this diagnosis you will most probably relapse. In which case, we will have little sympathy, declare you to 'lack insight' and expose you to 'our law'; indefinite confinement. There are no gods. From an economic standpoint you are currently worthless, which reflects the level of interest I'm showing in you, hardly any, as you can tell. However, you may once again become a productive member of society. The choice is yours.

So, I wanted to talk about what has come to be called 'psychosis' but you can't begin to have a discussion when there has been so much of this accumulated interference. Strangely enough, the further back in time you go the more fitting the explanation. You come across first-hand accounts and experiences that more resemble your own. Then, somewhere around the turn of the 18th century a savage domestication had occurred; the 'condition' had been hijacked by the medical fraternity, its then specificity immolated and its ludic mysteries expunged.

In short, no particular importance should be attached to my use of the word 'psychosis', it is merely the present day nomenclature for the phenomenon under consideration. As we are perhaps aware 'psychosis' is a strictly medical category and as such is grounded in the historically contingent act of handing over to clinicians the task of interpretation. For the historical development of the concept of 'madness' it is enough to remind ourselves that there is this history of intersecting influences, some consciously determined, others derived 'passively' from prevailing epistemological assumptions. These have contributed, and continue to do so, to our understandings of what is meant by, what I am tempted to describe, for the sake of a certain type of clarity, as simply x.

For the moment we will stick to the present term 'psychosis', whose singular failing, let us be reminded, as a satisfactory 'signifier' is precisely its function as a diagnostic category. In other words, as a signifier, it immediately designates the individual as belonging to this sorry tradition of belittlement, this corpus of knowledge produced by the psych-industry that diminishes and incapacitates.

Since we need to start somewhere we may as well begin with some of the concepts found in the work of the French social philosopher, Michel Foucault, since his labours have perhaps done the most to alert us to this particular hegemony's construction of knowledge

Divided into two distinct periods, Foucault's first phase is often regarded as the archaeological, the second as the genealogical. As he understood them, the dissemination of systems of thought and knowledge ('epistemes', or discursive formations) particularly as they pertain to the social field are governed by unconscious rules that make their proper apprehension lie beyond all but the most rigorous analyses. It is these 'rules' that determine the range of conceptual possibilities open to a society in any given period.

The 'social archaeologist' through an exhaustive study of the conditions that gave rise to and support the dominant episteme will be able to expose the often contingent and non-rational manner through which they secured legitimacy. More often, what is 'unearthed' by this form of social archaeology will be a detailed excursus of the means by which the dominant narratives maintained their hegemony. A genealogical analysis, by contrast, but in tandem with the same overall project of emancipation attempts to unearth those ignored, subjugated, or 'illegitimate' narratives and by unveiling them provide a more trenchant and lasting form of social critique.

Generally, it is through the richness and diversity of these alternative narratives that the inconsistencies and contradictions of the dominant paradigm begin to announce themselves. More often too we can also detect in these 'micro-narratives' the incursions or territorializing of the rationale and logic of the dominant meta-narrative(s).

Their organizing or 'master' signifiers will announce themselves at times so forcefully that our valued micro-narratives far from being the pristene and unalloyed stories we would like them to be often instead emerge as mimetic reproductions; more influenced than influencing. This is an effect of power.

It is here too then that there must begin the project of restoring true agency, valid self-determination and genuine empowerment to the often oppressed bearers of these suppressed 'tales from the underground'. In this respect too we may remind ourselves of the notion of the subaltern; a term originally used by Antonio Gramsci in the context of postcolonial theory to refer to marginalized or minority groups under the yolk of imperialist hegemony.

But in the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in particular her essay, 'Can the subaltern speak?' the term has received a more nuanced meaning referring to the subtle ways in which a person is denied this agency or means of representation on account, not merely of their physical dispossession through the colonial process but of their linguistic dispossession as a result both of the scrambling of familiar cultural registers and the forcible imposition of a foreign language; both of which events will now forever sit uneasily with the more natural rhythms of the native indigenuous 'mazeways' and idioscapes.

In our own context we can see that the dominant narratives produced by the psych-industry have wholly co-opted the experience of 'psychosis'. Having being brought it into being as a 'medical condition', Big Pharma has shepherded it carefully through its own studiously choreographed 'neuroleptic revolution' and is now watching it mature into some *optimus prime* real estate - evidenced by the fact that market penetration for the 'psychosis' product alone will inevitably spill over the two per cent demographic due to the casual ubiquity of off-label prescriptions and an increasingly expansionary diagnostic umbrella.

The United States today consumes eighty per cent of the entire global production of pharmaceutical drugs. It is an almost unimaginably lucrative market. In Pattison and Warren's 2002 paper 'Drug industry profits: hefty pharmaceutical company margins dwarf other industries', published by Public Citizen Congress Watch it was estimated that in that calendar year the top 10 drugs companies in the United States had an average profit margin of 17% compared to an average of 3.1% for all other companies in the Fortune 500.

What is altogether more remarkable is that the profits of these 10 companies ($35.9b) were more than half the combined profits of the other 490 companies ($69.6b). You cannot even begin to talk about 'mental illness' without reference to figures such as these. As the US market becomes increasingly saturated we may expect a steady migration of novel afflictions and disorders from across the Atlantic as US drugs companies aggressively target European markets - ADHD being the boardroom's current poster-child.

The 'subject', and I use the word deliberately, has been interpellated, for the person is no longer an autonomous actor, but is subject-to, or 'subjected to' the interpretative power of the corrosive fables emanating from these powerful institutions. Marx, who was alas, not an idiot, was among the first to deploy the notion of the interpellated subject, meaning as I have said, an individual who is been 'spoken for', deprived of autonomy; represented, but scarcely on 'their behalf'. And so, not for the first time in history a powerful multi-institutional complex is determining for its own ends the nature of objective reality.

When President Eisenhower, on leaving office, warned the American people to beware the disturbing encroachments of the 'military-industrial complex' he presumably looked to the executive and legislative branches of government as a bulwark. That the converse has occurred; the former absorbing the latter aided by rabble-rousing Cold War rhetoric and a frankly comatose electorate, should likewise have not struck him as all that shocking.

We call our own somewhat humbler, though no less ambitious *Complex*, 'psycho-pharmaceutical' mainly out of respect for brevity, for in reality it contains at least three other important feeding stations; a strumpeted research sector beholden to corporate financing, a hamstrung legislative crippled by the threat of an internationally mobile capital and, certainly with respect to the framing of the discourse on 'mental health' we see a wholly compromised fourth estate, the mainstream media. So, sitting in the midst of these four axes, which are simply a transparent extension of its will, lie the corporate entities of 'Big Pharma'.

Tales of the Fall of Communism

by spellbanisher

In this article I am going to summarize what I perceive as the two mainstream explanations for the fall soviet communism. Then I will highlight the implications of these two stories and informally comment on their validity in lieu of the historical record. These stories are not incompatible, but neither do they necessarily go hand in hand.

By mainstream, I mean explanations that essentially say communism failed because it wasn't market based. Where they differ is on why market economies succeed where soviet economies fail. There are many other explanations for why the soviet union failed, such as that it wasn't true communism. I don't care and I'm not going to discuss those explanations.

The first story can be summarized in a few lines. Communism failed because it is incompatible with human nature. People need incentives to work. Without the ability to get ahead, there is not incentive to work hard, innovate, or invest. Furthermore, if everyone is paid the same, there is no incentive to become a doctor over a hamburger flipper. Thus, resources and labor are not allocated to their most productive uses, and individuals tend to be lazy and unmotivated. Unproductive labor and misallocation of resources leads to stagnation and decline.

The second story cannot be summarized as succinctly, which is probably why it is not as commonly told in popular media and internet forums. This story deals more with how an industrializing economy evolves over time.

Initially, resources are marshalled to move workers into industry and to build factories and infrastructure. Workers become more skilled, infrastructure becomes more extensive, and technology becomes more advanced. Eventually, this results in such enormous productivity gains that jobs are destroyed. The most famous example of this is in agriculture, where technology has reduced the percentage of the population needed to produce society's food from over 90% to less than 3%.

As jobs are destroyed in producer industries, workers must be reallocated to new industries. New industries are formed by innovation, which flourishes best when you have millions of entrepreneurs, companies, and scientists working on their own ideas. This process of creation and destruction is continual. In the nineties, for instance, 115 million jobs were destroyed in the United States, but about 137 million were created.

It is at the point of transition from producer industries(the building of factories, roads, railroads, agricultural implements, automobiles, and other infrastructure) to consumer industries that communism fails. A centrally planned system can come up with neither the myriad innovations that create the new industries to keep labor productively employed, nor can it efficiently allocate the millions of workers displaced every year from job destruction. Without new industries, workers get trapped in industries that need fewer and fewer workers. Thus, per capita productivity declines, as does the overall wealth of society.

Both stories make markets central to sustained prosperity, but the implications of the two stories could not be more different. In the first story inequality is the basis of a modern economy. Without inequality, labor has no incentive to produce, capital has no incentive to invest, and society stagnates. Thus, greater inequality is often good for society. It creates greater incentives to work hard and to invest aggressively. Any attempts to redistribute wealth or tax the job creators ultimately constrains economic growth and productivity, as it lowers incentives to work hard and produce. In terms of policy, the implications of the first story are that any necessary government services should be funded by flat taxes (taxes that don't affect the distribution of wealth). This story is also more amenable to policies that encourage economic inequality, such as intellectual property and antiunion laws.

The second story implies that too much inequality can be a bad thing. If consumerism requires millions of companies, individuals, and scientists working on their own ideas to create new innovations and industries, then the concentration of economic resources into fewer hands can have the same adverse consequences as central planning: fewer individuals with access to the resources to develop their ideas.

Furthermore, too much income concentration can be a bad thing. As income concentrates, innovators have more incentive to innovate for few segments of society. This results in fewer innovation, or more intensive innovation in fewer industries, leading to the creation of fewer industries and thus fewer jobs for displaced workers.

The policy implications of the second story are that the government should pursue policies that give the broadest number of people access to economic resources. General public infrastructure allows for greater number of companies to compete. Public funding of basic research provides the foundations for innovation that is available to everyone. General public education allows more individuals to more fully develop their abilities and resources and pursue economic opportunities that allow them to fulfill their potential. Broader education also makes it easier for workers to move to new industries. As technology and society becomes more complex, so does the demands on workers. Having an unskilled or uneducated workforce is a impediment to the number of new industries that viability be created at any point in time. Safety nets allow individuals to take more chances. One instance of this; in the United States many tech workers won't start-up because they don't want to lose their health insurance.

The historical record is not kind to the first story. The Soviet Union was able to industrialize in a quarter century, whereas most modern economies took a half century plus to industrialize. If workers were lazy and unmotivated under communism, it could not have industrialized so quickly.

The experiences of modern developed nations also undermines the first story. Many countries with high taxes and high levels of equality, such as the Nordic states and Japan, are also some of the most innovative and productive countries in the world. On average, developed countries are much more equal and have higher levels of redistribution and taxation than in poorer countries.

In the United States, there has been no correlation in the last eighty years between tax rates and and levels of investment. Indeed, corporate investment has been much lower in the last thirty years than in the previous thirty when tax rates were higher; overall investment also declined in spite of the lowering of capital gains taxes. Furthermore, productivity growth in the last thirty years has been much lower than in the previous thirty years, even though the 1950-1980 period saw a much more economically egalitarian economy than the 1980-2010 period. This isn't to say that economic equality/inequality is the cause of these trends, only to say that if inequality was the basis of economic prosperity, the 195This isn't to say that economic equality/inequality is the cause of these trends, 0-1980 period should have been one of the least productive and innovative periods in American history, which the historical record shows to be the opposite.

While the second story in general is more consonant with the historical record, it doesn't mean they are in perfect accord. It hasn't always been true that dispersion of economic resources results in more innovation. Most of the products we use today were created by huge corporations. The long gilded age, 1880-1930, saw both unprecedented levels of inequality and enormous gains in productivity and innovation. Innovation in the United States, where there is a high level of economic concentration and lower level of small business, is higher than in European countries where business is more dispersed. In the case of Japan, despite the relative income egalitarianism as the individual level, their economy is still dominated by major corporations. However, the dominance of major tech companies in Japan as opposed to the greater incidence of startups in the United States may explain why the US and not Japan became the world's major player in software technology.

Another factor that must be considered is that over time technology becomes more complex, which also means it requires investment of more resources to continue to innovate. This may mean that much innovation can only be done by major corporations and universities. On the other hand, the necessary concentration of research and innovation may also result in lower overall levels of innovation, resulting in lower economic growth and higher levels of unemployment and underemployment. As Tyler Cowen has argued in *The Great Stagnation*, this is already happening. Despite the fact that research and development spending more than doubled between 1965 and 1985, the number of patents issued fell from 55,000 in 1966 to 53,000 in 1993.

> This isn't to say that economic equality-inequality is the cause of these trends,…

THE *NEW YORK TIMES* BESTSELLER
THE GREAT STAGNATION
How America Ate All the Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better

"THE MOST DEBATED NONFICTION BOOK SO FAR THIS YEAR" —DAVID BROOKS, *THE NEW YORK TIMES*

TYLER COWEN

This is my narrative and analysis of the little-known war waged by the Mughals against the Uzbeks in Central Asia between 1645 and 1647. This military campaign was notable for being the only time, in all of recorded history, that an India-based power sought to annex Central Asian territory, and went on the offensive across the Hindu Kush for that purpose. The entire war was fought north of the Hindu Kush mountains, with the main Mughal base of operations being located at Balkh, and the Uzbek capital being located at Bukhara. Shah Jahan himself had personally moved to Kabul with his court to better oversee the campaign. The Mughals ultimately failed to achieve their objectives, and the war ended with a status quo ante bellum, with the Hindu Kush continuing to form the northwest boundary of the Mughal Empire. By examining the ill-fated campaign, one can better answer the long-standing question of why invasions between Central Asia and India have historically been so one-sided, and why few other Indian states before or since have carried out similar campaigns.

Background:

Southern Central Asia in the 17th century was dominated by the Khanate of Bukhara, ruled by the Janid dynasty (also known as the Ashtrakhanids, as they originated from Ashtrakhan). From 1611 to 1642, the Khanate was ruled by Imam Quli Khan, whose reign was generally a stable one. His younger brother, Nadr Mohammed, ruled the provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan in what is now northern Afghanistan as a de facto independent ruler.

In 1622, Imam Quli Khan sent an offer of alliance to Mughal emperor Jahangir, proposing a joint offensive against the Safavids in Khurasan. However, the Mughal Empire at the time was embroiled in campaigns in the Deccan, and was not particularly interested in diverting forces away from that front. That same year, Shah Abbas of Persia launched an invasion of Mughal Afghanistan, and succeeded in capturing Kandahar. The failure of the Mughals to retake Kandahar from the Persians was interpreted by the Uzbeks as an indication of Mughal weakness, and they soon forgot about their alliance proposal, choosing instead to attack the Mughals and profit as the Persians had. The Uzbeks attacked in 1625 and again in 1626, but were repulsed on both occasions. On 19 May 1628, Nadr Mohammed launched a large-scale invasion of Mughal territory with the intention of capturing Kabul. The Uzbek army advanced up to Lamghan, ravaging the countryside along the way, and laid siege to Kabul in early June. The Mughal response to the invasion was swift; an army led by Mahabat Khan, the governor of Peshawar, and Rao Surat Singh was dispatched with 20,000 men to relieve the besieged city. The Uzbeks were routed and withdrew in defeat, with the Mughals holding a triumphal parade in Kabul on 14 September. This, coincidentally, was the first recorded military victory of Shah Jahan's reign, which began that same year.

The 1630s saw no further Uzbek invasions, and also saw the conclusion of the Mughal campaigns in the Deccan. Kandahar, which had been lost to the Persians the previous decade, came back under Mughal control in 1638. The Empire was at the peak of its power and prosperity, and the Mughal position in the northwest was as strong as it had ever been. Shah Jahan, at this point, became interested in pursuing his cherished dream of restoring Mughal rule to his ancestral homelands in Central Asia. The perfect opportunity to do so seemed to arise with the abdication of Imam Quli Khan in 1642, who had grown blind with age, and his succession by Nadr Mohammed. Unlike his older brother, who was content with letting the subordinate chiefs of Uzbekistan manage their own affairs with little interference, Nadr Mohammed was determined to strengthen his authority as Khan. He pursued a policy of transferring and redistributing the offices and titles of subordinate chiefs, leading to widespread discontent and rebellion among them. The country fell into civil war, and Nadr Mohammed was ultimately overthrown by his son, Abdul Aziz, who was proclaimed Khan of Bukhara in April 1645. However, Nadr Mohammed managed to retain his territories in Balkh and Badakhshan, which were under his possession even before he became Khan.

The Campaign:

The Mughals, taking advantage of the political turmoil and divisions in Central Asia, now commenced their opening attacks. In August 1645, a Mughal army under Asalat Khan was sent north to occupy Badakshan. Two months later, on 15 October, a force under Raja Jagat Singh was dispatched from Kabul and captured Khost. A fort was built between Sarab and Andarab in modern Baghlan province, and a Rajput garrison was placed there. Raja Jagat Singh returned to Kabul on 4 November, via the Panjshir Valley.

The main Mughal offensive had to wait until the next year. In June 1646, Prince Murad Baksh, a son of Shah Jahan, advanced from Kabul to Balkh with an army of 50,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, including musketeers, rocketmen, and gunners. Kahmard, Ghori, and Qunduz were all conquered by the Mughals, with the main army arriving in Balkh on 2 July. As far as we know, the army of Murad Baksh faced no major opposition during this military action. Nadr Mohammed, having lost his territories, fled to Persia, leaving his treasure to be plundered by the Mughals.

However, the young Murad Baksh soon came to tire of the unpleasant climate and foreign customs of Balkh, and desired to return to Hindustan. According to the *Badshahnama*, "many of the *amirs* and *mansabdars*, who were with the prince concurred with this unreasonable desire [to leave Balkh]. Natural love of home, a

preference for the people and manners of Hindustan, and the rigours of the climate, all conduced to this desire." With the Mughal commanders indifferent to the course of the campaign and desirous to leave as soon as possible, the soldiers became unruly and lost their discipline, and began plundering the local inhabitants. An angry Shah Jahan, upon receiving news of his son's abandonment of his position, sent his vizier Sadullah Khan to take the place of Murad Baksh. He arrived in Balkh on 10 August, and began reorganizing the despondent Mughal army. Shah Jahan himself had also moved from Lahore to Kabul, to be closer to the front. Prince Murad Baksh was disgraced for his failure to carry out his duties, and was deprived of his mansab. As winter approached, the Mughals garrisoned key outposts in southern Central Asia, including Termez, Qunduz, Rostaq, Taleqan, and Maimana. However, bands of Uzbeks began infiltrating into the Mughal territory and surrounded these frontier outposts, leaving them in a state of siege throughout the winter of 1646-47. The Mughals were unable to inflict decisive defeats on the Uzbek bands, who avoided open conflict; at the same point, the harsh climate and logistic difficulties prevented further Mughal offensives.

As the next campaigning season dawned, Shah Jahan appointed Prince Aurangzeb, then serving as the governor of Gujarat, to lead operations in Central Asia. Aurangzeb arrived in Kabul on 3 April 1647. Four days later, on 7 April, he set out for Balkh to reinforce the Mughal forward positions and expand the

campaign. The Mughal army under his command had a strength of 35,000 men, the majority of whom would have been heavy cavalry, supported by musket infantry, elephants, and artillery. The Uzbeks opposing them had amassed a total of 120,000 men, the majority of whom would have been light cavalry. Granted, the Uzbeks lacked the centralized leadership of the Mughals, and also lacked the heavy shock troops and gunpowder weaponry needed to inflict decisive defeats on an enemy, but they possessed the crucial advantages of numbers, mobility, and knowledge of terrain. The Uzbeks, led by a chieftain named Qutlugh Mohammed, attacked the Mughals as they were passing through the Dera-i-Gaz Valley. The Uzbeks were repulsed by the Rajput vanguard of the Mughal army, but not decisively so. The Uzbeks regrouped and, on 21 May, launched another attack against the Mughals. However, the Uzbeks this time made a tactical error by attacking the front of the Mughal army, rather than its rear or flanks. The Mughal wings were able to envelop and destroy the Uzbek force, and Balkh was reached on 25 May without any further fighting. The defence and custody of the city was handed over to Madhu Singh Hada.

Abdul Aziz, the Uzbek khan, now sent a force under Beg Ughli across the Amu Darya to Aqcha. The Mughals too set out towards Aqcha, following a three days' stop at Balkh. The center of the Mughal army was commanded by Aurangzeb, the vanguard by Bahadur Khan, and the rear by Ali Mardan Khan. The Uzbeks initially launched frontal attacks against the Mughals, but these were successfully repulsed on 2 June 1647 by Mughal musket-fire. The Uzbeks then opted to skirmish against the Mughal columns, wearing them down slowly through attrition. Then, on 5 June, news of a large army advancing south from Bukhara to Balkh reached the Mughal camp. The Mughal commanders were forced to turn around to defend the vital city, which was their center of operations in the theater. On 7 June, the Uzbeks led by Subhan Quli, brother of Abdul Aziz Khan, attacked the moving Mughal army in full force. However, they were once again repulsed by the superior firepower of the Mughal musketry and artillery. The Mughals safely returned to Balkh on 11 June.

By middle of 1647, both sides had suffered considerably from the back-and-forth fighting. Given the huge disparity in resources between the Indian empire of the Mughals and the Uzbeks, however, it is reasonable to assume that the latter were suffering much more than the former. The Uzbek armies, which had banded together largely because of the prospect of easy loot from the Mughals, began disintegrating when such financial rewards were not forthcoming. Some of the Uzbek cavalry were even said to have sold their horses to the Mughals (Central Asian horses were highly valued by Indians and fetched high prices), and then camped back across the Amu Darya! However, the Mughals for their part could not take advantage of this lack of discipline and organization among the Uzbeks and complete the conquest of Central Asia, for a couple pressing reasons. Firstly, there was a worry that, if the Mughals succeeded with the annexation of Central Asia, the Mughal troops and commanders would be permanently stationed there. Few of the Mughal commanders were interested in spending their careers in the region, as they all preferred the wealth, luxury, and familiarity of India. Indeed, some of the Mughal commanders, like Bahadur Khan, even secretly opposed Aurangzeb and the war effort, to avoid such a result. Secondly, and perhaps more pressingly, the Mughal army was faced with a serious shortage of food, caused by the ravaging effects of warfare on the countryside over the last couple years. There was great inflation in the prices of basic foodstuffs, with grain being sold at 10 per maund at the Mughal camp. The Mughal difficulties were compounded by the fact that the country lacked proper winter accommodation for a large army, and that many of the Indian soldiers were not accustomed to the cold climate. In light of all these issues, the Mughals, as well as the Uzbeks, both sought to bring the war to a close.

Peace Settlement and Withdrawal:

In mid-June, shortly after Aurangzeb had returned to Balkh, negotiations were opened with Nadr Mohammed, the exiled ex-ruler of the territories occupied by the Mughals since 1645. The talks moved slowly, lasting over three months before a settlement was concluded by Nadr Mohammed's grandsons on 23 September 1647. On 1 October, Balkh was formally handed over to the grandsons, and the Mughals began the withdrawal to Kabul two days later, on 3 October. The Mughal army during the withdrawal was commanded in the following manner: the right wing under Ali Mardan Khan, the left wing under Raja Jai Singh, and the rear under Bahadur Khan. The Mughal army continued to be harassed by roving bands of Uzbeks during the retreat, with the crossing at Ghazniyak pass being particularly slow and painful. On 14 October, the Mughals reached Ghori fort. From there until Kabul, Hazara tribesmen replaced the Uzbeks in harassing the Mughal columns. An early and unusually severe winter added greatly to the suffering of the Mughal army. The Mughals were burdened by a load of 10 lakh rupees and a lack of pack animals, thousands of whom died during the winter passage through the Hindu Kush. Aurangzeb crossed the range on 24 October, and reached Kabul on 27 October. However, large components of the Mughal army were still several days behind, and were slowed down by the heavy sleet and snow in the mountain passes. The Mughal column under Raja Jai Singh, in particular, crossed the Hindu Kush in the midst of a brutal snowstorm, and suffered immensely. The last Mughal troops finally returned to Kabul on 10 November 1647, marking the end of the campaign.

Conclusion and Analysis:

The Mughal campaign was, by all standards, a strategic failure. No territory was gained, no changes in ruling dynasty were made, and nothing of tangible benefit was acquired. The Mughals suffered 5,000 casualties during the campaign, the vast majority of whom died from the brutal weather, and also lost a similar number of animals (including horses, elephants, camels, etc.). The cost of the campaign was immense, amounting to some 4 crore rupees in total; to put this into perspective, the Mughals were able to collect only 22 lakh rupees in revenue from the conquered territories in Central Asia, during the brief imperial occupation.

Despite the failure of the Mughals to achieve their strategic objectives, the tactical performance of the imperial army was not terrible. In fact, although the Mughals can be said to have lost the war, they did not lose a single battle. The Mughals invariably repulsed every direct Uzbek attack, but they were unable to inflict decisive defeats on the enemy and break their back. The Uzbeks practiced a far more mobile style of warfare (which, ironically, was quite similar to the original Mughal style of warfare, practiced in the days of Babur), while the Mughals, although possessing far more firepower than the Uzbeks, were also more cumbersome and less able to maneuver effectively. The Mughal army, replete with heavy cavalry, musketeers, elephants, artillery, and all the pomp and pageantry of great imperial militaries, was more than capable of inspiring awe among the natives of Central Asia, but less capable of actually delivering decisive military results. This became especially apparent when the Mughals were pitted against a decentralized, militarized society like the Uzbeks, where every man was a cavalryman and a fighter, and "conquest" proved far easier than sustained military occupation.

Other reasons for the Mughal strategic failure have been alluded to earlier in the narrative. The distaste of both Mughal commanders and the average soldiers for Central Asia led to their lack of enthusiasm in completing the conquest and annexation of the country. As mentioned before, some Mughal commanders who were deputed to serve in the region, like Bahadur Khan, were secretly opposed to the war effort, and not particularly keen in seeing the task through. The difficulties posed to the Mughals by the harsh climate, as well as the logistic issues (especially in terms of food shortages), were also important factors in explaining the Mughal failure.

The failure of Shah Jahan's Central Asian campaign can be said to mark the beginning of the decline of Mughal power in the region. The Safavids of Persia, who had earlier pledged neutrality during the Mughal campaign (in early 1647, an Indian embassy had been sent to Isfahan, the Persian capital, for this purpose), took advantage of the Mughal defeat to pursue their own interests in the region. In the summer of 1648, Shah Abbas II of Persia set out to Afghanistan with an army of 40,000, and captured Kandahar from the Mughals on 22 February 1649. Despite repeated attempts in subsequent years, the Mughals failed each time to recapture Kandahar, indicating deep structural issues within the Mughal military. Kabul remained under Mughal control for the duration of Aurangzeb's long reign, but it remained a neglected frontier. A few decades after Aurangzeb's death, foreign armies once again crossed the Hindu Kush, but this time in the far more usual, opposite direction - from Persia/Central Asia into the Indian subcontinent. Nader Shah Afsharid and Ahmad Shah Durrani were the two most famous conquerors of the 18th century who made a fortune plundering the once-proud heart of the Mughal Empire.

However, no one who was familiar with history should have been surprised by such events. As the great Abu'l Fazl, close friend and adviser to Emperor Akbar, once said, "intelligent men of the past have considered Kabul and Kandahar as the twin gates of Hindustan, one (Kandahar) for the passage to Iran, and the other (Kabul) for that to Turan. By guarding these two places, Hindustan obtains peace from the raider and global traffic by these two routes can prosper." Indeed, the invasions of India in the 18th century, following the collapse of central Mughal authority, were merely a return to the long-standing historical norm of a highly unstable northwestern frontier and a jumble of weak, decentralized Indian states. To the historian, such cyclical trends are fascinating in themselves, but what are even more fascinating are the exceptions to the trends - the astonishing actions of powerful and ambitious men, which go against the currents of precedent and tradition. The Mughal campaign in Central Asia was precisely such an action, and it will be interesting to see if, or when, this particular history will repeat itself.

> "The failure of Shah Jahan's Central Asian campaign can be said to mark the beginning of the decline of Mughal power in the region."

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Of the many provinces in the Roman Empire, fewer were harder-won than Spain (which was in fact divided into several small provinces, varying in names and borders over the centuries of Roman dominance). The tribes of Spain were diverse in culture - the Lusitanians of what is now Portugal, and the tribes of northern Spain were Gaulish-speaking Celts, whereas some historians detect an African influence in the language of the Iberian peoples in southern Spain. Even more diverse were the political and social divisions of these peoples-locked in a state of perpertual, small-scale warfare, raid and counter raid.

But all of these peoples were united by their fighting spirit. Both the legions of Rome and the mercenary bands of Carthage had to face Spanish warriors, but by the second half of the 3rd Century BCE Spain was providing Carthage with some of her most numerous and bellicose contingents. The various Hispanic and Celtiberian tribes provided Hannibal and other Punic commanders with tough, fleet-footed infantrymen as well as cavalrymen who were as flexible as they were eager for battle.

Diverse as their cultural and linguistic affinities may have been, the Spanish tribes were all warrior cultures; in particular they glorified the mounted swordsman. Strabo and other ancient authorities commented on both the numbers and the quality of the wild horses of Spain. Modestly proportioned, many of them were little more than ponies to modern eyes yet were allegedly able to carry two men for long distances.

by SALAH

The Cavalry of Ancient Spain

Their speed and beauty made them desirable for equestrian gentlemen even in the settled days of the Empire, when the former riders of these majestic steeds had long since been tamed.

While ancient texts comment at length on the ancient Spanish horsemen, archaeology has been very generous in backing up their claims. What remains of Celtiberian culture reveals a people who worshiped the horse with a devotion that bordered on fetishim. Horses, usually mounted, are depicted on a myriad of vases and inscriptions, and are also envisioned in many sculptures, some of which may have been intended as idols. A host of bronze figurines, likely votary offerings, further attest to the popularity of equine themes in the imaginations of ancient Spain's talented metal-workers.

In some ways, the Spanish equestrian tradition looks crude. Saddles seem to have been unknwon in pre-Roman Spain despite the usage of the four-pronged Gaulish saddle favored by the Romans as well as the Gauls. Instead the Spaniards rode bareback, or on animal hides; the usage of a spotted wild-cat's hide as a horse blanket is attested. On the other hand, some researchers have tentatively credited the invention of the horseshoe to the Celtiberian horsemen; one of the many ases from Liria (in modern Valencia) depicts a cavalryman mounted on a horse wearing some manner of armor resembling chainmail. Even the animal's individual legs are each armored, though this perhaps seems a bit implausible. Either way, the overall effect of this unique image (unattested by ancient accounts) reminds us of the cataphracts of the contemporary Middle East. This may be a case of military parallel evolution, though an armored steed is in contradiction to what was expected, tactically, of the Hispanic cavalryman.

In battle, the Celtiberian used his horse much like how his British cousin used his chariot-a vehicle to get to and from the place of battle, but not often ridden in battle itself. Celtiberian mounts were even trained to kneel and remain silent, so as not to betray warriors plotting an ambush. The Celtiberians functioned as what we would modernly term guerillas, launching surprise attacks and lightning raids on the enemy. The horse was the reason for their uncanny mobility, but seldom their comrade in the thick of battle. The typical Celtiberian horseman was not necessarily a chieftain, but was probably a better-off member of the tribe. His equipment would include a helmet (often bronze and decorated with a crest), likely some form of body armor (captured Roman chainmail and simple bronze discs strapped to the chest would be common, though vases depict scalemail), one or several spears that could be used as javelins or thrusting weapons, the caetra (a round shield similar to the bucklers and targes of later times, and reflecting the swashbuckling nature of Celtiberian swordsmanship), and the dreaded falcata, a heavy precursor to the falchion of the Middle Ages, and a sister to the machaera of ancient Greece.

Celtiberians

It may have been common for a Spanish horse to carry two men into battle, its owner as well as a light infantryman. In Celtic warbands cavalry and chariotry often closely cooperated with javelineers and archers, the latter hitching rides with the former and supporting them in battle. Pausanias refers to the "trimarcisia" - a uniquely Celtic tactical unit consisting of three men sharing one horse, the man currently riding the horse using it to transport his comrades back and forth to the place of battle. The Celtiberian tendencies to fight dismounted with horses hidden nearby, as well as the notable sturdiness of their mounts, strongly suggests that a similar system was practiced by the tribes Rome faced in the Iberian Peninsula.

The Roman conquest of Spain began with the Punic Wars, and was not completely finished until Augusutus finally defeated the rebellion of the belligerent hill tribes of Cantabria in 19 BC. The Empire required at least ten legions, as well as the aid of friendly Spanish troops, to put these remarkably aggressive clans of shepherds and hunters in their place-an extremely powerul testimony to the stubborn warrior spirit of the pre-Roman Spaniards.

The story of the Spanish horsemen does not conclude with this final chapter to their independence. Not unlike the Scottish Highlanders of the 18th and 19th Centuries, it could be argued that the saga of Europe's Celtic warriors did not reach its climax until after their grudging submission to Rome. Spain was second only to Gaul in the number of recruits it provided for the Roman auxilia, most of them serving in the cavalry wings.

Though it enjoyed a prosperous upper class (who ruled the Roman Empire for much of the 2nd Century CE) , Spain was regarded as a squalid backwater in the days of the Empire. Most of its people lived in a state of poverty and misery, working as shepherds or miners, dangerous and notorious unrewarding professions. Service in the cavalry must have appealed to many young Spaniards indeed. It was a tribute to the brutal, passionate warriors the Roman Republic had once faced in Iberia, that their descendants were now on the front lines in the defense of the Empire their dashing ancestors had so valiantly opposed.

The Impact of
Baron Von Steuben
in the Continental Army
by Grotsmack

While working on my Master's thesis about the discipline in Washington's Continental Army while at Valley Forge, I stumbled across Wayne Bodle's book, *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War*.

It quickly became one of my main secondary sources in understanding how the Army could struggle in what was at one time considered the breadbasket of America. Bodle presented in this book the notion that perhaps Baron Von Steuben's contribution to the Continental Army was not as miraculous as the myths have presented. [1] When I first read this, I immediately took to trying to prove Bodle wrong. I stumbled through paragraphs trying to disavow Bodle's statements on Steuben. To me, it was verging on heresy, as I was a career Army man, a direct descendant of the Von Steuben system. As a young private in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) I had carried a copy of the Division Blue Book named after his famous book on drill and ceremony. Von Steuben was THE example that one wanted to set when conducting drill and ceremony, marching on the parade field. Not important to a modern day soldier, as small unit tactics have long since replaced the need for wheeling a battalion into line; however, the discipline that drill instilled was the major reason we still practiced. I started to see my flaw, however. I was too close to this argument, and had not used the discipline of the historian when dealing with the topic. The more I dug into this issue, I started to see that Bodle was correct, and there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Von Steuben had any true effect on the discipline and conduct of the Continental Army at the time.[2] I truly struggled with this realization, for it was not easy laying down the beliefs that I had held so dear as a soldier, to the evidence that history was providing. There really was not enough to back the claims that some have laid before in building up the myth that is Valley Forge, and the crucible of that winter that formed the ragged army into an effective fighting force to drive off the British. Von Steuben would be involved in the attempt to recapture Benedict Arnold as one of La Fayette's field commanders, but proved to be rather ineffective in that role, and soon would take a leave of absence until his organizational skills were needed again at Yorktown.[3] The legend that I had held was starting to fade. As a soldier, I could look up to the Baron, but as a historian, I needed to look objectively at this, and try to peel the layers of myth away from the truth.

I still hold the Baron in high regard. His impact, while not as transforming as I may have once believed, was still important enough to merit him a statue at Valley Forge overlooking the parade field where he drilled the test company. He was able to streamline the commands and process for an Army that wanted to know the reasons for what they did, not just be mindless robots or peasants obeying blind commands.[4] He was able to unify the soldiers from various states with various methods of drill, and get them united which may or may not have paid dividends to the Continental Army at Monmouth. But the lesson I have learned, and hope to impart upon my students, is that we can never fully forget that we are studying people and events that have shaped our nation. We may admire, but we must not get lost in our admiration.

[1] Wayne Bodel, *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War,* (University Park, PA., The Pennsylvania University Press,2002)13
[2] Ibid, 248.
[3] Arnold Whitridge, "Baron von Steuben, Washington's Drillmaster" *History Today,* Jul 76, Vol. 26 Issue 7, pp429-436,435.
[4] Ibid, 434.

END

In what capacities did Hitler's person serve as a symbol to the German people between 1933 and 1947, and to what extent did this succeed?

At the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946, judgement was confirmed over a complete political system. The Trials sought to highlight the criminal nature of Nazism and apportion a collective guilt, or 'communal responsibility' upon the whole German nation. [1] A key line of defence emerged, based on the 'chain of command' principle, of following orders. A dozen death sentences, prison terms, combined with numerous suicides and the wholesale dispersal of high-ranking Nazis, effectively eliminated the head 'gangsters'. [2]

Simultaneously, the forced migration of an estimated fifteen million ethnic Germans; the ferocious raping of possibly one million women; and an imbued sense of personal loss or grieving for lost family helped engender a culture of 'victimhood' [3] that would ultimately reinforce the judgement at Nuremberg. This very sense of victimhood, when combined with the explicit castigation of guilt meted out upon specific individuals at the IMT, presented the German public with an effective acquittal. In their stead, Hitler was presented in his absence as a tyrannical abuser of absolute power who committed a whole nation to criminal activity. This 'satisfactory' outcome, especially so within the deteriorating East-West relations at the time, fails to consider one deeply significant truth: that Hitler, in his many guises, was a response to German values, aspirations and devotion. Thus, German complicity in Hitler's reign is commensurate to complicity, also, in his crimes.   **by AVON**

[1] **Donald Bloxham**, 'The Genocidal Past in Western Germany and the Experience of Occupation, 1945-6', European History Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, (2004), pp. 305-335. See also Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial – War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory, (Oxford, 2001); Konrad H. Jarausch, tr. Brandon Hunziker, After Hitler – Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995, (Oxford, 2006), pp. 7-8.

[2] **Mary Fulbrook**, Fontana History of Germany, 1918-1990 – The Divided Nation, (London, 1991); Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory – The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies, (Harvard, 1997).

[3] **Robert G. Moeller,** 'War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany', The American Historical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4. (Oct., 1996), pp. 1008-1048; Atina Grossman, 'A Question of Silence: The Rape of German Woman by Occupation Soldiers', October, Vol. 72, Berlin 1945: War and Rape "Liberators take Liberties", (Spring, 1995), pp.42-63. Grossman suggests that the number of rape victims may have been as high as one million or as 'few' as 110,000, but stresses that many victims were raped on multiple occasions. On personal loss and a renewed culture of remembrance see Neil Gregor, '"Is he still alive or long since dead?": Loss, absence and remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945-56', German History, Vol. 21, No. 2. (2003).

*Image 1:
NSDAP poster
for the 1932
presidential campaign.*

Questions surrounding the character of Hitler's dictatorship carry significant consequences that range across private and public, as well as personal and political spheres and have, thus far, been tainted by memory and, at times, deep subjectivity. The concerns of historians since the 1960s have now successfully challenged the traditional application of 'totalitarian' dictatorship, prevalent in the 1940s and 50s, in the case of Hitler's regime as espoused at the IMT. [4] Concepts such as 'working towards the Führer' and 'cumulative radicalism' now seriously decentralise Hitler from the regime and vitiate his power and strength as a dictator [5] and consequently, directly challenge the 'satisfactory' outcome of the IMT itself. In other words, the intensity of Hitler's dictatorship directly reflects the level of complicity 'ordinary' Germans had in the regime and its crimes. The resulting debate, when divided cleanly into opposing camps, forms the essential core of the disagreement between those proposing an 'intentionalist' programme and those presenting 'structuralist' consequences as explanations for the events of the Third Reich and the Holocaust. [6]

[4] **Ian Kershaw,** *The Nazi Dictatorship – Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 2nd Edition, (London, 1989), pp. 18-41. In a characteristically reasoned discussion of the concepts of 'totalitarian' and 'fascist' regimes as they were applied, and consequently rejected, to the Third Reich, Kershaw plausibly concludes that, while such concepts have a limited utility, Nazism and the Third Reich were essentially unique. See also Ian Kershaw, *'Hitler and the Uniqueness of Nazism', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2004*), pp. 239-254. John Hiden and John Farquharson, *Explaining Hitler's Germany – Historians and the Third Reich, 2nd edition,* (Totowa, NJ., 1983), pp. 33-34. The changing historical perspective is characteristically well presented by comparing Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, Revised edition, (London, 1962) with Alan Bullock, Hitler and Stalin – Parallel Lives, 5th Impression, (London, 1992), pp. 356-358.

[5] **Ian Kershaw's** concept of 'working towards the Führer' is derived from a speech by Werner Willikens, State Secretary in the Ministry of Food, in 1934. In his speech, Willikens proposed that the Führer could not possibly dictate every aspect of everything he intends to realise in the course of time, and, as a consequence, those within the regime have worked best when they have worked towards the Führer. To further emphasise this point, Willikens asserted that everyone had a *duty* to work in this fashion [emphasis added]. Willikens speech is reproduced in *Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, vol. 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939,* eds. Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, (Exeter, 1984), p. 207. Internal competition within all levels of government and the prevalent notion of 'working towards the Führer' combined to generate a process of 'cumulative radicalisation', thus pushing the Third Reich as a whole towards certain destruction regardless of 'total war' and genocide. See Ian Kershaw, '*Working Towards the Führer' : reflections on the nature of the Hitler dictatorship'* and Hans Mommsen, 'Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction as structural determinants of Nazi dictatorship' in Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction as structural determinants of Nazi dictatorship' in *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison,* eds. Ian Kershaw & Moshe Lewin, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 75-87, 88-106; see also 'Introduction', in *Working Towards the Führer*, eds. McElligott & Kirk, pp. 6-7.

[6] A 'structuralist', or 'functionalist', position generally tends to stress the role of social groups or social classes in the formation and continued function of Nazism and the Third Reich. There is a tendency to reject the idea that responsibility for the evolution of the regime, and then for its many crimes, should be placed either on individual forces or groups. More specifically, they reject the idea that the leading personalities of the Third Reich *intentionally* pushed the nation towards the many barbarous acts that so indelibly scarred the twentieth-century. The 'structuralist' stance often highlights the lack of systematic order within the governmental organs. In short, the sometimes passionate (and often acerbic) response to this 'structuralist' approach has been the 'intentionalist' school whose presumption of a higher moral position often claims that historians who simply examine the structures of decision-making, without regard for the personalities involved, will essentially fail to assign the correct moral responsibility to those individuals who explicitly intended that those structures be such as they were. As a consequence, the crimes were also intended. The Third Reich was governed in a logical manner and the structure of government was a logical result of this. A seminal example of the 'structuralist' argument can be found in Tim Mason, 'Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism', alongside an equally stock statement of 'intentionalist' thought in Klaus Hildebrand, 'Monokratie oder Polykratie? Hitlers Herrschaft und das Dritte Reich', in *The "Führer State": Myth and Reality – Studies on the Structure and Politics of the Third Reich*, eds. Gerhard Hirschfeld & Lothar Kettenacker, (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 23-41, 73-95. For an intelligent evaluation of these issues see Kershaw, *Nazi Dictatorship*, pp. 61-81.

Ian Kershaw's 1987 study, *The Hitler-Myth – Image and Reality in the Third Reich,* although in essence leaning towards the 'structuralist' position, goes someway to finding this 'reasonable' route through the polemics of the above debate. [7] Other recent scholarship has persuasively demonstrated that, for the majority of his reign at least, Hitler's name and credibility remained untouchable by political or popular criticism. [8] So much so was this the case, that the German populace allowed Hitler to drag the nation and, by extension, the rest of Europe to the natural conclusion of his nihilist and pseudo-Darwinian [9] convictions even though criticisms had, by the last year of the war, began to reach as far as Hitler personally. Given the greatly deteriorated condition of Germany, and more visibly Berlin, by 1945, and the suffering that the German people were enduring, [10] many people, even in the face of what may have appeared to many as 'Armageddon', remained optimistic about the Führer's ability to make good the conclusion of the war. [11]

> This very idea demands explanation: How significant was Hitler's hold over the German people? The answer to this, it will be argued here, lies in the projection of Hitler as a 'messiah' to the German people.

[7] **Ian Kershaw**, The Hitler-Myth – Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (Oxford, 1987) is a slightly extended English translation of Der Hitler-Mythos: Volksmeinung und Propaganda im Dritten Reich, published in 1980. See also Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, (London, 1999); Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis, (London, 2000); cf. Kershaw, 'Working towards the Führer', op. cit.

[8] **Kershaw**, Hitler-Myth. For a more compact version of this thesis see Kershaw, 'The Führer Image and Political Integration: The Popular Conception of Hitler in Bavaria during the Third Reich' in "Führer State" eds. Hirschfeld & Kettenacker, pp. 133-160. See also David Welch, ''Working towards the Führer': charismatic leadership and the image of Adolf Hitler in Nazi propaganda' in Working Towards the Führer – Essays in Honour of Sir Ian Kershaw, eds. Anthony McElligott & Tim Kirk, (Manchester, 2003), pp. 93-117. The seminal text on popular opinion in the Third Reich throughout the war years is Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans – Public Mood and Attitude During the Second World War, Edited and Translated by Thomas E. J. de Witt, (Ohio, 1977).

[9] **Herf** states that Hitler's revolution was a "revolution of nihilism" see Jeffrey Herf, 'Reactionary Modernism: Some Ideological Origins of the Primacy of Politics in the Third Reich', Theory and Society, Vol. 10, No. 6. (Nov., 1981), pp. 805-832, esp. 806.

[10] **Antony Beevor**, Berlin – The Downfall, 1945, (London, 2002); Grossman, 'A Question of Silence', passim.; Golo Mann, tr.

[11] **Robert Gellately**, Backing Hitler – Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, (Oxford, 2001), pp. 253-255.

[12] **Rebecca E. Klatch**, 'Of Meanings & Masters: Political Symbolism & Symbolic Action', Polity, Vol. 21, No. 1. (Autumn, 1988), pp. 137-154.

The Nazis understood the potency of efficient symbol use. They recognised the representational capabilities of symbols to influence an individual, or indeed a whole nation, to act in a manner not necessarily considered rational by another not influenced by those same representations. [12] As a messianic figure within the Party, it was Hitler's person, more than any other factor, which led the Nazis to power in January 1933 after the 'years of struggle'. Polling for the 1932 presidential elections, the NSDAP found that Hitler's face and name on a poster were sufficient in themselves for voter recognition, thus, Hitler's image served powerfully as an initial symbol of the Nazi ideology and policy. [13] As a necessary form of ideological representation and reinforcement, the Nazis harnessed the power of representational symbolism and ritual. 'Nazi ideology', through the means of symbol and ritual, became 'Nazi theology' with Hitler presented as a deity through ritualised political statements in the form of celebrations. Utilising instruments of mass suggestion, reality became mystified on a grand scale. [14] Thus the presentation of Hitler, as a symbol to the German nation, in many ways explains this hold over the German people. Even after Hitler's suicide and the total collapse of the regime in April and May 1945, the symbolic Hitler achieved its own Götterdämmerung. Under the auspices of the occupying Allies, the IMT and coexistent processes of denazification continued to present a symbolic Hitler – if only in a transmogrified state – which contended with Nazi representations for a place in German memory.

In order to understand the capacities in which Hitler's person served as a symbol to the German people between 1933 and 1947 and the extent to which this was successful, the following thesis will separate into four areas of focus.

The first, an examination of the symbolic Hitler, and the pluralism of representation that this illusory 'being' assumed, will clearly demonstrate the many capacities in which the symbol was explicitly presented.

The second, this will be followed by an examination of the mechanics of symbol dissemination through propaganda and is intended to illustrate that the Nazis possessed the capacity to physically present Hitler as a symbol.

The third part of this paper will examine the efficiency of this propaganda by examining the public reception of the symbolic Hitler. It will call to question the extent to which the symbol was inculcated and, in the face of opposing 'evidence', cast doubt upon its validity.

The fourth and final part will focus on the broader issue of changing perceptions and will take account most specifically of the period 1945 to 1947. As perceptions of Hitler oscillated throughout the period of the Third Reich, 1945 brought Germany to what became imbued as *Stunde Nulle* (Zero Hour), [15] but the symbolic Hitler endured this shattering experience and remained symbolic across a range of popular subjectivity.

[13] It is interesting to note that on the ballot slips for this election, the NSDAP were labelled 'Hitlerbewegung' (The Hitler-Movement). The combination of this and the Nazis polling explicitly on the strength of Hitler suggests that votes were placed for Hitler rather than the NSDAP. On the other hand, Roger Eatwell points out the highly localised variations in the Nazis 1932 election campaign despite the 'Hitler over Germany' slogan which was used to emphasise the 'national' aspect of the Nazis. See Roger Eatwell, 'Explaining Fascism and Ethnic Cleansing: The Three Dimensions of Charisma and the Four Dark Sides of Nationalism', Political Studies Review, Vol. 4, (2006), pp. 263-278, esp. p. 266.

[14] **Simon Taylor,** 'Symbol and Ritual under National Socialism', The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 32, No. 43. (Dec., 1981), pp. 504-520; James M. Mayo, Jr., 'Propaganda with Design: Environmental Dramaturgy in the Political Rally', JAE, Vol. 32, No. 2, Politics and Design Symbolism. (Nov., 1978), pp. 24-27+32.

[15] **Toby Thacker**, *The End of the Third Reich – Defeat, Denazification & Nuremberg, January 1944 – November 1946*, (Stroud, 2006), pp. 13-14.

Image 2: Albert Speer's dramatic lighting effect at the Nuremberg Party Rally described by Speer as a 'cathedral of light' and British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson referred to as a 'cathedral of ice', see Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, (Aylesbury, 1971), pp. 100-101.

1. The Symbolic Hitler

"It is only on one or two exceptional points that Christ and Hitler stand comparison, for Hitler is far too big a man to be compared with one so petty." –Julius Streicher. [16]

Ian Kershaw's work *The Hitler-Myth – Image and Reality in the Third Reich* identifies seven foundations upon which the Hitler-Myth was contrived which are predominantly socio-political. Briefly, they advocate that Hitler was the personification of the nation and effective unifier of Volksgemeinschaft; the single creator of economic stability, who brought full employment, higher living standards and the potential for lasting prosperity. He was the single upholder of public morality, acting decisively when necessary and widely regarded as personally sincere in his protection of the traditional structures such as the Church where he acted to 'moderate' the more extreme tendencies of the other Nazis. Additionally, Hitler was considered to be the defender of Germany's rights, he alone being capable of rebuilding the strength of the nation against external enemies. As a statesman and diplomat of genius, able to achieve popular revisions to the Treaty of Versailles rather than warmonger. This diplomatic countenance was balanced by his presentation as a distinguished soldier, able to comprehend of the common soldier and well versed in military matters, he was the possessor of an unwavering determination that would bring certain victory. In addition, Hitler was portrayed as consistently standing firm against the (perceived) ideological enemies of the state. Whilst this idea was strong with the industrial and middle-classes – indeed, it was rudimentary to his *Weltanschauung* – Kershaw points out that this was not a primary component of the 'Hitler Myth' as regards to the general population and was only emphasised within the 'correct' surroundings. All seven components of the 'myth' were distorted by Nazi propaganda. [17] The 'Myth' was deliberately contrived by Goebbels' propaganda machine and embraced by the Führer himself. This 'Führer-Myth' worked on numerous levels and attempted to manipulate various popular German, pre-Nazi conceptions. Most specifically, social and economic disruption and anomie brought about by defeat in 1918; an ubiquitous antipathy of democracy and democratic process which worked against a popular concept of '*Volk*' and national community; the elite's distrust of 'republic' and a fear, particularly prevalent among the middle-classes, of Communism. [18] If propaganda was, as Zemen determines, National Socialism's integral, or central constituent, [19] then the propagation of the '*Führerprinzip*' was the central function of that element. There is one singular reason for this (that also effectively fuses all of Kershaw's seven bases): Hitler was portrayed as the new Messiah – "*Ein Völk, ein Reich, ein Führer*".

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[16] **John Laffin,** *Hitler Warned Us*, (London, 1995), p. 31.
[17] **Kershaw**, *Hitler-Myth*, passim. esp. pp. 253-269.
       These pages are reproduced in David F. Crew (ed.), *Nazism and German Society, 1933-1945*, (London, 1994).
[18] **Richard Grunberger**, *Germany, 1918-1945*, (London, 1964), p. 67; Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: a study in the rise of the Germanic ideology*, (Berkeley, 1961), p. 161; R.G.L. Waite, *The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler*, (New York, 1993), pp. 380-383; see also Brian Vick, 'The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National Identity in Nineteenth-Century Germany', *German Studies Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2. (May, 2003), pp. 241-256.
[19] **Z. A. B. Zeman**, *Nazi Propaganda*, (London, 1964), p. 2. It should be noted that Zemen's assertion is directed within the context of the Nazi 'revolution' implicitly suggesting that propaganda remained a central constituent of the regime thereafter.

In line with his own self-image, [20] Nazi propaganda continually placed Hitler in the role of 'saviour', his inner circle as 'apostles' and *Mein Kampf* as the "sacred book of National Socialism". [21] The failed putsch of November 1923 at the Munich Beer-hall, moved the Nazis into the already established tradition within *völkisch* movements of myth making. Hitler's imprisonment and the subsequent proliferation of the party necessitated the embodiment of the hero-leader myth upon release – primarily as means of re-establishing his control. His adoption of this status and consequent restoration to authority required that his political successes be visualised by his adherents as the realisation of this *völkisch* hero. [22] The failed putsch served another function. It ultimately provided one of the foundations upon which he would be presented as a modern-day messiah much in line with Streicher's statement. Every year at the Feldherrnhalle on 9th November, Hitler and his fellow putschists would reunite to celebrate the event and commemorate the deaths of sixteen of their number and, at the same time, transform and allegorise the experience. During the putsch, according to Nazi 'legend', the swastika banner had become stained with the blood of the fallen and this Nazi blood was then deemed sacred. The resulting ritual, by 1935, had become formalised and glorified in the ceremony known as "The Rite of the Blood Flag", or *Blutzeuge*, whereby every other Nazi flag and banner was empowered – Hitler used the blood flag to 'consecrate' all other flags. It remained for Hitler alone to carry out this 'divine' act. [23] Within this context, the blood flag became identifiable within Nazi culture as was the crucifix within a Christian context. [24] The Brown House where the blood flag was housed was the reliquary. [25] This was no subconscious allegory, as Victor Klemperer records, Hitler specifically referred to those who fell in 1923 as "My apostles." [26] Certainly, the overtones of 'resurrection' within this ceremony largely justify Robert Waite's description of the 9th November 'holy day' as "a kind of Nazi Good Friday." [27]

It is worth noting the nation-wide diffusion of these ceremonies as they were commemorated in towns and cities across the Reich. In Thalsburg, William Sheridan Allen shows that the small town experienced a diminutive version of the ceremony with synchronised radio broadcasts. The whole of the Reich knew of the significance of the symbol. [28]

[20] **Hugh Trevor-Roper**, *The Last Days of Hitler, 7th edition, (London, 1995), p. 90. Trevor-Roper's early, though astute, observations state that Hitler's "own firm belief in his messianic mission was perhaps the most important element in the extraordinary power of his personality." This view has been further elucidated within the general thrust of Bullock's early study, A Study in Tyranny.*

[21] **George L. Mosse,** *Nazi Culture – Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich, (London, 1966), p. 235; Waite, Psychopathic God, p. 31.*

[22] **Dietrich Orlow, '***The Conversion of Myths into Political Power: The Case of the Nazi Party, 1925-1926', The American Historical Review, Vol. 72, No. 3. (Apr., 1967), pp. 906-924, 911.*

[23] **Waite,** Psychopathic God, p. 30.
[24] **Taylor,** 'Symbol and Ritual', p. 508-510.
[25] **Waite,** Psychopathic God, p. 30.
[26] **Victor Klemperer**, tr. Martin Chalmers, I Shall Bear Witness – The Diaries of Victor Klemperer, 1933-41, (London, 1998), p. 133.

[27] **Waite,** Psychopathic God, p. 31. The importance of the concept of resurrection in Nazi ideology see Jay W. Baird, 'Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 17, No. 4. (Oct., 1982), pp. 633-650. See also George L. Mosse, 'National Cemetries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldier in Germany', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 14, No. 1. (Jan., 1979), pp. 1-20, for the importance of death and resurrection to the German national consciousness particularly after the First World War. See also Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, pp. 26-28.

[28] **William Sheridan Allen,** The Nazi Seizure of Power – The Experience of a Single German Town, 1930-1935, (New York, 1973), pp. 243-244. Thalsburg, it should be understood, was proportionately more 'Nazi' than the average German small town.

Similar religious connotations resound from the annual *Reichsparteitag* held in September around the autumnal equinox. [29] Outwardly, the rallies were designed, "not only as an important link between leader and follower",[30] but also as a manifestation of the Nazi concept of *Volksgemeinschaft*. Hitler, from his own experience, could understand how readily people could "submit to the suggestive magic of a spectacle so grandiose in effect." [31] The act of submission is, in itself, quasi-religious; in addition, the masses became de-humanised in the collective, and a skilfully 'charismatic' Hitler successfully transformed the events "into the practice of civil religion." [32] This effect was not lost on the Klemperers who sensed a degree of "Catholic hysteria" in the spectacle.[33] The environment of the political ritual was closed and free from contradictory representation and thus provided the consummate milieu for political representation and identification. Simon Taylor suggests that these rituals were an endeavour "to mystify real social conflict." [34]

Hitler's role was in many ways just this; he was an enigmatic, cabalistic power that brought conformity to both *Volk* and State. As Norman H. Baynes and Dr. Hans Frank wrote:

> "The essential link which in the National-Socialist theory of the state unites the people with the Führer is a mystical conception. … He is no representative to whom the people has given a mandate; he is the incarnation of the Spirit of the People, and it is only through his interpretation that the people is led to a full realisation of itself."[35]

As at the Feldherrnhalle ceremony, Hitler's divine role is again reinforced through the blood flag at Nuremberg. Indeed, Thornton Sinclair noted when he witnessed the occasion, his "dramatic entry and exit, and the ceremony built around the blood flag, [made] the ceremony a stirring experience for those present."[36] Hitler's role was central to this ceremony. He alone was capable of performing the ritual.

This leads to a question that is worthwhile examining briefly: would there be any other figure capable of succeeding Hitler? To all appearances, if Hitler was not present at the ceremony, then the ceremony simply did not take place. This would suggest that there was a deep and singular dependency on the Führer which itself ramifies to the whole regime. The pseudo-religious, Führer-worshipping nature of these ceremonies ensured this message was clear and distinct.
This was further expounded by the call from the party ranks:

"The Führer is Germany and Germany the Führer."

To which Hitler responds:

"I am never without you, and you are never without me." [37]

The implications are that neither Germany nor Nation Socialism could exist without Hitler, yet the Third Reich was to last a thousand years. Simple logic says that Hitler would also last a thousand years, and thus, must be eternal or divine. [38]

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[29] Albert Speer's overbearing colonnade measured over 1300 feet long and over 80 feet high which, Speer intimates, was inspired by the Pergamum altar. Sitting as a centrepiece, was an eagle with a wingspan of over 100 feet; the background was three massive Nazi banners. See Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, (Aylesbury, 1971), pp. 96, 110-116, 61.

[30] **Thornton Sinclair**, 'The Nazi Rally at Nuremberg', The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4. (Oct., 1938), pp. 570-583.
[31] **Adolf Hitler**, Mein Kampf, (Munich, 1925), p. 492, quoted in Taylor, 'Symbol and Ritual', p. 512.
[32] **Mayo**, 'Propaganda with Design', p. 26.
[33] **Klemperer,** Diaries, 1933-41, p. 33.
[34] **Taylor**, 'Symbol and Ritual', p. 516.
[35] Quoted in **Waite**, Psychopathic God, p. 80.
[36] **Sinclair,** 'The Nazi Rally at Nuremberg', p. 572.
[37] **A. I. Brandt,** Meilensteine des Dritten Reiches, (Munich, 1938), p. 118, quoted in Taylor, 'Symbol and Ritual', p. 511.

[38] Historical retrospection suggests that National Socialism was structurally incapable of self-reproduction. For a brief discussion of this idea see Kershaw, *'Working towards the Führer'* op. cit., pp. 96-97. See also Bullock, *Study in Tyranny*, passim.

The assumption of the role of a pseudo-messiah is evident in rituals other than this one. Children in Cologne were instructed to recite a pair of 'invocations'. Prior to meals, the children thanked Hitler for their daily bread where, as Catholics, they should have thanked God:

> *Führer, my Führer, bequeathed to me by the lord,*
> *Protect and preserve me as long as I live!*
> *Thou hast rescued Germany from deepest distress,*
> *I thank thee today for my daily bread.*
> *Abideth thou long with me, forsaketh me not,*
> *Führer, my Führer, my faith and my light!*
> *Heil, mein Führer!*

At the conclusion of meals, allegiance is promised to the Führer in a more sympathetic fashion:

> *Thank thee for this bountiful meal,*
> *Protector of youth and friend of the aged!*
> *I know thou hast cares, but worry not,*
> *I am with thee by day and by night.*
> *Lie thy head in my lap,*
> *Be assured, my Führer, that thou art great.*
> *Heil, mein Führer! [39]*

Quasi-liturgical incantations were not restricted to the indoctrination of the young. 'Faith' in the Führer was expressed in song, as 'allegiance' was pledged in oath. Children of pre-school age were trained in the art of oath-taking by singing:

> *We love our Führer*
> *We honor our Führer*
> *We follow our Führer*
> *Until we are men;*
>
> *We believe in our Führer*
> *We will live for our Führer*
> *We will die for our Führer*
> *Until we are heroes.*

Boys entering the *Jungvolk* pledged:

> "In the presence of the Blood flag which represents our Führer, I swear to devote all my energies, all my strength to the savior of our country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready to give up my life for him, so help me God.
> One *Volk,* one *Reich,* one *Führer*"

At 14, on entering the *Hitler jugend*:

> *"I consecrate my life to Adolf Hitler: I am ready to sacrifice my life for Hitler; I am ready to die for Hitler, my savior, the Führer."* [40]

[39] **Johann Neuhäusler**, Kreuz und Hakenkreuz: Der Kampf des Nationalsozialismus gegen die katholische Kirche und der kirchliche Widerstand, (Munich, 1946), p. 251, quoted in Mosse, *Nazi Culture*, p.241, and in Welch, 'Adolf Hitler in Nazi Propaganda' in *Working Towards the Führer*, eds. McElligott & Kirk, p. 104.

[40] **Gregor Ziemer**, Education for Death, (New York, 1941), pp. 48, 59, 121, Quoted in Waite, Psychopathic God, pp. 80-81.

The oath of the Reichswehr was changed on 2nd August 1934 to:

> "I swear by God this holy oath that I will render unconditional obedience to the Führer of the German Reich and People, Adolf Hitler, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and as a worthy soldier I will be ready at all times to risk my life for this oath." [41]

The widespread presentation of these loyalty oaths, unprecedented in modern military history,[42] presents a powerful message. Primarily, the oath demonstrates a complete consolidation of power in the hands of the 'saviour of the nation',[43] and the capitulation of the army to the new regime.[44] More applicably, the immediate similarity between the Oath of allegiance and a commitment to God can be found in the *Westdeutscher Beobachter*:

> " … whoever has sworn his oath of allegiance to Hitler has pledged himself unto death to this sublime idea [National Socialism]." [45]

The symbolic significance is intimated in Klemperer's complete resignation at the loss of a hope that the *Reichswehr* would restore order on the death of Hindenburg.[46] Many of the ceremonies were captured on film and shown in newsreels and display similar religious qualities to the over rituals already described. [47]

   Hitler's symbolic representations here clearly function within two distinct spheres. On one hand, the Führer of Kershaw's 'Hitler-Myth' – unifier of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, herald of economic stability and prosperity – of the earthly domain. Parallel to this, there is the representation of the Führer of the heavenly realm – immortal, as Taylor reports, able to bestow immortality on others [48] – a pseudo-messianic figure of eternal disproportion. The realities of these representations are also clear: as long as the German populace perceived Hitler within these roles, then the functioning of those roles were realities. The *Volksgemeinschaft*, suggested by some as mythical in itself, was a reality to those of the *Volksgenossen* who utilised the concept as an instrument in pursuit of their own interests, [49] or as an instrument of indoctrination. [50]

[41] **Gregor Ziemer**, Education for Death, (New York, 1941), pp. 48, 59, 121, Quoted in Waite, Psychopathic God, pp. 80-81. Cf. Welch, Ibid., p. 106; see also Waite, Psychopathic God, p. 31. Waite quotes a slightly different version of the Oath: "I swear by God this sacred oath that I will render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler…"

[42] **Waite**, Ibid., p. 31

[43] **Kershaw**, Hitler-Myth, pp.67-68.

[44] **Kershaw**, Hubris, p. 436.

[45] Quoted in **Waite**, Psychopathic God, p. 30. It should be noted, of course, that the Westdeutscher Beobachter is a Nazi newspaper.

[46] **Klemperer**, Diaries, 1933-41, pp. 77-78.

[47] **Welch**, 'Adolf Hitler in Nazi Propaganda' in Working Towards the Führer, eds. McElligott & Kirk, p. 116, n. 31. Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will, 1935, shows 52, 000 members swearing allegiance to Hitler in a remarkably liturgical ceremony.

[48] **Taylor**, 'Symbol and Ritual', p. 510.

[49] **John Connelly**, 'The Uses of Volksgemeinschaft: Letters to the NSDAP Kreisleitung Eisenach, 1939-1940', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 68, No. 4, Practices of Denunciation in Modern European History, 1789-1989. (Dec., 1996), pp.899-930, cf. esp. pp. 901, 928. For those who have labelled Volksgemeinschaft as 'myth', Connelly cites Heinrich August Winkler, 'Vom Mythos der Volksgemeinschaft', Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 17, (1977): 484-90; Jeremy Noakes, 'Leaders of the People? the Nazi Party and German Society', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2004), pp.189-212.

[50] **Cf. Manfred Messerschmidt**, 'The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Military History. (Oct., 1983), pp.719-744. Messerschmidt's paper asserts that, by 1933, the generals of the Wehrmacht allayed their petty bourgeois fears about social status with an attraction to the National Socialist ideas of Volksgemeinschaft which, to them, promised domestic and foreign policies beneficial to the military. The generals saw the Volksgemeinschaft as a potential long-term recreation and maintenance of the Burgfiede of 1914. This would provide the military with a solution to their pervasive fear failing domestic support in time of war, which they saw as the main reason for defeat in 1918.

Foreign conquest and revisionism to the Versailles Treaty prior to 1939 were concrete 'achievements' that were widely popular and did not require much manipulation to be lauded and directly contributed to the 'myth'. The Nazis, through extravagant political visualisation – festivals, torchlight parades and pseudo-historical pageantry – explicitly presented Hitler in a divine role and skilfully manipulated these representations. [51] Once the symbol became more sanctified than reality, as Bosmajian points out, "the symbol became more important than the reality." [52]

Only after such a substitution had taken place could a nine-year-old member of the *Jungvolk* state:

I *must* die for Hitler. [53]

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[51] **Paul Betts, '**The New Fascination with Fascism: The Case of Nazi Modernism', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 37, No. 4. (Oct., 2002), pp. 541-558, esp. 547. Cf. Taylor, 'Symbol and Ritual'.

[52] **Haig A. Bosmajian**, 'The Use of the Symbol "Unknown" in Nazi Persuasion', *Folklore*, Vol. 77, No. 2. (Summer, 1966), pp. 116-122, cf. p. 121.

[53] **Cf. Waite,** *Psychopathic God*, pp.88-89. The quote here comes from a small boy who, ill with pneumonia, was required by the *Jungvolk* to complete a forced march as part of his 'obligation' to the Führer. The doctor who attended the boy was less susceptible to the Nazi *Weltanschauung* when he asks of a companion: "What is this strange ideology that can even pervert instincts?" More revealing still is the attitude of the father who points out that "if he dies, then he dies for Hitler." Waite's citation is Gregor Ziemer, *Education for Death*, (New York, 1941), pp. 80-81.

2. The Mechanics of Symbol Diffusion

"[the] propagandist is a man who canalises an already existing stream."-Aldous Huxley [54]

   There was no unanimous popular support for the coming of this new Christ in 1933. Hitler was sent by disillusioned democrats, rather than by God, to take up the Chancellorship of Germany with only marginal support, but yet, by 1940 a large proportion of the German populace perceived Hitler as a messianic figure. Even as far as the end of the war, there still remained those few that retained this notion. Kershaw clearly demonstrates the accumulative effect by which the secular 'Hitler-Myth' develops and then recedes. [55] The spiritual Führer, outlined above, was proselytised from the very outset of our period. Certainly, there is ample enough evidence for Robert Waite to assert that Hitler was aware of his divine mission in the 1920s. [56] So, unlike the accumulation and building of the secular myth, the pseudo-religious myth was a constant within Nazi symbolism after 1933.

   Nonetheless, it is necessary to call into question the dissemination of the above summary by means of an examination of the mechanics of symbol delivery. Hitler, often directing Goebbels, [57]was aware that propaganda is more effective when reinforcing existing societal values or political opinion and will encounter resistance when attempting to manufacture new value systems. [58] Within Nazi propaganda four *leitmotifs* are consistently present. The idea of 'the community before the individual' appeals to the Nazi concept of the *Volksgemeinschaft* that would bind the nation together as one. The benefits for the regime of such an achievement would provide for a greater effectiveness of ideology and propaganda. [59] The second motif is that of the need for racial purity or racial hygiene that would allow for the sustenance of the national/Aryan community. Racial purity is also manipulated in the third theme that professes a hatred of enemies that became increasingly focussed on Jews and Bolsheviks. The fourth *leitmotif* is that of the *Führerprinzip* (the principle of 'charismatic' leadership) that, as Kershaw has solidly proposed, resulted in the 'Hitler Myth'. [60] These four *leitmotifs* were, in accordance with Hitler's own understanding, reduced to easily remembered slogans. In *Mein Kampf*, he wrote:

> "The receptive powers of the masses are very restricted, and their understanding is feeble. On the other hand, they quickly forget. Such being the case, all effective propaganda must be confined to a few bare essentials and those must be expressed as far as possible in stereotyped formulae. These slogans should be persistently repeated until the very last individual has come to grasp the idea that has been put forward." [61]

[54] **Aldous Huxley**, 'Notes on Propaganda', *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. 174, (December, 1936), p. 39, quoted in *David Welch (ed.), Nazi Propaganda – The Power and the Limitations, (Beckenham, 1983),* p. 7; also quoted in *David Welch*, **'Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People's Community',** *J'rnal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2004), pp. 213-238, 214.

[55] *Kershaw, Hitler-Myth.* Kershaw charts the Führer's image from being accepted generally in 1933 (pp. 35-55); to being the personification of the nation by c.1936 (pp.73-82); to 1939 when "the great majority of Germans could find some point of identification with his achievements" (pp. 140-141).

[56] **Waite,** Ibid., p. 27. Waite quotes Hitler in the 1920s as saying: "Just like Christ, I have a duty to my own people. …" Other examples from this period are given.

[57] **Hitler's own words**: "Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda. All that matters is propaganda." J. Fest, Hitler, (London, 1974), p. 187, quoted in David Welch (ed.), Nazi Propaganda – The Power and the Limitations, (Beckenham, 1983), p. 1.

[58] **Kershaw**, Hitler-Myth, p. 4; Welch (ed.), Ibid., p. 2.

[59] **Cf. Connelly**, 'The Uses of Volksgemeinschaft'; Messerschmidt, 'The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft'; Noakes, 'Leaders of the People?'.

[60] **Welch**, 'Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft', p. 217; Cf. Kershaw, Hitler-Myth; also see Kershaw, 'How Effective was Nazi Propaganda?' in Nazi Propaganda, ed. Welch, p. 183.

[61] **Adolf Hitler**, Mein Kampf, (London, 1939), p.159, quoted in Nazi Propaganda, ed. Welch, p. 3.

The importance assigned to the role of propaganda survived the Nazi take-over and is clearly illustrated by the immediate appointment of Goebbels as Minister of Propaganda in March 1933. On the 25th of that same month Goebbels elucidated, for the benefit of the controllers of German Radio, the centrality of propaganda within the new regime:

"We make no bones about the fact that the radio belongs to us and no one else. And we will place the radio in the service of our ideology *and no other ideology will find expression here* … The radio must subordinate itself to the goals which the Government of the national revolution has set itself. […]" [62]

The potential of the radiophonic medium was realised in physical terms with the mass production of *Reichsvolksempfänger* ('people's receivers') which were marketed primarily as an instrument for receiving the words of the Führer. These receivers would allow the Nazi propagandists to place Hitler's wisdom – as well as other propaganda and entertainment) directly into over 70% of German households by the beginning of the war.[63] In the meantime, messages to the 'faithful' were broadcast by means of communal listening in all public places and working environments. All "factory owners, department stores, offices, shops, pubs, and blocks of flats" were ordered to construct loudspeakers "to allow all national comrades to participate fully" in the Führer's broadcasts.[64] There was a considered desire to speak to the people in a collective environment rather than in the privacy of the home. With communal listening, like the environment of the mass rally, the Nazis viewed the German mind to be more susceptible to manipulation in an environment surrounded by other potential 'believers', what Sigfried Giedion calls "collective emotional events." [65] As Victor Klemperer indicated in 1936, everything was "aimed at deafening the individual in collectivism" with the further suggestion that printed material was suppressed in favour of the primitively more efficient oratorical means of communication.[66] A further signifier of Hitler's understanding of the importance of radio as a means of propaganda delivery lies in his intention, according to Goebbels' diary entry for 22nd October 1936, to invest 70 million RM in the building of radio stations.[67] In 1938, the first permanent loudspeaker column was erected in Breslau and was promptly followed by "thousands" of others. [68] The success of the Nazis utilisation of this medium allowed the potential for the Führer's sermons to access the large majority of private places as well as almost every major arena of public congregation.

[62] **H. Heiber** (ed.), Goebbels Reden Bd. I 1932-1939, (Düsseldorf, 1971), pp. 87-91, reprinted in Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, vol. 2: State, Economy and Society 1933-1939, eds. Jeremy . Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham, (Exeter, 1984), p.385. The italicised emphasis is added in place of the speaker's banged fist on the lectern.

[63] **Welch** reports that during "1933, 1..5 million sets were produced, and in 1934 the figure … passed the 6 million marks. By the beginning of the war [Germany had] the highest proportion [of radios to households] in the world." See David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, 2nd edn., (London, 2002), pp. 38-43, quoted in Welch, 'Adolf Hitler in Nazi Propaganda', op. cit., p.115, n. 21. These statistics are also noted in Noakes & Pridham, Ibid., p. 386. Cf. Lothar Kettenacker, 'Social and Psychological Aspects of the Führer's Rule', in Aspects of the Third Reich, ed. H. W. Koch, (Basingstoke, 1985), pp. 112-113.

[64] **D. Rebentisch & A. Raab,** Neu-Isenburg, p. 110, quoted in Noakes & Pridham, Ibid., p. 386.

[65] **Sigfried Giedion**, 'The Need for a New Monumentality', Harvard Architecture Review, (Spring, 1984): 60, quoted in Michael North, 'The Public as Sculpture: From Heavenly City to Mass Ornament', Critical Inquiry, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Summer, 1990), pp. 860-879, quote on p. 867.

[66] **Klemperer,** Diaries 1933-41, p. 83.

[67] **Elke Fröhlich** (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Sämtliche Fragmente. Teil 1: Aufzeichnungen 1924 bis 1941, (Munich, 1987), vol. 2, p. 703, reprinted in Norbert Frei, tr. Simon B. Steyne, National Socialist Rule in Germany – The Führer State, 1933-1945, (Oxford,1993), p. 167.

[68] **Nazism**, vol. 2, eds. Noakes & Pridham, p. 386.

If Hitler's voice had an intrusive reach through the radio, then cinema provided the medium by which he could "plant [his] picture ... deep and ineradicably [*sic.*] in every German heart." [69] Despite 350,000,000 annual ticket sales and the gradual diffusion [70] of "talkies", the Third Reich did not attempt to bring the industry under direct state control. It was not until 1942, under war conditions, that the industry fully became the reserve of the state. Although full control was neither economically, nor politically viable in 1933, as with radio, the Nazis were resolute that the medium of film would be their servant. [71] It has been suggested that the effects of film on this "psychologically unprepared ... first generation" of cinematic audiences was stronger and more emotive than on modern audiences, often eliciting a "quasi-religious thrill" at the sight of the Führer.[72] However, Norbert Frei notes that attempts to use the cinema for explicit propaganda or ideological indoctrination were ineffectual. Anti-Semitic films, such as *The Eternal Jew* or *Jew Süss*, and blatant propagandistic films (*Hitlerjunge Quex,* or *SA-Mann Brand*) were unsuccessful by comparison with lighter entertainment. Realising this, Hitler and Goebbels understood that ideological indoctrination could be given through lighter movies such as *The Golden City*. [73]

The banning of all Communist and Social Democratic publications and the seizing of their publishing facilities, greatly assisted the Nazi control of the press. In October 1933, the Law on Editors (*Schriftleitergesetz*) obliged editors of the bourgeois press to the state [74] and self-censorship became standard practice. [75] As "the seventh great power that is better suited than any other to shape and to influence public opinion for or against a government", [76] the Nazis well understood the need to control the press. To this end, 'instruction' was to play a more considerable role than 'information'. The role of the press became a mechanism for explaining government policies to the masses that would be supplied by the Propaganda Ministry at daily conferences. [77]

[69] **Hadamovsky to Hitler**, Mar., 1935, in Josef Wulf, ed., Presse unf Funk im Dritten Reich: Eine Dokumentation, (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1964), p. 309, quoted in Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience, (Harvard, 2005), p. 94.

[70] **Koonz,** Ibid., p. 94.

[71] **M. S. Phillips,** 'The Nazi control of the German film industry', Journal of European Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Mar., 1971), pp. 37-68. By 1942, annual ticket sales had risen to over one billion per annum.

[72] **Kettenacker,** 'Social and Psychological Aspects of the Führer's Rule', op. cit., p. 113. See also Stephen Lowry, 'Ideology and Excess in Nazi Melodrama: The Golden City', New German Critique, No. 74, Special Issue on Nazi Cinema. (Spring – Summer, 1998), pp. 125-149.

[73] **Frei,** National Socialist Rule in Germany, pp. 92-94.

[74] **Frei,** Ibid., p. 64.

[75] **Koonz,** Nazi Conscience, p. 71.

[76] **Heiber** (ed.), Goebbels Reden, vol. 1, p. 91 quoted in Richard Taylor, 'Goebbels and the Function of Propaganda', in Nazi Propaganda, ed. Welch, pp. 32-33.

[77] **Taylor,** Ibid., p. 34.

Illustration 3: [detail]

1938 oil portrait of Hitler, by Heinrich Knirr.
Knirr's painting conforms to Hitler's idealisation of what 'art' should be.

It was painted from a photograph taken by Hoffman, Hitler's photographer, the sky and landscape were 'created'.

With this, the three most apparent organs of opinion forming, propaganda and public 'enlightenment' became tightly within the control of the National Socialist state. Other means by which the symbolic Hitler was presented, although visually more apparent, remain less diffused in the public eye. Of these areas, Art managed to portray the symbolic Hitler in abundantly explicit measures. Hitler did not mind being viewed as an artist-statesman, and so, with his expertise, he was presented as the final arbiter of aesthetic taste and the protector of the German artistic legacy. Variously presented as a soldier, commander or military genius – sometimes with a divine vinculum – sometimes as a paternal figure or unifier of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, he was also presented as a Messianic figure. [78] However, regardless of either the symbol, or the mechanisms in place for the projection of that symbol, no system of propaganda has ever functioned with the degree of efficacy as it would aspire to, and the Nazi system, regardless of the reputation of its propaganda machine or propaganda's centrality to the National Socialist State, is no exception to this.

[78] **Welch,** 'Adolf Hitler in Nazi Propaganda' op. cit., pp. 97-98.

3. The Symbol Received

A pseudo-messiah such as the symbolic Hitler became, managed to draw on the subdued expectations and aspirations of the masses that had, by the 1930s, become bewildered within social conflicts, economic grievances and the political turmoil and weakness of the Weimar Republic. [79] This symbolic figure therefore theoretically satisfied the needs of a (potentially) volatile society, stricken by economic vulnerability and political apathy. Many of the discussions on the nature of the Hitler dictatorship, especially those of the 'structuralist' doctrine, tend to overlook the reciprocal relationship in the form of interdependency between the psychological fabrication of the 'chosen one' and that of the wider populace which perpetually, and necessarily exists. [80] And so this society reciprocates, and projects onto him the status of "saviour". Hitler's comprehension of the intricacies of such an interdependent relationship can be found articulated in a speech to his generals in January, 1944:

> "…values that do not exist cannot be mobilised. It is therefore impossible to make of the Volk something other than is already present in its values…." [81]

And so, the events of the twelve years of Nazi rule are not entirely the responsibility of Hitler and 'his apostles'. [82] If the idea of the symbolic Hitler and the means of image projection described in the previous sections *are* reasonably accurate, then the widespread complicity of 'ordinary' Germans in the crimes of the regime would be negated by a considerable degree. It is therefore necessary to challenge the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda and the extent to which it was satisfactorily inculcated.

The outright demonstration of this remains troublesome given the general and widespread insecurity of German public opinion under a regime so readily willing to resort to coercion and terror. [83] Although public opinion did not officially exist, significant attention to such opinion was given and in fact gathered through numerous agencies (SD, Gestapo, Party, local authorities). Measurement of opinion was also conducted by the exiled SPD. Although there are obvious problems with objectivity in these accounts, they are often surprisingly concordant with internal reports. [84] Any examination of these opinions, even a brief one, demonstrates quite readily that the Nazi state was not a monolithic entity as has previously been expressed as propaganda increasingly resorted to social division and exclusion as a means of creating affinities between those who belonged to the *Volksgemeinschaft.* [85]

[79] **Mary Fulbrook,** Fontana History of Germany, 1918-1990 – The Divided Nation, (London, 1991), pp. 32-65; Ruth Henig, The Weimar Republic, 1919-1933, (London, 1998), pp. 77-85; Niall Ferguson, 'The German inter-war economy: political choice versus economic determinism', in Twentieth-Century Germany – Politics, Culture and Society 1918-1990, ed. Mary Fulbrook (London, 2001), pp. 36-58.

[80] **Cf. Mommsen**, 'Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction', op. cit.; cf. Mason, 'Intention and Explanation', op. cit.. There is a tendency within these, albeit excellent articles, to concentrate on relations within the regime to the detriment of attention towards the reciprocal relationship that necessarily existed between Hitler and the masses.

[81] Quoted in **Steinert,** Hitler's War, pp. 8-9.
[82] **Steiner**t, Ibid., p. 9.
[83] **Gellately**, Backing Hitler,
[84] **Kershaw,** Hitler-Myth, pp. 6-8.
[85] **Koonz**, Nazi Conscience, pp. 59-60.

The potential inaccuracy of either of these sources where Hitler's popularity is concerned, lies mainly in the fact, as Kershaw points out, that there was a wariness of voicing negative remarks about the Führer. [86] This caused concern for the regime as pointed out by the *Regierungspräsident* of Upper Bavaria in 1935:

Illustration 4: Stamp to commemorate the 1939 Nuremberg Party Rally. The rally was due to be called "Party Rally of Peace," the start of World War II in Sept.caused its cancellation.

> "A true assessment of the barometer of popular opinion is faced with difficulties … denunciations, which are still regrettably numerous, and in view of the fanaticism of some subordinate offices, it can be observed that large sections of the population and, in particular, those who are loyal to the State only give vent to their true opinion about public and especially local conditions in their most intimate circle. Otherwise, they simply keep their mouths shut because of completely unjustified fears." [87]

However, such a wariness is potentially the result of, firstly, a widespread consensus of genuine admiration for the Führer. Secondly, as Gellately suggests, a general willingness of the German populace, not only to fully co-operate with the Gestapo, but rather a discreet enthusiasm to initiate Gestapo investigations by means of denunciations. [88]

The presence of a widespread consensus of genuine admiration for the Führer is particularly plausible given the widespread pre-disposition of the general population to believe in the form of leadership that the Hitlerbewegung quite openly promised. [89] To present the symbol, the Nazi propaganda machine, using the techniques described above, merely manipulated existing values. [90] The symbol also built upon, and appealed to, religious disunion and congregational anxiety resulting from the Concordat signed by the Papal Curia and the Nazis. The Nazis managed to manipulate this and attempted to establish themselves as a secular religion directly challenging the place of the Church. [91] Once the Concordat had been signed, as with other Nazi 'agreements', the Church found themselves under increasing pressure to comply with the regime; much of this pressure came from within the German Church suggesting that many were pre-disposed to National Socialism ideology. [92] The German Christians, and their attempts to benefit from long-term divisions in the Protestant Church, attempted to draw support for a National Socialist Church based on notions of Führerprinzip under the auspices of a Reich Bishop. [93]

[86] **Kershaw**, Hitler-Myth, pp. 6-8. Kershaw further points out that this reluctance on the behalf of the general population to openly criticise the Führer was then further exacerbated by internal agents' unwillingness to offend their superiors.
[87] **Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv**, MA 106/670 quoted in Nazism, vol. 2, Noakes & Pridham, (eds.), pp. 568-569.
[88] **Gellately**, Backing Hitler, passim. but esp. pp.190-197. Gellately's analysis questions the origins of the information the Gestapo required to begin its investigations. The study concludes that of all Gestapo cases, more than 50% originated directly from civilian denunciations. Although there was little evidence of, or indeed capacity for Gestapo spying, the study asserts that there was a (metaphorical) "flood of denunciations" (p. 192); that a "denunciatory atmosphere covered the country" (p. 196); and suggests that the Secret Police reacted to this flood rather than initiating new cases for themselves. Denunciations occurred within families, neighbourhoods, between friends and suggests that there existed a very much higher level of support for the regime than has previously been asserted. See also Robert Gellately 'Surveillance and Disobedience: Aspects of the Political Policing of Nazi Germany', in Germans Against Nazism – Nonconformity, Opposition and Resistance in the Third Reich. Essays in Honour of Peter Hoffmann, eds. Francis R. Nicosia & Lawrence D. Stokes, (Oxford, 1990).
[89] **Stephen G. Fritz**, 'The NSDAP as Volkspartei? A Look at the Social Basis of the Nazi Voter', The History Teacher, Vol. 20, No. 3. (May, 1987), pp. 379-399
[90] **J. P. Stern**, Hitler – The Führer and the People, (Glasgow, 1975), p. 111.
[91] Frei, National Socialist Rule in Germany, p. 65.
[92] **Michael Phayer,** 'Questions about Catholic Resistance', Church History, Vol. 70, No. 2. (Jun., 2001), pp. 328-344; Shelley Baranowski, 'Consent and Dissent: The Confessing Church and Conservative Opposition to National Socialism', The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Mar., 1987), pp. 53-78; Roderick Stackelberg, Hitler's Germany – Origins, interpretations, legacies, (London, 1999), pp. 136-141; Noakes, 'Leaders of the People?'
[93] **The division** mentioned here specifically refers to the confessional division between the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. It is also worth noting that German Protestantism as an ideology, which had traditionally been identifiable with German nationalism and ultra-Conservative views, was particularly drawn to National Socialism. Cf. Nazism, vol. 2, Noakes & Pridham, (eds.), pp. 582-584.

These attempts were ultimately unsuccessful. The so-called 'Church Struggle' of 1934, found that Hitler was in a position whereby he was encouraged to acquiesce in the face of popular opinion; yet, he emerged from the dispute in a position still beyond widespread condemnation. As Kershaw determines, Hitler was viewed as the guardian of German religious traditions rather than attempting to subvert them. [94] Shortly after his restoration to office, Bishop Meiser stated publicly:

> "Protestants would be ashamed if, through service to the Gospel, they were to make themselves incapable of service to the people and incapable of offering, in all difficulties, the most loyal following to the Führer of our people" [95] And, three years later, when publicly offering prayers to the Führer, Meiser declared:
> "On this day we commend to you especially the Führer and Chancellor of the Reich. We thank you, Lord, for every success which, through your grace, you have so far granted him the good of our people." [96]

The Führer remained above all criticism, even in the face of critical popular opinion being directed at the Party, and was openly endorsed by the Church. This being the case, it is also evident that the impact of the symbolic Hitler was insignificant in this area. Although admired, there is no suggestion that even the diplomacy of the high ranking church officials had much cause to pay even basic lip service to Hitler in the role of the new messiah.

It can be seen from the controversy over the 'Church Struggle' that Hitler began to be ever more so considered separate from other Nazis. This is an aspect of the National Socialist regime that became more apparent as the period 1933-1939 moved on. A 1939 SOPADE report from Danzig notes:

> "One may well assert that the whole nation is convinced that Hitler is a great politician … Only the most convinced opposition people already to some extent believe that Hitler has got bogged down … Until now, both his supporters and his enemies have been convinced that as a politician Hitler is greater than all opponents." [97]

A similar report from Southwest Germany reinforces this view. Hitler was perceived as being entirely aloof from the rest of the regime; "Hitler does not want that, but the small fry do what they want" became an oft-stated phrase. Or if dissatisfaction was encountered when dealing with an administrative arm of the government or a Party organ, then writing to Hitler was seen as the correct course of action. [98]

Hitler's backing down in the so-called 'Church Struggle' may appear inappropriate for a 'strong' dictator, and certainly does not fit with the popular conception of him, but closer consideration of his actions suggest otherwise. The Nazis need for recourse to popular opinion, a need for reassurance, is constant throughout the 'peace years'. With a clear understanding of the

[94] **Kershaw,** *Hitler-Myth*, pp. 112-120.
[95] ***Die kirchliche Lage** in Bayern nach den Regierungspräsidentenberichten 1933-1943*, 4 vols., ed.
 H. Witetschek and (vol iv) W. Ziegler, (Mainz, 1966, 1967, 1971, 1973), i, p. 36, quoted in Kershaw, Ibid., p. 110.
[96] **Ibid.,** p. 82 quoted in Kershaw, Ibid., p. 111.

[98] ***Deutschland-Berichte** der Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 1934-1940*, (Fankfurt, 1979), 1939 p. 52, reprinted
 in *Nazism*, vol. 2, Noakes & Pridham, (eds.), pp. 572-573.
 Deutschland-Berichte der Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 1934-1940, (Frankfurt, 1979), 1939, pp. 450-1
 reprinted in Noakes & Pridham, (eds.), *Ibid.*, p.573; see also Noakes, 'Leaders of the People?'.

importance of, and a continued emphasis on, local level support, [99] decisions were tested by plebiscite on a number of occasions with the results consistently being unsurprising. [100] The fusing of consent and coercion can be found in the Nazis determination to provide electoral victories. A police report from Kappel in the district of Simmern shows this for the 1938 plebiscite:

> "The control was effected in the following way: some members of the election committee marked all the ballot papers with numbers. During the ballot itself, a voters' list was made up. The ballot papers handed out in numerical order, therefore it was possible with the aid of this list to find out the persons who cast 'No' or invalid votes. …" [101]

Illustration 5:

This 1940 portrait by Conrad Hommel presents Hitler as an authoritative and pensive Feldherr. The gathering storm, rough terrain and the map (suggesting a mission) are no problem for the capabilities of the Führer.

Polling days were heralded and trumpeted. "Strict control will be maintained by the NSDAP to make certain that everyone exercises his voting duty." [102] The extent to which the Nazis were prepared to go to affirm and invent public consent and approval is strangely dichotomous with the concept of dictatorship. By 1939, the SD alone employed 3,000 members to analyse the information submitted by more than 50,000 'spies'. [103] Likewise, the Nazi Party collected opinion from their own sources. [104]

The presented symbol would not appear to have been received in accordance with the intention by the majority of Germans. Whilst there were those who accepted Hitler as a messianic figure, it remains clear that the majority did not confer the same divine status upon him. Although this majority was willing to separate Hitler from the other Nazis, they would appear to require him to attain concrete achievements in return. However, the coming of war in 1939 effectively changed the reciprocity of the relationship.

[99]   **Allen,** *Seizure of Power*, p. 39-40; Fritz, 'The NSDAP as Volkspartei?', p. 382.
[100] **See** Appendix.
[101] **Nuremberg Trial Document** R-152 reprinted in *Nazism*, vol. 2, Noakes & Pridham, (eds.), p. 595
[102] T**halburger** Neueste Nachrichten, November 9, 10, 1933, quoted in Allen, Seizure of Power, p. 243-246.
[103] **Steinert,** Hitler's War, pp. 17-51; Kershaw, Hitler-Myth, pp. 94-117; Koonz, Nazi Conscience, pp. 73-77.
[104] **Aryeh L. Unger**, 'The Public Opinion Reports of the Nazi Party', Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4. (Winter, 1965), pp. 565-582.
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The 'Myth' remained intact for as long as there were concrete achievements. Despite a popular distaste for war, [105] the successful campaigns from Czechoslovakia to the fall of France persuaded Germans of the righteousness of Hitler's actions [106] and to many reinforced earlier beliefs in his geniuses, as suggested in an SD report of 24th June, 1940 (two days after the signing of the armistice in France):

> " … the whole Reich are unanimous in presenting the following picture: [under] the impression of the great political events and under the spell of military success, the whole German nation is displaying an inner unity and a close bond between the front and the homeland which is unprecedented. The soil is no longer fertile for opposition groups.
>   Everyone looks up to the Führer in trust and gratitude and to his armed forces pressing forward from victory to victory. … " [107]

Even in a populace having to endure food rationing, Hitler remained above criticism, and, as the above report suggests, would appear to have been generally admired. But there does not seem to be any of the adulation witnessed during the years of peace; indeed, there was still, according to Speer, a detectable apathy. [108] From this point the situation deteriorated rapidly.
A report from the SD dated 19th April 1943 suggested that, due to deteriorating morale, Hitler should feature more prominently in Propaganda. [109] Since 1940, Hitler had featured less and less in public life and in propaganda. The report suggested that this was attributing to rumours about Hitler's health, that "his hair has gone white". An appearance by the Führer would abate such rumour and raise morale within the population. Hitler-Myth at this point, in relative to Hitler's popularity, was straining as a result of the crisis of 1941-42 and, to further exacerbate the situation, the Wehrmacht's halt at Stalingrad. Similarly, the Party Chancellery, summarising the Gau reports of 7th-20th March 1943, suggest that rumour mongering was "more than ever" still persisting.[110] Singled out as particularly dangerous, people were now openly criticising the Führer. The same source reports four weeks later, highlights a "sharp" increase in Führer-based jokes, [111] jokes which had, by the time on an SD report dated 8th July, become vulgar and detrimental to the state. [112]   This general decline of Hitler's support can be traced, as Kershaw and Steinert rightly point out, [113] to the changing circumstances on the military front in the East. The fact that these are based on Gau reports suggests the widespread nature of the falling opinion. A salesman in Augsburg observed that:

> "The Führer has also spoken himself about how important Stalingrad is, and now he has gone and lost it." [114]

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[105] **Helmut Krausnick,** who bore witness to the times, summed up the German popular mood as "reluctant loyalty". See Helmuth Krausnick and Hermann Graml, 'Der deutsche Widerstand und die Allierten', in Vollmacht des Gewissens, Vol. 2, (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 485, quoted in Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, vol. 4: The German Home Front in World War II, ed. Jeremy Noakes (Exeter, 1998), p. 509. See also Steinert, Hitler's War, p. 7.
[106] **Welch,** 'Adolf Hitler in Nazi propaganda', op. cit., p. 109
[107] **H. Boberach,** ed., Meldungem aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lagerberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes des SS 1938-1945, (Herrsching, 1984), Vol. 4, p. 1305 reprinted in Nazism, vol. 4, ed. Noakes, p. 547.
[108] **Speer,** Inside the Third Reich, pp. 244-245.
[109] **Boberach,** ed., Meldungem aus dem Reich, Vol. 13, p. 5145 reprinted in Nazism, vol. 4, ed. Noakes, p. 547.
[110] **Bundesarchiv** Berlin NS 6/414 reprinted in Noakes, Ibid., pp. 547-548.
[111] **Bundesarchiv,** Ibid., in Noakes, Ibid., pp. 548-549.
[112] **Boberach,** op. cit., Vol. 14, pp. 5445-6 reprinted in Noakes, Ibid., p. 549.
[113] **Steinert,** Hitler's War, pp. 101-125; Kershaw, Hitler-Myth, pp. 185-199.
[114] **Staatsarchiv** München, Sondergericht München 12443, quoted in Kershaw, Ibid., p. 194.

However, it would be wholly appropriate to assert that this process began in 1939 with the attack on Poland. The process of decline was interrupted briefly with military success, as we have seen, and again in the aftermath of the July 20 assassination attempt, [115] as an SD report of 20 August asserts:

> " … the general effect of the reporting of the trial [of those accused of the July 20 assassination attempt] may be assessed as in every respect a positive one. The population's anger at the crime and the contemptible way it was committed is so great that the *carrying out of the sentence by hanging is considered to be far too mild.*" [116]

In the remaining seven months of Hitler's life, and that of the Third Reich, the morale and public opinion of the majority degenerated to the point of complacency at the announcement of his death. However, this would not appear to be the case for all. It was only after Hitler's death that the Nazi Party and the *Wehrmacht* capitulated and disintegrated.[117] The symbolic Hitler's powerful hold over the German's still remained *de facto*, and is attested to by the level of fanatical loyalty witnessed in the final desperate days and hours of the war by the *Waffen SS* and *Hitler jugend* who bolstered the morale of the *Wehrmacht*. [118] The oaths that much of the population – particularly the *Wehrmacht* – participated in, appear, in many instances, to have remained sacred. Hitler's anti-Semitic maledictions also remained to the end. One German who was sharing his homeless predicament unwittingly (not knowing Klemperer was himself Jewish) confided:

> "It's only the Jews I hate, I think I've been a bit influenced by that." [119]

[115] **Steinert,** Hitler's War, pp. 266-268.

[116] **H. –A. Jacobsen**, Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944. Geheime Dokumente aus sem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, (Stuttgart, 1989), Vol. 2, p. 597, reprinted in Nazism, vol. 4, ed. Noakes, pp. 630-632. This is further attested to by Klemperer, who, as early as 1st January 1944, recorded his uncertainty that 1944 would bring about the end of the Third Reich. See Victor Klemperer, tr. Martin Chambers, To the Bitter End: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1942-1945, (London, 1998), p. 273. As late as June 1951, of those polled by the Allensbach Institute, 30% stated a disagreement with the July 20 attempt on Hitler's life. See Elisabeth Noelle & Erich Peter Neumann, Jahrbuch der Offentlichen Meinung, 1947-1955, (Allensbach am Bodensee, 1956), p. 138.

[117] **Laurence Rees,** The Nazis – A Warning from History, (London, 2005), p. 349. Rees quotes Walter Fernau as saying: "For us [the Wehrmacht] the Führer was … an idol."

[118] **Thacker,** The End of the Third Reich, pp. 13-14, 123-131.

[119] **Klemperer,** Diaries, 1942-1945, p. 417**.**

4. Lasting Perceptions and Conclusions

As we have seen, the image of Hitler as the new messiah was quite explicitly proselytised during the years of peace. The mechanics for the diffusion of the symbolic Hitler were in place and brought under the control of the regime. It is clear that the majority of the wider population, whether or not the symbol was inferred or not, did not explicitly respond to this symbol. Instead, Hitler was viewed in peacetime under numerous identities, as Kershaw clearly sets out, but does not at any time appear to have been viewed as a messianic figure by the German majority. There were few, of course, that did view Hitler as a divine or messianic being. However what is also clear is that as the end of the Third Reich drew ever more obvious, fighting became commensurately fanatical in areas. The conclusion that must be drawn states that, although not explicitly demonstrated in the gathered public opinion statements of the SD and SOPADE etc., there is reason to suggest that the proselytised image of the symbolic Hitler was indeed effectively inculcated to varying degrees by a significant proportion of the population. Certainly, this is true to the extent that Nazi fanaticism was able to unite in a bitter stand against the overwhelming forces of the Allied assault.

As the enemy drew nearer in the closing days of the war, Günter Esdor, member of the Hitler Youth, disposed of all his possessions bearing any sign of Nazism (including an oil painting of Hitler and a copy of *Mein Kampf*) into a foetid manure pit and "felt like a blasphemer". To feel blasphemous, even in an act of self-preservation, signals a raw internalisation of the symbolic messiah. He was not alone in this experience of trying to distance one's self from Hitler,

> "Of course, most Germans … mourned the collapse of the Third Reich, that is, as long as they had not been persecuted by the Nazi regime." [120]

Yet, one isolated case does not create a rule. The creation of such a generalisation becomes a difficult task in the face of the secrecy and hidden complicity forced by the varied intensities of Allied denazification activities. [121] These activities initially targeted the population as a whole and then became more individualistic in their pursuit with ruthless condemnations and a number of executions. The German reaction was equivalent to a closing of the ranks, a retreat into the psychological sphere of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, and the wholesale production of *Persilscheine* to 'wash the Brown Shirt white' until, as some commentators noted, 'Hitler must have been the only Nazi in Germany'. [122] This, as noted earlier, suited the German self-image.

The lasting effects of the symbol acceptance are perhaps more plainly discovered in these immediate post-war years than during the period of the Third Reich. Although both sets of evidence are problematic and shrouded in a desire for discretion at source, the post-war *Fragebogen* present a potentially more accurate survey than the SD or SOPADE spies. The surveyed findings of the *Fragebogen* pay testament to both the extent of symbol acceptance and internalisation, as well as the apparent failure of Allied Occupation practices. As many as between 47% and 55% of Germans, even in the face of the daily hardships of 1945-1947 (that Allied re-education policy insisted was the responsibility of Hitler), still believed in National Socialism. For these people, National Socialism was a good idea that that been badly managed by the Nazis. [123] Approximately 18% of the population could be judged to be 'unreconstructed Nazis'. [124]

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[120] **Günter Esdor,** "'Haben Sie das gehört. Es ist Krieg!!!' Die Geschichte meiner ersten 23 Lebensjahre in einer bewegten Zeit von 1933 bis 1955," MS, Bremen 1998, KA 6479, quoted in Jarausch, *After Hitler*, p. 46.

[121] **John H. Herz**, 'The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 63, No. 4. (Dec., 1948), pp. 569-594. See also Carolyn Eisenberg, *Drawing the Line – The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 118-138, 262-263; see also Tom Bower, *Blind Eye To Murder – Britain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany – A Pledge Betrayed*, (London,1981); A. Mann, *Comeback*, pp. 61-70.

[122] **Fulbrook**, *The Divided Nation*, pp. 147-149. See also Morris Janowitz, 'German Reactions to Nazi Atrocities', *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 52, No. 2. (Sep., 1946), pp. 141-146.

[123] **Anna J. Merritt & Richard L. Merritt,** *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949*, (Urbana, Ill., 1970), pp. 32-33. Cf. Nicholas Pronay & Keith Wilson (eds.), *The Political Re-education of Germany and Her Allies After World War II*, (Beckenham, 1985), p. 148. Statistics also cited in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 205. For allied re-education policy see D. Culbert, 'American film policy in the re-education of Germany after 1945', in *Political Re-education of Germany*, eds. Pronay & Wilson, which suggests that the Germans were cynical about re-education activities, often regarding them as propaganda.

[124] **Merritt & Merritt**, Ibid., p. 38.

Likewise, the Allensbach Institute surveyed public opinion and found similar Nazism and discreet belief in Hitler. They found variously that Germans still believed Hitler to be the greatest statesman of the twentieth-century (10%), an excellent statesman (22%), [125] the statesman who did most for Germany (10%). [126] There was also a dramatic increase in anti-Semitism and belief, or 'reaffirmation' of racial superiority across the period, increasing from about 55-65%. [127] Given the attempted re-education, and later the explicit attempts to compensate Israeli Jews, this also calls to question the lasting extent of the Hitler's *weltanschauung* and explicit racism. As Moskowitz suggests, embittered Jews were haranguing the Germans with accusations of guilt. [128] Outwith the permeated presence of positive memories of Hitler, attention should also be drawn to the significant numbers that consistently failed to comment in the Allensbach surveys. Within the environment of denazification and the occupancy of past 'enemies', it seems most likely that a considered response would be likely to elicit a non-Nazi answer, which suggests that the above figures are potentially understated.

Those restored to political prominence in the post-war period presented the symbolic Hitler, both for their own political ends and for the restoration of the German nation. Konrad Adenauer projection of National Socialism as a pagan and atheistic construct: in the mind of the Germans, the State became "*zu einem fast göttlichen Wesen*" ("an almost god-like being"). His antidote was the replacement of one religion with another. [129] Nonetheless, Adenauer's 'internal emigration' allowed him to witness, like Klemperer, the day-to-day evolution of the Third Reich. He stated: "If broad layers of the German population, peasants, the middle class, workers, and intellectuals had not had the right mentality the victory of National Socialism in 1933, and thereafter, among the German people would not have been possible." [130]

This castigation of German involvement was clear and untainted by his later political optimism; instead, there was a hint of moral disgust and, perhaps, an intuitive understanding of the general desire to distance one's self, at least superficially, from Nazism. Adenauer's later *Vergangenheitspolitik* of the (discrete) amnesty of war criminals (by this time subtly referred to as "condemned soldiers") for the sake of political integration and support, shows the wide acceptance of the past and its symbols. Which shows the very definite existence of National Socialism and the internalisation of the symbolic Hitler in the post-war State.

[125] **Noelle & Neumann,** *Jahrbuch 1947-1955*, p. 136. These results are from questions first asked in 1952.

[126] *Ibid.,* p. 132. This question was asked in 1950. Bismarck received 35% and the Kaiser 14%. A substantial 15% did not respond to the question. See G. R. Boynton & Gerhard Loewenberg, 'The Decay of Support for Monarchy and the Hitler Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4, No. 4. (Oct., 1974), pp. 453-488, for an in-depth analysis of a very similar question. The article suggests that support for Hitler and the German flag was strongest amongst those who disagreed with parliamentary process. Once support for the *Bundestag* grew, Hitler's support diminished correspondingly.

[127] **Merritt & Merritt,** *The OMGUS Surveys*, p. 39.

[128] **Moses Moskowitz,** 'The Germans and the Jews: Postwar Report – The Enigma of German Irresponsibility', *Commentary*, 2 (1946), p. 7, also cited in Herf, *Divided Memory*, p. 204. See also Frederick Weil, 'The Imperfectly Mastered Past: Anti-Semitism in West Germany since the Holocaust', *New German Critique*, No. 20, Special Issue 2: Germans and Jews. (Spring – Summer, 1980), pp. 135-153.

[129] **Jeffrey Herf, '**Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 1945-1946', *Central European History*, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Spring, 1993) pp. 21-56, esp. 41-43.

[130] *Ibid.,* p. 41. This comes from Adenauer's speech at the University of Cologne on 26th March 1946.

The above article has proposed that there was a very specific and explicit presentation of a symbolic Hitler that, although appearing in many guises, took the form, at times, of a messianic figure. By means of a tightly controlled and centralised monopoly of propaganda, this figure was presented to the whole nation. The centrality of 'myth' and 'ceremony' to the National Socialist *weltanschauung* and *Jahreslauf*, central components of most religions, [131] and Hitler's obvious centrality within these 'celebrations', had nation-wide participation; thus placing Hitler at the very heart of the ideology. On the part of the Germans, the taking of oaths expressly to 'Adolf Hitler' or 'my Führer, Adolf Hitler' placed their explicit allegiance to his (symbolic) person directly. A willingness to take such an oath demonstrates much about the latent belief that many had in their Führer. The significant bond that this created in many is attested to in the enduring strength that this oath retained when, even in the face of death, there was a general stubbornness and unwillingness to renege on the pledge. With this in mind, and in consideration of the numerous (possibly bias) public opinion reports, the presented symbol would not appear to have been received by the majority of Germans in accordance with its intention. Whilst there were those who accepted Hitler as a messianic figure, it remains clear that the majority did not in the same explicit sense. However, the implicit, possibly subconscious extent by which the symbolic Hitler *did* remain in the minds of Germans can be found in their actions and opinions of the relatively immediate post-war years.

The appearances of Hitler as a 'weak' dictator due to the structural '*behemoth*' that administrated Germany of the Third Reich are, to a degree, misrepresentative of Hitler's strength as a symbol. If the bureaucratic *modus operandi* of government required the concept of 'working towards the Führer' to stave off the systematic collapse of the administrative ability of the state – resulting in 'cumulative radicalisation' – then the potency of the symbolic Hitler acted, in large part, as an incipient component of this system. The deliberate proselytising of the symbol, and the consequent success of that representation, is indicative of strength of dictatorship not accounted for by the 'structuralist' argument. Likewise, the tendency to overlook the reciprocal relationship and interdependency between the symbolic Hitler and that of his community of *Volksgenossen*, which is perpetually, and necessarily in existence, fails to take account of 'communal responsibility'. [132] Regardless of any other form of guilt, the very fact that German society did reciprocate, and project onto him the status of "saviour", then complicity in his crimes should be apportioned correspondingly. As Hitler stated himself, " … values that do not exist cannot be mobilised." [133] As such, the events of the twelve years of Nazi rule are not the sole responsibility of Hitler and 'his apostles', and the justice of Nuremberg falls short of the truth.

[131] **Hiden & Farquharson**, *Explaining Hitler's Germany*, pp. 49-50.

[132] **Cf. Mommsen**, 'Cumulative radicalisation and progressive self-destruction', *op. cit.*; cf. Mason, 'Intention and Explanation', *op. cit.*; Bloxham, 'The Genocidal Past in Western Germany', p. 308.

[133] **Quoted in Steinert**, Hitler's War, pp. 8-9.

A. 12 November 1933, on the decision to leave the League of Nations

Entitled to vote	Votes cast	%	Yes	%	No	%	Invalid votes
45,176,713	43,951,575	96.3	40,632,628	95.1	2,101,191	4.9	750,270

B. Reichstag Elections, 29 March 1936
(Remilitarisation of the Rhineland was tied in with this vote)

Entitled to vote	Votes cast	%	Votes for the list of Nazi candidates	%	Invalid votes and those cast against Nazi list	%	
45,176,713	43,491,575	99	44,461,278	98.8	542,211	0.2	542,211

C. Plebiscite over Anschluss with Austria, 10 April 1938.

Entitled to vote			Yes votes	%	No votes	%	
49,646,950			48,799,269	99.08	539,640	0.92	

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The Kitos War

by Salah

מרד הגלויות

Spoils of the temple carried in triumph.

After the 1st Century CE, our contemporary sources on the Roman Empire become fragmented and tantalizingly incomplete. Inscriptions found by archaeologists in recent decades attest to wars across the Empire, from the Alps to Egypt, that went totally unrecorded in the writings of Cassius Dio, Herodian, and other historians of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Centuries.

Other wars were not forgotten in our written sources, but even these are not documented in the same detail as the civil wars of the late Republic and early Empire. One such war has gone down in Jewish history as the Kitos War, and if Cassius Dio's account is even partially true, it was a war of almost unparalleled destruction and human tragedy.

Another Jewish Revolt - the Kitos War by Salah

Imperial Rome fought three wars over the course of the 1st and 2nd Centuries that were termed *bellum iudaicum* – Jewish Wars. All three constituted the revolts of Jewish communities within the Eastern provinces (the first and third revolts centered on Judea itself), who were aspiring to set up an independent Jewish state totally free of Roman control. The First (or "Great") Revolt spanned from 68 to 73 CE, and was the backdrop for such dramatic encounters as the sieges of Jerusalem in 70, and of Masada in 73.

The Roman occupation of Jerusalem in 70 resulted in the thorough destruction of the Herodian Temple. Titus Flavius Vespasianus the Younger, the Roman general commanding the siege, recognized the Temple as a focal point for Jewish nationalistic aspirations, and reacted accordingly. Their Temple destroyed, their rebel armies butchered or driven into the hill country, thousands of Jews were sold into slavery. Many consecrated the newly-constructed Flavian Amphitheater – otherwise known as the Colusseum – with their blood and sweat.

The Jews were not banned from Jerusalem in the aftermath of the First Revolt, but their catastrophic losses – both human and spiritual – had made them a deeply embittered people. They still made up the bulk of Judea's population; very large Jewish minorities also resided in Syria, Cyprus, and both the urban and rural areas of northern Egypt. Egypt's greatest metropolis, Alexandria, was home to an estimated 150,000 Jews, who lived in a constant state of friction with the city's larger Greek population.

The Second Jewish War – the Kitos Wars – broke out in 115 CE. Exactly what caused the revolt is unknown. Its outbreak during the Emperor Trajan's Parthian War has led some modern scholars to suggest Parthian meddling was the catalyst, the latter making deliberate attempts to stir up the already discontented Jewish community's passions against Rome. Its spontaneous nature, its diverse and apparently uncoordinated leaders, and the appalling ill-discipline and brutality of the revolt would suggest that it was not a pre-planned event. Passions that had been simmering for a generation boiled over. Men who, as children, had heard tearful recountings of the Roman barbarities in Judea a generation before were now old enough to avenge the crime committed against their people.

As apparent evidence of its lack of organization, the Kitos War in fact broke out in two locations simultaneously. In Mesopotamia – modern Iraq – bands of armed Jewish men surrounded and butchered Roman garrisons left behind by Trajan, who was now marching on the Parthian capital of Ctesiphon. Mesopotamia was home to a large Jewish population who had received no ill-treatment at the hands of the Parthians; they were loathe to trade these gentler masters for Rome's heavy hand.

It was in the African province of Cyrenaica, however, that the revolt broke out in its most horrific intensity. Angry Jewish mobs in the streets of the provincial capital of Cyrene were welded into a ragtag army of sorts by a rabble-rouser named Lukuas, also known as Andreas. Cassius Dio tells us that this Lukuas took the title "King of the Jews" – perhaps he was claiming to be the long-awaited Maschiach? Lukuas definitely appears to have been grinding an axe of a religious nature – he is credited with destroying the temples and cult-buildings of every Graeco-Roman god worshipped in Cyrene. For good measure, Lukuas' followers also destroyed Roman government buildings and burnt down the Roman bath-houses of the city, apparently viewing these as symbols of government oppression and gentile influence, respectively.

Cyrene had been home to a very large Jewish community since pre-Roman times; readers of the Gospels will recall a certain Simon of Cyrene, staying in Jerusalem for the Seder feast when he was tasked with helping Jesus Christ carry his cross. As a result, Lukuas' following grew into an unwieldy mob, predominately of lower-class young men, which proved impossible to control. Dio blames them for a long list of atrocities, even accusing them of cannibalism and using the internal organs of murdered Romans and Greeks as belts. Somewhat more plausibly, the rebel Jews are also accused of forcing Romans to fight as gladiators. Jews were common victims of Roman brutality in the arenas, and inscriptions attest to the existence of Jewish gladiators (including some with stereotypical names such as Yeshua – Jesus). This would suggest that, like Spartacus' rebel gladiators two centuries before, the Cyrenaic Jews were taking sadistic pleasure from enforcing a brutal role-reversal on the hated Romans.

Lukuas and his rebels did not stop at Cyrene – advancing eastwards into Egypt, they found Alexandria had been abandoned by the Roman governor Marcus Rutilius Lupus and his soldiers. Here they joined forces with the local Jewish communities, which were deeply embittered by prejudice they had endured at the hands of Alexandria's Greek majority. The result was an orgy of bloodshed and arson similar to that which had taken place in Cyrene – it culminated in the destruction of Pompey the Great's tomb, and of the partial burning of Alexandria herself.

In response to this news, the Jews of the island of Cyprus also broke out into a bloody revolt, with almost identical results. These Jews, under the leadership of a man named Artemio, burned the provincial capital of Salamis to the ground. Simultaneously, the fires of rebellion spread into Judea herself. Here two Jews, Julianus and Pappos, gathered their own force of rebels and took the city of Lydda by storm, making it their makeshift capital. All of this also apparently occurred in 115 CE, while Trajan was pursuing his dream of Eastern conquest.

Roman Empire after 120

The Roman army was stretched very thin. Trajan's immediate forces were spread across Mesopotamia, where they were clashing with Parthians, Jews, and others. The Praetorian Prefect Quintus Marcius Turbo was nonetheless dispatched at the head of several legions, tasked with putting down the revolt in Egypt and Cyrene. Only after two years of bitter fighting did he quash these revolts, and Lukuas and his remaining followers fled to Judea, perhaps in an attempt to join forces with Pappos and Julianus. In Mesopotamia herself, Lusius Quietus was given command of a predominately mounted force that was tasked with silencing the rebels. Quietus was a Moorish prince who had enjoyed a somewhat controversial career in the Roman army. Dashing, arrogant, and sadistic, Quietus displayed both ferocious energy and a total lack of human pity in destroying or driving out very nearly all the Jews of Mesopotamia.

By the fall of 117 Turbo and Quietus had both entered Judea, which had become the focal point of the revolt under the joint leadership of Lukuas, Julianus, and Pappos. They put Lydda up to siege, forcing great hardship upon the rebels. Trapped within the city was the Rabbi Gamaliel II, who famously gave the defenders permission to fast even during Chanukkah, for such was the desperate situation of their rations. Gamaliel had already died at the end of the year, when Lydda fell to an assault and all of her defenders were killed – many were crucified after the fall of the city. When and how the revolt in Cyprus was extinguished has not been recorded by history.

The amount of destruction caused by the Kitos War (so called from the Hebrew form of Lusius Quietus' name) was titanic. Supposedly 220,000 Greeks and Romans were murdered in Egypt and Cyrene, and another 240,000 perished in Cyprus. Papyri found in Egypt attest to the murderous fighting between Jewish and gentile gangs in the desert, and the state of fear in which the common people of the province lived in. How many Jews were killed, Cassius Dio does not bother to record. But he does tell us that such was the bitterness of the people of Cyprus towards the Jews, that a law was passed banning any person of Jewish descent or faith from ever setting foot on Cyprus, under pain of death. This law was still in effect a century later under the Severan emperors, and was even applicable if the offender had been shipwrecked on Cyprus or had been blown to its shores by unforeseen winds.

Fate did not reward Lusius Quietus for his cruelty. Just one year after his victories in Mesopotamia and Judea, he fell out of favor with the new Emperor Hadrian and was executed. The War that Jewish tradition named after him, however, gave the entire Empire, both its Jewish and gentile populations, reason to mourn.

If your first thought was 'Where are the words?' then you are not grasping the essence of zen.

BLAME IT
on MacArthur....

by **Fred Leander**

Once in a while I bump into military subjects discussed on the web where I react instinctively to the rigid conclusions drawn by some debaters. One such *military subject* is General Douglas MacArthur. When I read the often somewhat degrading descriptions of him, I get the same feeling as when I first started researching the **German Operation Sea Lion (Unternehmen Seelöwe),** the planned invasion of England in the Fall of 1940. The Germans are often portrayed as military amateurs with little or no experience in naval warfare or amphibious operations in spite of their recent military successes on the European continent and Scandinavia and their flare for offensive improvisations and *Kraftsammlung!* How could this be? The conclusions reached by myself after some years of research indicated that Operation Sea Lion was quite feasible, a jewel of military planning and execution. With General Franz Halder, the venerable German Army's Chief of Staff as its progenitor, this should surprise no one. It was German staff work at its best and most expeditious. So convinced was I that I ended up writing a book about it.

Having studied MacArthur in some detail I end up with the same question. How can this be? Why is he so criticized? The general conclusions, as I see them, surely are somewhat skewed? I shall elaborate on this in connection with his engagement in the Philippine Campaign 1941/42, as this is the most discussed subject as far as he is concerned. I have no intention on writing a book about it.

General MacArthur was a controversial person. Heavily decorated in the First World War he went on to become Army Chief-of-Staff before he took up position as military advisor for the Philippine president, Manuel Quezon, in 1935, at the same time liaising between the Philippine Department and Philippine forces. He knew President Queson from his earlier service with the US Army in the Philippines. In 1922 he married American multi-millionaire Louise Cromwell Brooks, a recently divorced, very beautiful and popular woman in the snobbish Washington upper social circles. It was rumored that General Pershing courted the same woman. In that same year MacArthur was transferred to the Philippines, taking his wife and her two children with him. He returned with his family to the US in the spring of 1925. While in the Philippines he was promoted Major General, the youngest in the US Army.

In the meantime, he had been central in settling a minor mutiny among the Philippine Scouts, a unit manned by Philippine locals but officered by Americans. This would distinguish itself during the fighting on Luzon in 1941/42. MacArthur tried to improve on their salaries and allowances, but this was for a large part frustrated by the local authorities. He also reacted to the social and racial prejudices among his colleagues and the colonial administration. In all, MacArthur seems to have had a pronounced social (human) streak. During the Great War, ending up as divisional commander of the 42nd (Rainbow) infantry division in France, he used much energy on the safekeeping of his men and he was decorated several times for personal appearances up front with the purpose of verifying the actual battle situation before letting his men loose. His service as Superintendent of the West Point Academy also shows this. He introduced changes in the curriculum and tried, among many other things, to get to hand with the vicious class-system developed among the cadets. During his service in the occupied German territories (Rhineland) he had developed an understanding of social and economic problems. This, too, he wanted to introduce into the cadets' training. It is reasonable to assume that his attitude as the Chief Occupant of Japan many years later was based on his experiences in Germany. Many of the changes introduced by MacArthur were discarded after he left West Point, only to be gradually introduced again as the years passed on. Just before leaving the Philippines in February 1942 he was able to have the pay of his Philippine soldiers upgraded to the same level as the American serving beside them. A pioneering "same pay for same work". Unfortunately, few of his Filipinos would benefit from this.

There are some points of criticism of General MacArthur which are particularly recalcitrant:

-That he lost his Philippine Air Force on the ground,

-that he disobeyed the orders of the War Plan Orange 5 (WPO - Rainbow 5),

- that he misled the Leadership at home on the (lack of) capabilities of the Philippine defense, was too optimistic,
-that he "fled" the Corregidor,

- that he accepted the Congressional Medal of Honor bestowed upon him by President Roosevelt.

B-17 at Clark field.

Clark field under attack.

Why General MacArthur left Corregidor

To take his departure from the Philippines first: The real reason for MacArthur leaving is moot, much colored by personal opinions aired in various biographies. Was he a coward that just wanted to get away to avoid imprisonment or was he dragged away against his own will? Were there rational or emotional reasons for him staying on? Did his departure contribute to the collapse of the US defense? One thing is for sure, MacArthur himself was quite adamant that officially there should be no doubt that he *was ordered to leave and that this was against his own will. True or false?*

There is one aspect I find is little discussed in this context. At the end of January 1942, the Philippine president wrote a letter to MacArthur where he complained about the lack of material support to the Philippines:

"We decided to fight by your side and we have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance….it seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation nor the feelings which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare have engendered in the hearts of the people here".

As was probably expected by Queson, MacArthur sent his message on to Roosevelt. This underlined MacArthur's own constant urging for supplies, reinforcements and a more active strategy by the United States. Little happened and before Roosevelt had time to comment on this first message Queson sent a new message, aimed directly at Roosevelt. This letter reflected the deteriorating situation at hand and contained some, for Roosevelt, quite disturbing passages:

"…militarily it is quite evident that no help will reach us from the United States in time either to rescue the beleaguered garrison now fighting so gallantly or to prevent the complete overrunning of the entire Philippine Archipelago.

….all our soldiers in the field were animated by the belief that help would be forthcoming. This help has not and evidently will not be realized .

…after two months of war not the slightest assistance has been forthcoming from the United States.

…aid and succor have been dispatched to other warring nations such as England, Ireland, Australia, the N.E.I. and perhaps others, but not only has nothing come here, but apparently no effort has been made to bring anything here. The American Fleet and the British Fleet have apparently adopted an attitude which precludes any effort to reach these islands with assistance

…as a result, while enjoying security itself, the United States has in effect condemned the sixteen millions of Filipinos to practical destruction in order to effect a certain delay".

After this heavy and somewhat unfair broadside followed Quezon's real bombshell:

"...I deem it my duty to propose my solution...

...that the United States immediately grant the Philippines complete and absolute independence...

...that the Philippines be at once neutralized...

...that the Philippine Army be immediately disbanded...

...it is my proposal to make this suggestion publicly to you and the Japanese authorities without delay..."

MacArthur sent his own evaluation of the situation along with Queson's letter. He made no attempt of glorifying the situation and showed little of his usual optimism:

"...my estimate of the military situation is as follows: The troops have sustained practically 50% casualties from their original strength. Divisions are reduced to the size of regiments, regiments to battalions, battalions to companies. Some units have entirely disappeared...

...it is possible for the time that the present enemy force might temporarily be held, but any addition to his present strength will ensure the destruction of our entire force...

...we have pulled through a number of menacing situations but there is no denying the fact that we are near done..."

On Corregidor:
"...Corregidor itself is extremely vulnerable. This type of fortress, built prior to the days of air power, when isolated is impossible of prolonged defense...
...since I have no air or sea protection, you must be prepared at any time to figure on the complete destruction of this command..."

"...you must determine whether the mission of delay would be better furthered by the temporizing plan of Quezon or by my continued battle effort...

...the temper of the Filipinos is one of almost violent resentment against the United States. Every one of them expected help and when it has not been forthcoming they believe they have been betrayed in favor of others. It must be remembered that they are hostile to Great Britain on account of the latter's colonial policy...

...if help does not arrive shortly nothing, in my opinion, can prevent their utter collapse and their complete absorption by the enemy. The Japanese made a powerful impression on the Philippine public imagination in promising independence...
...the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle..."

Roosevelt's reply to Quezon's first message to MacArthur was centered around this brisk passage:

"...you have no authority to communicate with the Japanese government without the express permission of the United States government".

After having received Quezon's second letter Roosevelt sent an elaborate reply summing up the international situation and justifying his rejection of Quezon's proposals as to a Philippine collaboration with the Japanese and the eventual granting of Philippine independence outside the original treaties between USA and the Philippine Commonwealth. On the other hand, in a personal letter to MacArthur he opened for the possibility of letting the Philippine Army off the hook by allowing it to surrender independently to the Japanese. For the American forces, however, there was to be no surrender as long as there was any power left in them.

Following this, both Quezon and MacArthur made complete turnarounds in their replies to Roosevelt and declared their intention to hang on no matter, without any further fledgling. Quezon was impressed by Roosevelt's will to fight on regardless and MacArthur – had he just thrown out a bluff that had been called? In politicians' way of thinking one could say "the damage was done" - that a breach of confidence had occurred no matter Quezon and MacArthur's backtracking. Roosevelt was a full-blooded politician. Could Quezon and MacArthur be trusted, even with their renewed pledges of loyalty to the common cause? Anyway, the question of MacArthur's withdrawal was first actualized after Quezon's first letter, the one MacArthur had sent on to Roosevelt. President Quezon left Corregidor by submarine with his family not long after the exchange of the quoted letters. MacArthur finally accepted the repeated requests for his departure when he was informed that there was a job waiting for him in Australia, that of leading the Allied forces in South-West Asia. He was not be left out in the cold and was allowed to decide the exact time of his withdrawal as he found it "psychologically acceptable ". In the middle of March this assumption was fulfilled as the Japanese had pulled back from the frontline some time before to build up new forces, in the meantime staying passive. The fronts had settled down. MacArthur could leave

It is not unusual, nor necessarily unwise, to have superior military leaders evacuated from a combat zone according to changing circumstances. It was done during the Dunkirk evacuation. Lord Gort, the BEF CO, was ordered back to England. Also he, according to the official history and Churchill, left his troops unwillingly. As the beachhead gradually shrunk, more superior officers were taken out, finally General Alexander was the only one left. That Churchill needed his best generals for future battles was one thing, it was also a question of propaganda, not to give the enemy the opportunity to brag about captured enemy generals. For the Americans the domestic public was probably more important in the propaganda war than the enemy. Dunkirk was, in some perverse way, perceived almost as a victory by the British – Pearl Harbor and the Philippine Campaign was a very different experience for the Americans. They did not need more bad news. Like the capture of the, up to then, iconic General MacArthur.

Manuel Luis Quezón y Molina (August 19, 1878 – August 1, 1944) served as president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines from 1935 to 1944. He was the first Filipino to head a government of the Philippines (as opposed to other historical states), and is considered by most Filipinos to have been the second president of the Philippines, after Emilio Aguinaldo (1897–1901).

Quezón was the first Senate president elected to the presidency, the first president elected through a national election and the first incumbent to secure re-election (for a partial second term, later extended, due to amendments to the 1935 Constitution). He is known as the "Father of the National Language".

During his presidency, Quezón tackled the problem of landless peasants in the countryside. Other major decisions include reorganization of the islands' military defense, approval of recommendation for government reorganization, promotion of settlement and development in Mindanao, dealing with the foreign stranglehold on Philippine trade and commerce, proposals for land reform, and opposing graft and corruption within the government. He established an exiled government in the U.S. with the outbreak of the war and the threat of Japanese invasion, and during his exile in the U.S. he died of tuberculosis at Saranac Lake, New York.

Studying his historic ties with the Philippines it should be obvious to everyone that he was very much attached to this fledgling nation. He first came there as a young engineer second lieutenant in 1903, his father had served there during the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars in 1898 and 1899. After a short stop in the US after the end of his first Philippine tour, Douglas MacArthur reported to his father, a general, in Tokyo. Together they toured Japanese military establishments, later to continue through China, Singapore and India up through the Khyber Pass, skirting through China again on their return trip. His later Philippine stints in the US Army and as a military adviser for President Queson seemingly developed the strong ties to the country and its people. He must have felt terribly depressed to have to leave what can only be described as the mission of his life. And his men. For seven years he had worked hard at developing the Philippine defense under constantly developing circumstances, first as *Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines*, then from the Summer of 1941 as *CO of the USAFFE – US Armed Forces Far East.* After the Japanese assault on Dec. 8th he had seen his combined American and Filipino forces pushed back to the Bataan peninsula, himself and his near staff banished to the fortress of Corregidor in the Manila Bay. Mind you, his service in the Philippines was quite profitable for him, the first years he drew double pay as an American general and a Philippine field Marshall and advisor.

To imply that General Douglas MacArthur was a coward is rather far-fetched considering his previous active service, stretching from his escapades during the Mexican War (1914) to his repeated visits along the WW1 frontlines. During his early years he was twice recommended for the Medal of Honor without getting it. While both these recommendations were covered by the proper statutes and therefore could have been awarded him, the one he received it for, the first Philippine Campaign, was not. The circumstances, and the fact that the assigning of the award was initiated by Roosevelt himself, made it difficult to decline it. MacArthur sidestepped this elegantly by dedicating the Medal to all the defenders of the Philippines. In all, one may ask how it came to that MacArthur was awarded all his medals, a multiplicity of most of them – among them seven Silver Stars presented retrospectively. Anybody having been through the military system knows that some are much more inclined to look for concrete confirmation of their actions than others. As MacArthur no doubt felt that he and his men had been *betrayed* to some degree by the leadership in Washington, receiving the highest US military decoration probably went a long way to compensate for this.

There are those that claim that the inferior military support for MacArthur was grounded in a political hostility between the two parties. That Roosevelt really didn't want MacArthur to succeed. They *were* positioned on opposite flanks of the American political playground, Roosevelt a Democrat and MacArthur a hardcore Republican. If there is anything in this theory, General Marshall was not in on it as he used every venue to pressure his people in the budding base areas in Australia to do everything they could to get merchandise stranded there onwards to the Philippines. Statistically, much more supplies and war material was sent westwards than in the other direction during this period. Millions of dollars were used, and wasted, to hire civilian ship transports, most of them were destroyed by the Japanese. None got any protection from the US Navy. If there is anything in the backstab theory it would rather be that by ordering MacArthur out of the Philippines he would not achieve the martyrdom gloria he undoubtedly would have if he had entered into captivity with his men. On the other hand, to have a reproaching, loose gun like MacArthur running around in Washington was perhaps not such a good idea for Roosevelt. When MacArthur finally returned to the US Roosevelt was gone.

MacArthur left the Philippines on March 12th 1941 with his family and closest associates to take up the sword again from a new start in Australia. Always the optimist, he must still have had grave doubts as to a quick relief of his left-behind troops. For many a month the Leadership at home had promised reinforcements and supplies to the beleaguered Americans and Filipinos, always with less than enough arriving. Comparing the Philippine situation with that of Malta in the Mediterranean one cannot but be a little surprised by the passive role of the US naval forces in the area but that is another story. Is it his frustration that is mirrored in his last order, to the surrounded defenders of Bataan:

"Attack the enemy with all you've got".

Just after that Bataan fell.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
1941

Principal Japanese landings
Principal American controlled airfields-7 December 1941.

MILES 50 0 50 100 150 200

10 DECEMBER 1941

10 DECEMBER 1941

22 DECEMBER 1941

23 DEC. 1941

18 DECEMBER '41

12 DECEMBER 1941

20 DECEMBER 1941

30 DECEMBER 1941

N

APARRI

TUGUEGARAO

Vigan

LUZON

ILAGAN

LINGAYEN GULF

BAGUIO

Agoo

CABANATUAN

O'DONNELL

IBA

CLARK FIELD

SAN FERNANDO

SAN MARCELINO

DEL CARMEN

LUBAO

SAN RAFAEL

NIELSON

CABCABEN

NICHOLS

KINDLEY

CANLUBANG

MARIVELES: New Field prepared by 803d Engrs. after 7 Dec.

4 Fields (Hermosa, Orani, Abucay, & Pilar) prepared for A. C. by Dept. Engr. after 7 Dec.

TANAUAN

LIPA

Atimonan

PARACALE

3 Fields prepared for A. C. after 7 Dec., abandoned 24 Dec.

Legaspi

SIBUYAN SEA

MINDORO

SAN JOSE

Capiz

VISAYAN SEA

PANAY

ILOILO

MEDELLIN

FABRICA

SAMAR

TACLOBAN

ORMOC

LEYTE

LA CARLOTA

NEGROS

CEBU

CEBU

CARMEN

BOHOL

TAGBILARAN

DUMAGUETE

SOUTH CHINA SEA

SEA

MINDANAO SEA

BUENAVISTA

GINGOOG

CAGAYAN DEL MONTE

LAKE LANAO

VALENCIA

MARAMAG

MALABANG

MINDANAO

DAVAO

Digos

ZAMBOANGA

PALAWAN

SULU SEA

SULU ARCHIPELAGO

NORTH BORNEO

CELEBES SEA

PHILIPPINE SEA

MAP NO. 1

GENERAL MAP OF CAMPAIGN ON NORTH LUZON AND BATAAN
8 DECEMBER 1941–9 APRIL 1942

Lines occupied by our forces
Routes of advance of Japanese forces

SCALE
0   50   MILES 100

SOURCE: Report of Operations of USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands, 1941-1942, Annex IV.

MAP NO. 2

Too optimistic?

How could General Douglas MacArthur not be the right man in the position he filled on Dec. 8th 1941? He was professionally well educated, experienced and had excessive knowledge of the local conditions and area. He had good connections with the local people and those supplying him and his men with the daily bread – the leadership in Washington. It is said he was overly optimistic. How could he not be optimistic? Or show himself optimistic? While the President and General Marshall always expressed a will to defend the Philippines, and that all sorts of equipment would be shipped to him as soon as possible, he could never be exactly sure of the lay of the land. If the Home Front suspected that the struggle in the Philippines was hopeless, would they not stop the already scarce supplies of a hopeless cause? If the Philippines was deemed a lost cause, and thereby denied more supplies, would its defenders be allowed to surrender, or were they supposed to fight on under even more uneven conditions? Did he have a reason to be optimistic? When the Japanese invasion was a fact and his fate was in the hands of the supply people at home and along the Pacific transport routes, his optimism was a dire necessity to keep up the fighting spirit of his officers and men. Many a strange MacArthur statement at the time should be seen in this light. He was known to exaggerate, or twist the truth, when he saw a purpose in it.

What about before the invasion, should he have been less optimistic? Even if MacArthur always expounded an aura of optimism he rarely let his *superior*s rest. As the Philippine advisor he constantly pestered the US military, of which he was not a part in that capacity, to get their act together, at the same time lobbying for contributions to the Philippine part of their budding defense system. In principle, the expansion of the Philippine army and air Force was to be funded by the Philippine Commonwealth's own budget but there was quite a lot of intermingling, the eventual success of this was often person-related. While the expenses of Philippine Army training and their facilities were to be covered by the Philippine defense budget, personal and unit equipment often came from US stocks. In case of war the Philippine forces should go under US command.

As the Far East crisis developed through 1940 and 1941 the question of the Philippine defense was getting hotter and hotter. After the fall of France in June 1940 the Japanese took the opportunity to elbow themselves into French Indo-China, established air bases outflanking the Philippines in the South-West and obtained a springboard towards the important British naval base of Singapore. The following summer Indo-China came under total Japanese domination. It was decided to upgrade the Philippines as a

US base area, the USAFFE was established by presidential decree on July 26th 1941 and MacArthur was recalled to active duty as its Commanding Officer. The Philippine forces came under US command and with it started a hefty expansion on all levels and branches.

Even if the local conditions had heated up both General Marshall in the US, and MacArthur, believed that they had more time than they had to develop the defenses of the Philippines. They saw April 1st 1942 as a possible, or hoped-for, deadline. If that deadline was granted him MacArthur had good reason to be optimistic for on its way to him were more fighter aircrafts, tanks, artillery, ammunition and supplies of all sorts. Amongst it a complete dive bomber group consisting of 54 Douglas A-24's, the army version of the SBD Dauntless which did so good service for the Navy later. As it were, the ground crews and pilots of this bombardment group arrived in Manila a few days before the Japanese assault. The aircrafts, on a later transport, ended up in Australia, never got to the Philippines and was later wasted in the fighting around Java. Much of the squadron's personnel ended up as infantry on Bataan. Other, much missed items when the fighting started, was 0.50 caliber ammunition for the M2 Browning machine guns and mortar rounds, particularly the 60 mm. version. What was in stock was very old and a large part proved to be duds due to their advanced age. The lack of .50 caliber M2 ammunition was so serious that practically no test or training shooting was allowed with these machine guns. This was later to develop into a minor disaster for the fighter units.

Most importantly, had this delay in the Japanese assault taken place, the situation for the Philippine Army would have been very different. This fact was well understood by the Japanese leadership. Coupled with the problems created by the US embargo on POL supplies and scrap metal they had their own deadline to make, not to wait until they lost their freedom of action. MacArthur's optimism changed nothing of this and can hardly have influenced any actions taken by the leadership back in the States. When the thunderstorm gathered for real any additional capacity for a rescue by more forces or equipment was exhausted, particularly sea transport, which was extremely lacking due to the recent US engagement in supplying the UK and the Soviet Union. Would anything have changed if MacArthur had shown a less optimistic attitude?

DISPOSITION OF U.S. ARMY FORCES, FAR EAST
8 December 1941
—XXX— FORCE SECTOR BOUNDARY
100   50   0   100
MILES

NORTH LUZON FORCE
(Gen Wainright)
4 Inf Divisions
1 Cav Regiment

LUZON

RESERVE FORCE
2 Inf Divisions

SOUTH LUZON FORCE
(Gen Parker)
2 Inf Divisions

Manila

MINDORO

SAMAR

VISAYAN SEA

PANAY

LEYTE

PALAWAN

NEGROS

CEBU

BOHOL

VISAYAN-MINDANAO FORCE
(Gen Sharp)
3 Inf Divisions

The wasted supply stores

In case of a Japanese invasion a defensive strategy was selected, as outlined in WPO-3 (War Plan Orange 3). This only concerned Luzon, the main island with Manila and the main US bases. The primary element of this plan was a controlled withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula where large stocks of supplies should be stored. Supply officers estimated that they would probably require enough supplies for 31,000 men (the Bataan Defense Force), later raised to 40.000 men, to last 180 days.

Coordinated with the Corregidor artillery batteries Bataan was supposed to hold out for many months, until eventually relieved by forces from the US. WPO-3 assumed a war only between USA and Japan, and the potential enemy would attack with approximately 100.000 men. As such, the actual situation, with British, Australian and Dutch partners in war, was supposedly better than the plan prescribed. On the other hand, the plan did not cater for the fact that the main US base in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor, was more or less out of the game for a period.

However, with the Japanese expansion in Indo-China and the development of the Axis cooperation the Army Staff developed a new, more offensive plan for the Philippines. In the case of a war with Japan heavy bomber and naval forces should operate offensively along the Japanese supply lines. These bombers would have to operate from the Philippines according to the new plan, WPO-5 (Rainbow 5).

This was all well but that plan would not work if the US ground forces were to withdraw into Bataan. That is, provided the Japanese landed on Luzon. In all this came a new give from MacArthur. With the changing

MacArthur and Sutherland in Corregidor Tunnel

Clark Field

conditions of promised heavy reinforcements in the near future, as regularly promised by Marshall, and the accelerating expansion of the Philippine Army, its 10 new divisions had now started to assemble for their first large-units training, regiment by regiment. He wanted to defend the major parts of Luzon, the so-called "defense of the beaches", as well as some of the other Philippine islands. MacArthur has been criticized for this but his new plan was actually approved by General Marshall in October with the formal approval dispatched with General Brereton, MacArthur's new air force Chief, in the beginning of November. Everything considered it was a sound plan, particularly if the Americans had had their hoped-for grazing period to April 1942. It was also a necessity if Rainbow 5 was to be implemented. When the Japanese started their main attack MacArthur had to revert to plan WPO-3, the withdrawal to Bataan. Rainbow 5 never came to execution.

It is quite popular to claim that the reason for the fall of Bataan was that in MacArthur's new strategy large stocks of fuel, ammunition and food was moved up front and lost there because of the speedy Japanese advance. Stocks that should have been stored on Bataan for an eventual last stand. There are some flaws in that theory. First of all, it is not mentioned specifically in the official history (Morton). At least, I am not able to find it. Secondly, as the approval of the plan was known to MacArthur only in the first part of November, I am hard put to see that much additional supplies could have been moved up. This question mainly centers on the defense of Lingayen Bay. Finally, as I understand it, the original supply plan for Bataan was meant to cater for 30-40.000 defenders. There is differing information on this but some are quoting that more than 100.000 persons moved into Bataan. Considering that rationing was put into effect almost immediately this implies that the actual volume of stocks was at least as much as originally planned. There are other points to be considered. If the Japanese had not been met at Lingayen Bay and held up in constant delaying actions along the central Luzon plain there would have been much less time to evacuate Manila where much of the stocks were kept in the first place. While there were many desertions in the fresh, untrained Philippine army units during the long withdrawal those that finally ended up on Bataan was the hard core, while the Japanese suffered proportionally during their advance. Unknown to the Americans, General Homma's forces were smaller than feared. However, this was for a large part compensated for by their better training even if the divisional core of his Northern army was a relatively fresh one.

No bombers dispatched

The utilization of the strategic bombing part of WPO-5 could hardly have been full-filled without MacArthur's forward defense. But, did he not refuse (disobey) to execute WPO-5? Hardly. To evaluate the information existing on this question one needs to have some understanding of orders, leadership and tactical limitations. This was not a PC game. One should also consider the personal implications of the leaders of the fiasco the Philippine Campaign was seen as back in the US. It was not much different from Pearl Harbor in that respect and it is not very surprising, rather human, really, that the various reports often differs considerably. So, what happened in MacArthur's HQ this morning? A couple of hours after the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor most military installations on the Philippines had been briefed on the actual situation. MacArthur's HQ had received a phone call from Marshall to implement Rainbow 5. The main, offensive, part of this was the use of the bomber force to attack enemy forces and installations. According to General Brereton, he immediately contacted the HQ to get approval for a B-17 raid against the Japanese bases at Formosa. According to him, no approval was forthcoming. As the hours passed Brereton ordered the B-17's in the air to avoid being bombed on the ground at Clark field, their main base, a very prudent decision. In the meantime a reconnaissance flight was dispatched to Formosa. Later in the morning, after another request by Brereton, approval for the raid was given him by Sutherland, MacArthur's Chief-of-Staff. It was to be planned as a dusk raid, reaching the Japanese bases in the last light of the day. A wise move, with the Japanese fighters probably on the ground and their bombers having returned from their missions.

For what it is worth let us look at what the official historian, Morton, writes:

On Brereton's proposal to bomb Formosa, General MacArthur expressed himself most clearly. When Brereton's diaries were published in 1946, MacArthur released a statement to the press recounting in full his recollection of the events of 8 December 1941. The press release, issued on 27 September 1946, read:

"General Brereton never recommended an attack on Formosa to me and I know nothing of such a recommendation having been made .... That it must have been of a most nebulous and superficial character, as no official record exists of it at headquarters. That such a proposal, if intended seriously, should have been made to me in person by him; that he never has spoken of the matter to me either before or after the Clark Field attack. That an attack on Formosa with its heavy concentrations by his small bomber force without fighter support, which because of the great distance involved, was impossible, would have had no chance of success".

Confusing, to say the least but MacArthur states that, in his opinion, to send the bombers into the enemy's lair was not such a good idea. With other words, if a request for this had reached him he would have denied it out of purely tactical reasons. Which isn't to say that the bombers couldn't have flown other missions coming under the label *offensive. Was it Sutherland, MacArthur's grey eminence, who clouded the issue?*

In the meantime the bombers had landed again at Clark field and started bombing-up for the afternoon mission. Somebody had given the order. Then the Japanese struck. With many of the B-17's destroyed on the ground the idea of strategic bombing was permanently switched to one of pure survival. As far as the Rainbow plan goes a major part of it was void by the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor as the main part of it was the transfer of the Pacific Fleet westwards. There, too, the switch was to pure self-defense.

A memorial to the 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts) of the United States Army, in front of the headquarters of the Thirteenth Air Force.

Even if an order was given to implement the bombing part of Rainbow 5 it doesn't necessarily mean that a flight of B-17's should be immediately dispatched out in the blue yonder. A wiser strategy would be to evaluate the situation properly before initiating any rash actions. The wisest would be to have no B-17's at Luzon at all, but on the new base at Mindanao, outside the range of the Formosa-based Japanese bombers and fighters. Some sources say MacArthur had ordered this. General Brereton insists that those B-17's that were transferred before the Japanese attack was on his initiative while others say he reduced on MacArthur's order. Another difference of opinion which include Generals Brereton and Sutherland.

This wasn't really the point. The point was that wherever the US air force aircraft were, they were vulnerable on the ground without a system of solid revetments, camouflage, anti-air defense and warning system. As on Oahu, there were US radar stations on Luzon. At least one was operational on the morning of Dec. 8th but the reports about the approaching Japanese bomber formations were badly handled. Can MacArthur be blamed for this?

He did not refuse to initiate the offensive part of Rainbow 5 he simply wasn't allowed to by his opponent - the Japanese Air Force. That said, a better use of his bomber resources would probably have been to hunt for enemy shipping along the coast, to prevent eventual landings, but according to standard doctrine one did not just send large formations off without any confirmation of valid targets. If a raid had been launched against Formosa, the B-17's might have fared just as badly as on the ground on Clark Field. The first Japanese air raid on Luzon was delayed in the morning due to ground fog on Formosa. A B-17 morning raid could therefore have been a blow in the dark, so to speak. They could have damaged ground installation but not the Japanese flying assets as these were off as soon as the fog lifted. Arriving a little later they might have bumped into their opponents on their way South, or in the opposite direction when going back home. The B-17's based on Clark Field and del Monte on Mindanao in December 1941 was also not the same aircraft that roamed the German skies in 1943 and 1944. They were less armed, less protected, a much easier prey for the Japanese Zero fighters.

Aftermath of the Japanese attack on Clark Field on December 8, 1941.

MacArthur has been reproached for his Air Force's lack of success, that he lost his Air Force. This is a ridiculous claim. His Air Force was as prepared as it could be under the circumstances. The Japanese were expected but the main issue is that MacArthur was not the one to see to it that his Air Force had everything under control or that everything worked according to plan. He could do little with the lack of .50 caliber machine gun ammunition, that weapons were not checked and tested, the machine guns malfunctioned because they were not properly cleaned of the Cosmoline grease they were stored in, or that many of the P-40's had their hydraulic recycling system for the machine guns disconnected due to a general technical problem. That the new P-40E's were not able to reach the altitude at which Japanese bombers were flying or that their only way to escape destruction by the Zeros (Zekes) were to dive away from them, giving the Japanese bombers a free run. When the American pilots first sighted the Zeros they described them as the "mystery fighter" as very little was known about them. MacArthur cannot be blamed for the better Japanese equipment and pilots. He had got the best the US could offer at the time. Responsible to secure the efficient operation of his Air Force was, first and foremost, General Brereton and his staff, group, squadron and airfield commanders. All these had to learn the hard way. A couple of weeks later what few aircraft remained of the Philippine Air Force was operated from protected and well-camouflaged revetments, the airfields strutted with machine guns against low-flying aircraft and dedicated ground crews were stand by round-the-clock to repair runways and parking stands. Improvisations and ingenuity had become the rule of the day rather than the exception. Instead, the pilots and ground crews were organized as infantry in the Bataan perimeter defense as flying activity gradually diminished due to the constant losses, If only…if only…

General MacArthur got his revenge, but applied it gently. He returned. Most of his men did not.

a brief photo history of
GEORGE ORWELL

This photo essay was orginally part of a Historum Book Discussion.

by PEDRO

Baptismal photo of Eric Blair with his mother on Oct. 20, 1903
Orwell Archive, UCL Library Service, Special Collections

George Orwell was Eric Blair's pen name.

ENGLAND
YOUR
ENGLAND
AND OTHER ESSAYS

GEORGE
ORWELL

Eric as a chubbythree-year-old, in standrd sailor suit
Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services, Special Collections

Eric and his sister Avril
with their mother and father, late 1917
(Orwell Archive, UCL Liblary Services, Special Collections)

Left to right: Prosper Buddicom, Guniever Buddicom, Eric Blair (Georgw Orwell) Sept. 1917
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

PENGUIN BOOKS

WHY
I WRITE
—
Political language is
designed to make lies
sound truthful and
murder respectable,
and to give an
appearance of solidity
to pure wind

GEORGE
ORWELL

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TO
WIGAN
PIER
by
GEORGE ORWELL
Author of
Keep the Aspidistra Flying
Burmese Days
A Clergyman's Daughter
Down & Out in Paris & London

THE LION AND
THE UNICORN
SOCIALISM AND THE ENGLISH GENIUS

GEORGE ORWELL

SEARCHLIGHT BOOKS

Jacintha Buddicom
(1901–93)

Neighbor and close friend of Eric Blair during his adolescent years. The two met in 1914 when Eric befriended Jacintha, her brother, Prosper, and her younger sister, Guinever. Jacintha, who was two years older than her friend, shared with him a love of reading.

Their friendship ripened when Eric and his sister spent the Christmas holidays of 1917 and 1918 at the Buddicoms. It was during the 1918 holiday that Eric wrote a love sonnet to Jacintha, an early indication that for him, now 15, the friendship had been transformed into something more.

The Pagan

So here are you and here am I,
Where we may thank our gods to be;
Above the earth, beneath the sky,
Naked souls alive and free.

Dione Venables suggests that "The Pagan" celebrates their first kiss and that for the next three years, "Jacintha was pleasantly attracted to Eric." But that all changed in September 1921, when Jacintha wrote to Eric, relating her shock at being held down by him in an attempt to force her to have sex. She described how he persisted, tearing her skirt and bruising her shoulder and hip. She screamed at him to stop, and he finally desisted. She saw him briefly after that, but he did not spend the summer holidays of the following year with the Buddicoms. Shortly afterward, he left for Burma.

He wrote her three letters from Burma, full of distress and what she felt was self-pity. She answered the first but not the last two. When he returned in 1927, he visited the Buddicoms, but Jacintha was not there. The reason, however, had nothing to do with him. The year before, she had fallen in love and become pregnant, and was later deserted by her lover. The baby was born a few months before Orwell's return. She gave up the baby to her aunt. The baby grew up thinking of her mother as a cousin. Jacintha never married but lived for 30 years as the mistress of "a peer of the realm."

In 1949, when she learned the true identity of the famous writer George Orwell, she wrote to him. He wrote back lovingly and telephoned a number of times. It seemed to her that, as his health worsened, he wanted her to be his son's guardian.

In 1949, Jacintha was very involved with the care of her dying mother and was tormented by the prospect of renewing her relationship with Eric. She attended his funeral in London, sitting alone, unknown to everyone there. In 1974, she published a memoir, Eric & Us, which depicts their relationship as essentially platonic. Her memoir includes a chapter titled "Eric and Sex," which proclaims in effect that the subject never came up.

The revelation of his forcing himself on her surfaced after her death when her sister, Guinever, discovered a copy of the letter written in September 1921. Guinever told the story to their second cousin Dione Venables, who recounted it in a postscript to a new edition of *Eric & Us*, published in 2006.

Jacintha Buddicom, a bridesmaid at a family wedding, September 1918

Eric Blair (George Orwell) at Eton
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Police training school in Mandalay, Burma, 1922 Orwell is in the rear woe, third from the left.
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Eileen O'Shaughnessy Blair's visit to the Argon front, March 1937. Orwell is standing slightly behind and to her left. The kneeling rifleman wearing a beret is American Harry milton.
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

George Orwell's identity card photo, September 1938
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Barnhill, Orwell's home on the island of jura in the Hebrides, located off the coast of northern Scotland
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

George Orwell at Canonbury Square, 1946
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Independent Labour Party summer school, Letchworth in Herdfordshire, England, August 1937. Left to right: John McNair, Douoglas Moyle, Stafford Cottman, George Orwell, and Jock Branchwaite.
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

George Orwell's 1943 National Union of journalists card
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Hôpital cochin, the Parisian hospital where Orwell was confined for two weeks with influenza in 1929, an experience he described in the essay 'How the Poor Die'. (photo by William Herman)

Members of POUM (Partido Obrero de Unification Marxisti unit assembled at the Lenin barracks in Barcelona, Spain, January 1937. Orwell is partially obscured in the extreme rear.
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

Blair pictured in a passport photo
during his Burma years

Orwell's press card portrait,
taken in 1933

"When I came to Spain, and for some time afterwards, I was not only uninterested in the political situation but unaware of it. I knew there was a war on, but I had no notion what kind of a war. If you had asked me why I had joined the militia I should have answered: 'To fight against Fascism and if you had asked me what I was fighting for,

I should have answered: "Common decency." I had accepted the News Chronical-New Statesman version of the war as the defence of civilization against a maniacal outbreak by an army of Colonel Blimps in the pay of Hitler. The revolutionary atmosphere of Barcelona had attracted me deeply, but I had made no attempt to understand it."

George Orwell with his adopted son Richard at home in Islington.

As a small child Richard Blair was unaware that his father was seriously ill.

"There was never anything other than love from him," he reflects. "He thought into the future about what would happen were he not to survive — the arrangements he made for my welfare were carefully thought out."

"Sonia Brownell was born in Calcutta in 1918. Her father died when she was four; her stepfather took to the bottle, and when the family eventually returned to England, her mother made ends meet by managing boarding-houses. Sonia was sent to the Sacred Heart Convent in Roehampton: she loathed it - so much so that in later life she spat if she passed a nun in the street - and if her Catholic education instilled habits of loyalty and service to others, it also exacerbated feelings of guilt and inadequacy. She left at 17 and, after learning French in Switzerland, did the obligatory secretarial course.

She was, by now, a voluptuous Renoir beauty, blonde, strong-featured and pink-and-white: even then, judging by the photographs, she seldom looked happy. She fell in with the painters of the Euston Road School - William Coldstream and Victor Pasmore among them - for whom she acted as model and mistress. But although the 'Euston Road Venus' was to befriend and champion young artists like Francis Bacon and Lucian Freud, books and writers were her passion, and her consolation."

- Christopher Hitchens, reviewing Hilary Spurlings book aout Brownell -

Sonia Brownell, Orwell's second wife and controversial keeper of his flame
Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections

THE GIRL FROM THE FICTION DEPARTMENT

A PORTRAIT OF SONIA ORWELL

'Absorbing. Gallantly sets out to right a wrong and solve a mystery, triumphantly succeeding in both objectives' Literary Review

HILARY SPURLING

PENGUIN BOOKS

Richard Lodowick Edward Montagu Rees,
the son of Sir John Rees and Mary Catherine Dormer, was born on 4th April, 1900.

Rees was educated at Eton College and Trinity College. He later recalled: "Without intending any disrespect to the great university, or to Eton, where I had studied from 1914 to 1918, or to my parents, I attribute it to a kindly providence rather than to any of them that I was not recognisably a cretin. Emerging from a disharmonious family background, I was certainly a lamentable milksop; I was a mathematical dunce, which had seemed to worry nobody at Eton; I was slightly above the average in most other subjects."

His father died in 1922 and he inherited the baronetcy. Rees became an attache at the British Embassy in Berlin. In 1924 he became a socialist and joined the Labour Party. He later recalled that he believed "with moronic simplicity" that he could help change society. However, that it "was no more than a symptom of my own maladjustment." The following year he was appointed as a lecturer at the Worker's Educational Association in London.

Richard Rees, Orwell's good friend and benefactor during the lean years of the depression
(Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections)

George Orwell's gravestone in All Saints' Churchyard
in the village of Sutton Courtney, Berkshire, England
Orwell Archive, UCL Library Services. Special Collections

The simple tombstone inscription "Eric Arthur Blair"
(he left instruction that it bear only his birth name and dates)
is undoubtedly a reflection of the author's aversion to the spotlight,
but lurking beyond it may have been a glimmer or recognition that,
although Eric Blair was dead and buried,
George Orwell was alive and well.

James McNeill Whistler Dies in London

By THE NEW YORK TIMES July 18, 1903

LONDON, July 18.--James Abbott McNeil Whistler, the celebrated American artist, died yesterday afternoon at his residence, 74 Cheyne Walk, Chelsea, at the age of sixty-nine years. His death came unexpectedly, although for some time he had been seriously ill.

This morning's papers publish elaborate obituary notices, recognizing the distinguished and unique personality of Whistler, whose genius greatly dominated European art of the present generation. While admitting that it is a question for posterity to decide his exact position as a painter, it is generally conceded that he was a consummate etcher.

The Daily Telegraph says:
"It may safely be prophesied that the light of his genius will but burn the brighter when his self-asserted individuality has been a little forgotten or, at any rate, obscured."

The Daily Chronicle says:
"It is mortifying to think that there is no example of his work in the public galleries of London, where he lived and worked for so many years."

It is twenty-five years since the famous case, "Whistler versus Ruskin," was tried. In the history of art it might be two hundred years, so completely has the point of view of the critics and the public changed, so completely has the brilliant genius of the man whom Ruskin called a "coxcomb" been vindicated.

And yet, even now, there are no standards by which one can judge his work, by which one can form an estimate of his true place in the ranks of the world's great artists. That he is among them is not doubted; just how high up among them is not so clear. It is only once or twice in a century that the originator of a new style in art or literature appears, and it takes at least a century for the world to recover from the dazed condition into which it is thrown by such a man's work.

James Abbott McNeill Whistler was a native of Lowell, Mass., where he was born in 1834. He was, therefore, nearly seventy years old at the time of his death, which will probably be a surprising fact to most people, for if ever a man lived whose manner and behavior conveyed the impression of youth, it was he. Details in regard to his early life are not easily ascertained.

His father and his elder brother were among the engineers who developed the great Russian railway system, and James was taken to Russia when he was a child. He returned to this country when he was twelve years old, and later he entered West Point. "If salicylate had been a gas I should have been a soldier," he once said, in referring to his failure to pass his examination at the Military Academy. It was extremely lucky for the art world that salicylate is not a gas.

At West Point one can see to this day a painting which Whistler executed when was a cadet there. There is nothing remarkable about it, even viewed in the favorable light which a knowledge of the artist's after achievements suggests. Later on, however, when Whistler was connected with the Coast Survey, he engraved many a fancy head and landscape at the side of his more formal topographic work (which habit led to the severing of his connection with that branch of the United States Government) that exhibited great mastery of the graver and extraordinary promise.

In 1855 Whistler went to England, and shortly afterward moved to Paris, and studied under Gleyre, who was a painter of classic and early Christian subjects in the Neo-Greek style. Needless to say, one looks in vain in Whistler's work for any trace of Gleyre's teaching.
There are no means of tracing the gradual growth of the "Whistler manner" in the artist's work. A portrait of himself which he etched in 1859 is in existence, and shows almost all the characteristics of his later productions. The year it was executed he began to exhibit at the Royal Academy, and four years later he settled in London.

It was in 1863 that Whistler's first famous painting was executed. It was the exquisite "Femme Blanche," now known as the "Symphony in White, No. 1: The White Girl." Nowadays it is hard to believe that it was rejected at the Salon. Such, however, was the case, though the painting, when shown at the Salon des Refuses, made a great sensation in the art world of Paris. In the next ten years some of the artist's best known masterpieces were painted, including the portrait of Carlyle and the "Portrait de Ma Mere." It was only poetical justice that the latter picture should have been bought for the Luxembourg.

From the time he settled in London Whistler's output of work was remarkable. One painting after another now regarded as a chef d'oeuvre was produced. Merely to catalogue them all would take up considerable space. The "Sarasate," the "Lady Meux," the "Harmony in Gray and Green: The Ocean," the "Falling Rocket," the "Miss Alexander," the "Symphony in White No. 3"--each title conveys to the art lover familiar with the master's work an impression of tender color, exquisite line, fluency of modeling, and refined tone values. And at the same time Whistler was producing etchings, which collectors now seek as eagerly as those of Rembrandt or Meryon, and which would have made his reputation had he never held a palette in his hand.

Of Whistler the wit, the maker of paradoxes, the epigrammist, the master of the "gentle art of making enemies," it is perhaps unnecessary to speak. The general public is quite familiar with his achievements in this direction, and for a long time was under the mistaken impression that it was all done for self-advertising. It is safe to say that this side of his career will be forgotten. His work will remain.

END

"creativity is the sudden cessation of stupidity."
-edwin land